CHRISTIAN EDUCATION AND CREATIVE CONFLICT: RELATIONS BETWEEN CREATIVE INTRAPSYCHIC CONFLICT AS UNDERSTOOD IN LUTHER'S EXPERIENCE AND THEOLOGY AND AS UNDERSTOOD IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES WITH CONCLUSIONS FOR CHRISTIAN EDUCATION PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE.

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ABSTRACT

It is the hypothesis of this dissertation that Luther's Anfechtungen and the resulting theological understandings are an expression of on-going creative intrapsychic conflict and conflict resolution and that an understanding of the conditions, content and process of that creative conflict yields conclusions directly related to Christian Education principles and practice. In order to demonstrate that Luther's Anfechtungen are indeed creative intrapsychic conflicts, social psychological theories dealing with such conflicts are investigated and correlated with Luther's experience and theology. The method of correlation utilizes a common unit of experience at a single level of understanding. Commonalities and differences between the positions are pointed out in order to maintain the integrity of each position. The common unit of experience is that of creative intrapsychic conflict with its stages of conflict, resignation, insight and interpretation. This experience is correlated at the descriptive-experiential level in contrast to the theoretical-interpretive level. Three groups of social psychological theorists are selected and correlated with Luther. The three groups are comprised of cognitive consistency theorists (cognitive balance, cognitive congruity, belief congruence, cognitive dissonance, social judgment-involvement), developmental theorists (Erik Erikson and Jean Piaget), and a broadly defined group of holistic theorists (Ernst Kris, Lawrence Kubie, Harold Rugg,

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and Arthur Koestler). The explanatory power of each of these groups is determined on the basis of criteria drawn from Luther at the required descriptive-experiential level. The criteria demand that a social psychological position must take into account two frames of reference, explain the dynamics of the _Anfechtungen_ and their resolution, help in understanding the length of time involved in resolving the _Anfechtungen_ and their recurrence, allow for resolutions that hold opposites in tension, and maintain the integrity of Luther's experience and theology.

The hypothesis that Luther's experience and theology are an expression of on-going creative intrapsychic conflict is demonstrated by the commonalities found between Luther and the holistic theorists, especially Arthur Koestler. Koestler's concept of matrices governed by codes which control the strategies within them, his process of the creative act through a blocked situation, period of incubation, bisociation of matrices, and period of verification, his allowances for premature integrations, partial blindness to one's own creations, conditions of ripeness, and gradual integrations, as well as the holding of opposites in tension through bisociation of matrices, correlates well with Luther. However, Koestler, along with all the other theorists, is unable to maintain the integrity of Luther's experience of God. Supplementary data from Langdon Gilkey and Ian Ramsey shows that the revelatory experience of God and the language used to express that experience are self-authenticating.

Methodological inquiry into the method of correlation and its results indicates that a common unit of experience is used at a single level of understanding but that, among the philosophical assumptions of the two positions, only the epistemological is shared and not the ontological or axiological. Thus the study is multidisciplinary rather than interdisciplinary.

Conclusions for Christian Education principles and practice are drawn from the results of the correlation. The most important principle is that of a learning process involving the steps of conflict, resignation, insight and interpretation. Principles of timing, personnel, context, scope and purpose related to the process are spelled out along with an organizing principle for curriculum development. An examination of other Lutheran educators and curricula reveals that they, for the most part, do not use the principles implicit in Luther's experience and theology.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The basic reason for writing this dissertation is to arrive at an understanding of Luther's experience and its resulting theology. Luther's basic theological statements are couched in dialectical terms. Such dialectical statements, e.g., law and Gospel, are an expression of the creative resolutions resulting from his Anfechtungen, Luther's conflicts with God. It is the hypothesis of this dissertation that Luther's Anfechtungen and the resulting theological understandings are an expression of on-going creative intrapsychic conflict and conflict resolution and that an understanding of the conditions, content, and process of that creative conflict yields conclusions directly related to Christian Education principles and practice. Such conclusions are of special interest to Christian educators in the Lutheran tradition. A glance at past principles and practice of Christian Education in the Lutheran Church shows that conclusions derived from Luther's experience and theology have not been utilized.

Luther himself insisted that experiences like his Anfechtungen were the only valid way of coming to 'know" God in faith. Such Anfechtungen were occasioned by his attempts to resolve his conflicts with a seemingly implacable God. The conflicts were unresolvable within the framework of the medieval theology in which he had been schooled. Over the years Luther acquired a different, more Biblical, theological frame of reference. Then his Anfechtungen began to result in new insights gained from associations made between the old and the new theological frames of reference. The solutions he arrived at were creative because they were new connections between old and new theological frames of reference rather than solutions confined by the old theological system, a restriction which had always hampered his predecessors. The Anfechtungen and their creative solutions occurred over a period of time. But even when the solutions came, they had to be continually strengthened. The Anfechtungen continued, precipitated by old theological assumptions, troubling circumstances, and strong challenges to Luther's theological position. All of these elements give some indication of the conditions precipitating his Anfechtungen and the content involved in them. The process of the Anfechtungen can also be indicated. It can be broken down into four stages: the active struggle with God; passive resignation in the face of the insoluble problem; the arrival of an unsuspected solution; and the long-range theological interpretation of the new insights and solutions.

In order to support the hypothesis that Luther's Anfechtungen and the resulting theology were indeed creative intrapsychic conflicts and to help in understanding the conditions, content and process involved in the conflicts, it is necessary to investigate other studies of creative conflict and correlate them with Luther's experience. Such understandings make it possible to arrive at conclusions which are applicable to Christian Education principles and practice. Otherwise, Luther's experience remains locked in its historical context as an interesting case study but has no application to present and future educational endeavors. The studies chosen for correlation with Luther are in the broad field of social psychology. Many of the studies and their resulting theories do not adequately explain the conditions, content and process of Luther's experience. But one of them is most helpful in understanding Luther even though that theory also has a limitation. This is not surprising since a correlation between a theological point of view and a social psychological one cannot be completely compatible without reducing one into the terms of the other. The method of correlation must be such that the individual disciplines, the theological and the social psychological, maintain their own integrity while at the same time mutually informing and enriching one another. Such a method of correlation is proposed.

Before presenting a method of correlation, a theory for relating theology and social psychology, the criteria for determining the adequacy of such a method or theory are set forth. This is done by indicating the components of a methodological inquiry into theories or methods for relating theology and any of the behavioral sciences.

Figure 1 presents the components for such an inquiry.[1]

Methodological inquiry raises questions about the adequacy of a theory on the basis of philosophical assumptions on the one hand and about the validity of the theory on the basis of its relation to facts on the other hand. The components of theory, methodology, and philosophical assumptions are suggested by Talcott Parsons. He proposes that theory be

> confined to the formulation and logical interrelation of propositions containing empirical facts in direct relation to the observation of the facts and thus empirical verification of the propositions.[2]

In this paper theory is a proposition or method indicating the relation between theology and any of the behavioral sciences. Methodological inquiry comes in when

> we ask whether on general grounds, apart from the specific facts involved, such a procedure can lead to valid results, or is our impression of their validity illusory. The testing of scientific theory on this level is the task of methodology.[3]

Parsons indicates that such testing leads into philosophical

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[1] Cf., Robert L. Conrad, "Theories for Relating Theology and the Behavioral Sciences: A Position Paper" (Unpublished paper in the possession of the author, July, 1970), for the basic material regarding this mode of methodological inquiry

[2] Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: The Free Press, 1937), p. 24.

[3] Ibid.


Unit of Phenomenal Experience
Method
Theory
Philosophical Assumptions
Methodological Inquiry
Correspondence
Coherence
Function
Epistemological
Ontological
Axiological

Figure 1. Methodological Inquiry

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considerations.

> For among the grounds, real or alleged, for believing or disbelieving in the validity of scientific procedure, there will be some of a philosophical order, which must be philosophically considered.[4]

There are less exact ways of viewing methodological inquiry than that of Parsons. Abraham Kaplan collapses theory into method when he says,

> Methods include such procedures as forming concepts and hypotheses, making observations and measurements, performing experiments, building models and theories, providing explanations and making predictions.[5]

He states that the aim of methodology is

> to describe and analyze these methods, throwing light on their limitations and resources, clarifying their presuppositions and consequences, relating their potentialities to the twilight zone at the frontiers of knowledge. In sum, the aim of methodology is to help us understand, in the broadest possible terms, not the products of scientific inquiry but the process itself.[6]

With the scope of methodological inquiry clarified, the specific criteria can be examined. Neither Parsons nor Kaplan includes a common unit of phenomenal experience as one of the criteria. However, it is vital to the relation between theology and the behavioral sciences to determine whether or not the two disciplines, or representative positions in each, are examining the same phenomenon and thus share a common base from which to begin their respective interpretations of human experience. This is the first and most important of the criteria. Turning to the philosophical assumptions, they can be broken down into the epistemological, the ontological and the axiological. Epistemological assumptions have to do with how one knows. How does one come by knowledge and how can he be sure it is true?[7] In this inquiry the question needs to be raised as to the possibility of a common epistemology for theology and the behavioral sciences or is there such a distinct and unalterable difference in knowing between the two that there is no such possibility? Ontological assumptions have to do with the nature of being. One aspect of the ontological question is the question of what is real. In this regard one can ask of theology and the behavioral sciences make the same claim as to what is real.[8] Axiological assumptions have to do with the values of life.[9]

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[4] Ibid., p. 25.

[5] Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p. 21.

[6] Ibid.

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[7] J. Donald Butler, Four Philosophies: And Their Practice in Education and Religion (Third edition; New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 13.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 21. Butler defines ontology as the question of what is meant by existence. "What is real?" is Butler's question for metaphysics. But here metaphysics is taken to mean the end result of a philosophy encompassing the areas of epistemology, ontology, and axiology.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

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Is it possible for theology and the behavioral sciences to share the same values when the behavioral discipline restricts itself to the description of religious phenomena and makes no judgment about its validity while theology values religious experience and makes judgments about the validity of certain types of experience? The questions raised in connection with each of these assumptions are answered in connection with the method of correlation which is proposed.

The other direction in which to look in methodological inquiry is the direction of the relation of theory to facts. Abraham Kaplan proposes that the validity of a theory be questioned in terms of the relation of the theory to facts through the norms of correspondence, coherence, and function. The first norm, correspondence, is the most important.

> We say that a theory is true if it 'fits the facts,' that is, if the predictions made on the basis of the theory are in fact fulfilled. . . . We may say that what counts is the range of facts that the theory takes into account, and especially their heterogeneity.[10]

In this paper correspondence refers to the adequacy of the theory or method for relating theology and the behavioral sciences in accounting for the commonalities and differences that exist between the disciplines as well as in accounting for the facts of the phenomenon under scrutiny

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[10] Kaplan, p. 313.

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by both. A second norm is that of coherence. Coherence has to do with how well the theory fits into the established body of theory.[11] This means that a theory must not only fit its own facts but also fit into other established theory and facts. Kaplan warns, however, that this is a conservative principle. It is meant to prevent the establishment of the validity of a theory in isolation from the rest of theory. But it must not be held too rigidly or it prevents breakthroughs into new areas of understanding. Coherence can also be applied to theory in terms of simplicity, i.e., the simpler the theory the more vulnerable it is to falsification. A complex theory can have so many qualifications that nothing can falsify it. Its validity can then be called into question.. In the present inquiry the question must be asked to what extent the proposed theory agrees or disagrees with other theological and behavioral positions. The final norm of validation is that of function. This, according to Kaplan, is a pragmatic norm. It has to do with how the theory guides and stimulates the on-going process of scientific inquiry. "From this standpoint, the value of theory lies not only in the answers it gives but also in the new questions it raises,"[12] Thus a determination has to be made as to how

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[11] Ibid., p. 314.

[12] Ibid., p. 319.

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well the proposed theory functions in promoting further inquiry into the relation between theology and any of the behavioral sciences.

By way of summary, then, methodological inquiry into a theory or method purporting to relate theology and the behavioral sciences takes into account a common unit of phenomenal experience, the philosophical assumptions regarding epistemology, ontology, and axiology, and, of lesser importance, the norms of correspondence, coherence, and function. Guiding the inquiry are two major principles. The first is that each discipline must be allowed to retain its own integrity so that it is not reduced to the terms of the other or either of them reduced to the terms of a third. The second principle is that, though the disciplines must retain their integrity, there must be some commonalities between them or they cannot be related at all. The more commonalities that can be posited the closer the relation between the two disciplines approaches an 'inter-disciplinary' status. Thus the theory or method of correlation proposed in this chapter must be analyzed in terms of the commonalities it assumes in the unit of phenomenal experience and in philosophical assumptions.

The theory or method of correlation utilized in this dissertation is one which has been adapted from James Loder. The following statement is the base upon which the method is constructed.

> A method which confines correlation to a single level of understanding and employs functional analogues between typological categories will be able to maintain the integrity of concepts employed in both disciplines and at the same time establish a continuity of meaning and a deepening of insight across the boundaries of the respective disciplines.[13]

The 'single level of understanding' referred to in the above statement involves two steps: (a) the determination of a concept or dynamic (i.e., a unit of phenomenal experience) common to both positions; and (b) the determination of a level of understanding common to both positions. In the first instance, the dynamic common to both positions in this dissertation is that of creative intrapsychic conflict. The conditions, content and process of the conflict are considered. The four stages of the process are, in general: (1) conscious conflict; (2) 'giving up' on solving the conflict; (3) sudden insight; and (4) interpretation of the new insight. The second aspect of a single level of understanding refers to the level of abstraction which is used in correlating the positions. Each position, whether theological or social psychological, has its theoretical terminology by which it interprets certain phenomena in human experience. This level of interpretation can be called a secondary level of abstraction. It is rarely possible to correlate positions exclusively at this level without reducing one position or discipline to the terms of the other. There is, however, a primary level of description of phenomena which precedes the more formal level of interpretation. This level can be referred to as the experiential level. It is at the descriptive-experiential level that the correlation between positions is carried out. There is little difficulty in presenting data on both levels from Luther. Though much of the data is theological (theoretical-interpretive level) in nature, Luther does provide many descriptions of his experience (descriptive-experiential level), especially in regard to his Anfechtungen. The social psychological positions present more difficulty in supplying data at both levels. All of them present theory at the theoretical-interpretive level but often they do not adequately describe the experience on which the theory is based. When such descriptive-experiential data is available it is included, if not in the body of the text, then in an appendix. Where the descriptive-experiential data is not available it must be inferred.

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[13] James E. Loder, "The Nature of Religious Consciousness in the Writings of Sigmund Freud and Søren Kierkegaard" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1962), p. 32.

The third step in the method of correlation is the selection and presentation of positions which deal with the common dynamic. The theological position presented in this dissertation is that of Martin Luther. The behavioral positions are from the field of social psychology. There are several theorists in social psychology who deal with intrapsychic conflict. All of them have made controlled studies or careful observation of cases in order to support their theories. The theorists fall into three broad categories.

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1. Cognitive Consistency Theorists. These theorists deal with intrapsychic conflict and its resolution at the cognitive level. The theories treated are those of cognitive balance, cognitive congruity, belief congruence, cognitive dissonance, and social judgment-involvement.

2. Developmental Theorists. Intrapsychic conflict is an on-going process in human growth and development. The understanding of conflict in the theories of Erik Erikson and Jean Piaget are treated in this category.

3. Holistic Theorists. Intrapsychic conflict involves the full range of personality. Following Nevitt Sanford, theorists who deal with all levels of the personality in an integrated way are placed into the broad category of 'holistic' theorists. Included in this category are Ernst Kris, Lawrence Kubie, Harold Rugg, and Arthur Koestler.[14]

The fourth and last step in the method of correlation is the indication of the functional analogies, or commonalities, and differences between the theological and social psychological positions in their understanding of intrapsychic conflict. This is done at the end of each category of theorists. Though each social psychological theorist has some commonalities with the theological position, one of them has the greatest commonality and thus best helps in understanding the conditions, content and process of Luther's intrapsychic conflict.

The final chapter includes several conclusions and distinctions. The first section presents conclusions on how well the method of correlation meets the criteria of the methodological inquiry set forth in this introductory chapter. This includes how adequate the method is in allowing each position to maintain its integrity. It also includes decisions on how well the method utilizes a common unit of phenomenal experience, what the philosophical assumptions are that guided the inquiry and how adequately it takes into account the norms of correspondence, coherence and function. Finally, a conclusion is drawn concerning how close the method comes to being an interdisciplinary one.

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[14] Nevitt Sanford, Issues in Personality Theory (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1970), p. 76.

The second section deals with the conclusions stemming from the functional analogies, or commonalities, and differences between Luther and the social psychological position which best correlates with his position.

The third section draws on the previous conclusions concerning creative conflict in a theological context and presents principles of Christian Education which can serve as guides to practice.

The fourth and last section indicates how the above principles differ from the conclusions of men like Lloyd Sheneman and Stephen Schmidt who have dealt with the relation of Lutheran theology to educational principles. It also indicates how those principles differ from certain past and present principles of Christian Education in Lutheran Churches.

CHAPTER II

LUTHER

Introduction to the Treatment of Luther

As stated in the first chapter, Luther's dialectical theology is an expression of the creative solutions resulting from his Anfechtungen. This chapter begins with Luther's testimony to the importance of Anfechtung for faith and theology. The definition of what Luther meant by Anfechtung is also included.

Since his Anfechtungen were occasioned by Luther's attempts to resolve his conflicts with a seemingly implacable God and those conflicts were insoluble within the framework of medieval theology, it is important to present the theology which Luther had originally learned. Following the presentation of medieval theology the new, more Biblical, theology which Luther acquired is outlined. The new theological framework made it possible for him to gain new insights through intersections between the old and the new theologies. The presentation of this historical and theological context relies mostly on secondary sources.

After the historical and theological context is set Luther's Anfechtungen are presented in the sequence in which they occurred. Luther himself is the primary source for the description of his Anfechtungen and their outcomes. The necessary data for correlation at the descriptive-experiential level is supplied in this way. Secondary sources are used to relate Luther's Anfechtungen to the historical and theological context. The sources help in providing a greater understanding of the conditions which occasioned the Anfechtungen and the meaning of the results for Luther's further development.

The succeeding section deals with the fact that the solutions to Luther's Anfechtungen were gradual in coming and that, even though he arrived at creative solutions, he continued to grow through the experience of recurring Anfechtungen. Luther's creative theological insights did not occur all at once. There were incomplete attempts at resolving his Anfechtungen over a period of years. The scholarly dispute over the date of the experience to which Luther referred in 1545 indicates that Luther's basic reformation insight was the culmination of a number of inadequate and incomplete attempts at solution. But even when Luther had arrived at creative solutions to his major Anfechtungen, they continued to recur. Challenges to his theological position, troubling circumstances, and reversions to old ways of thinking brought back the Anfechtungen. But the overcoming of the Anfechtungen made for growth. Growth occurred as the conscience, which, for Luther, was the center of man's being, became more and more controlled by the Gospel. Growth also meant the acknowledgement of God as the source of Anfechtungen in order to cause more growth in faith.

After the presentation of the Anfechtungen, their gradual solutions and life-long recurrence, Luther's theological interpretations of his creative insights are discussed. They are presented in a two-fold division; how Luther viewed man in the sight of God and God in relation to man.

Finally, there is an analysis of the conditions causing the Anfechtungen and their recurrence, the theological content and the stages of the process of the Anfechtungen. The analysis provides the characteristics of Luther's experience which can be correlated with the social psychological positions. The characteristics provide criteria to determine which of the latter positions most closely correlates with and explains Luther's experience.

The Importance of Anfechtung for Faith and Theology

There is little doubt that Luther ascribed great importance to his Anfechtungen and their influence on his faith and theology. In fact, he once expressed the desire to write a book that would emphasize, not just the importance, but the necessity of such Anfechtungen for the theologian and for the Christian in general.

> If I should live for a while, I want to write a book about temptations (Anfechtungen), without which a man cannot understand either Scripture

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> or the fear and love of God; yes, he cannot know what the Spirit (Geist) is.[1]

Erich Vogelsang regarded this statement of Luther's as having such significance that he reprinted it on the flyleaf of his book, Der Angefochtene Christus bei Luther.[2] This conviction was deeply rooted in Luther's own experience for it was out of his personal Anfechtung that his faith and theology came. In 1532 he said,

> I didn't learn my theology all at once. I had to ponder over it ever more deeply, and my spiritual trials (tentationes; Anfechtungen) were of help to me in this, for one does not learn anything without practice.[3]

The practice he refers to is the experience of being challenged and deeply troubled in one's faith. He went on to say that the spiritualists and sects lacked that experience and made claims about the authenticity of their Christian faith on the basis of pleasant experiences. While at the Wartburg in 1522, he advised Melanchthon to test the authenticity of the spiritualists.

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[1] Martin Luther, Tischreden, in D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus, 1913), 4. Band, 4777. Hereafter the Weimar edition of the Tischreden will be referred to as TR, followed by the volume in Roman numerals and the item in Arabic numerals, e.g., TR IV, 4777.

[2] Erich Vogelsang, Der Angefochtene Christus bei Luther (Berlin and Leipzig: Verlag von Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1932).

[3] Martin Luther, Table Talk, in Luther's Works, edited by Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 54, 50. Hereafter the American edition of Luther's Works will be referred to as LW, followed by the volume and page in Arabic numerals, e.g., LW 54, 50.

> In order to explore their individual spirit too, you should inquire whether they have experienced spiritual distress and the divine birth, death, and hell. If you should hear that all (their experiences) are pleasant, quiet, devout (as they say) and spiritual, then don't approve of them, even if they should say that they were caught up to the third heaven. The sign of the Son of Man is then missing, which is the only touchstone of Christians and a certain differentiator between the spirits. Do you want to know the place, time, and manner of (true) conversation with God? Listen: "Like a lion has he broken all my bones," "I am cast out from before your eyes," "My soul is filled with grief, and my life has approached hell." The (Divine) Majesty (as they call it) does not speak in such a direct way to man that man could (actually) see it; but rather, "Man shall not see me and live." (Our) nature cannot bear even a small glimmer of God's (direct) speaking. As a result God speaks through men (indirectly), because not all can endure his speaking. The angel frightened even the Virgin, and also Daniel. And Jeremiah pleads, "Correct me (O Lord) but in just measure," and, "Be not a terror to me." Why should I say more? As if the (Divine) Majesty could speak familiarly with the Old Adam without first killing him and drying him out so that his horrible stench would not be so foul, since God is a consuming fire! The dreams and visions of the saints are horrifying, too, at least after they are understood. Therefore examine (them) and do not even listen if they speak of the glorified Jesus, unless you have first heard of the crucified Jesus.[4]

Luther is saying that such people want a theology of glory rather than a theology of the cross, a distinction which will be discussed at greater length later.

Since Anfechtung is so vital to the 'knowing' of God in faith and for an adequate theology, it is important to understand how Luther defined Anfechtung. Luther used the German word Anfechtung to translate the Latin word tentatio. A more appropriate German word for tentatio would have been

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[4] LW 48, 366-367.

Versuchung. Versuchung connotes subjection to a test while Anfechtung has the connotation of an attack or an assault.[5] C. Warren Hovland gives an even more precise definition.

> Jacob Grimm in the Deutsches Worterbuch explains that the word comes from the middle-high German word for "bodily-struggle." The base of the word, fechten, means "combat," "struggle," or "attack." In theological usage the word is often translated "temptation." However, it is interesting to note that Luther prefers the word Anfechtung to Versuchung even in his translation and explanation of the sixth petition of the Lord's Prayer.[6]

Hovland's own short and precise definition of Anfechtung is "the terror the individual feels in the moment he is confronted with some dark aspect of God."[7] Anfechtung, then, is not a doctrinal concept but a spiritual experience of struggle with God out of which comes creative theological insight. In order to understand what occasioned Luther's Anfechtung it is necessary to turn to the historical and theological context in which it arose.

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[5] Lennart Pinomaa, Faith Victorious: An Introduction to Luther's Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), p. 90.

[6] C. Warren Hovland, "Anfechtung in Luther's Biblical Exegesis," in Reformation Studies: Essays in Honor of Roland H. Bainton, edited by Franklin H. Littell (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1962), p. 46.

[7] Ibid., p. 48.

The Historical and Theological Context of Luther's Early Thought

One of the earliest and most significant theologians for Luther was Augustine. Augustine emphasized the absolute sovereignty of God. God had an infinite number of choices, a _potentia absoluta_, as to how he might create the world and man. The final choice which God made, the _potentia ordinata_, was the ordained plan which now exists. No man has the right to question the order of things since it was ordained by God. Man, the greatest creation of God, fell into sin. After the fall, according to Augustine, the human race was divided into two classes: (a) the elect and; (b) the lost. The members of the two classes were chosen from all eternity by God according to His divine purpose. Salvation was entirely a gift of God. God's grace was active only in the elect. There was nothing the lost could do to change their fate. It remained forever hidden in the ultimate purpose of God.[8]

Those who were to be saved were in need of preparation by God's divine grace. The preliminary work of favorably disposing the elect toward God's saving purpose was accomplished by the _gratia praeveniens_. Such prevenient grace changed the inner being of man so that he was now ready to co-operate with God. Thus he reached the level of the gratia co-operans, the grace of God which assisted a man to accept Christ by faith so that he could become a recipient of the fullness of God's saving grace. At this point the process of justification began. But, according to Ernest Schwiebert, Augustine's doctrine of justification was weak.

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[8] Ernest G. Schwiebert, _Luther and His Times: The Reformation from a New Perspective_ (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950), pp. 158-159.

> One of the great weaknesses in Augustine's theology was that he never learned to distinguish in true Pauline fashion between justification and sanctification. In his thinking, justification was not a forensic act, not the declaration of the forgiveness by God of all the sinner's sins and guilt because of faith in Christ's suffering and atoning death; but rather justification was a lifelong process, a gradual reparation of the soul by the inpouring of God's grace. Through Baptism there occurred a remission of original sin, but man was not justified nor certain of his salvation until the end of his life. The terrifying aspect of this whole plan of salvation was that it applied only to the elect. For the lost, whose state was already determined, there was no hope whatever.[9]

During the succeeding centuries theologians departed from Augustine and began to stress more and more the ability of human reason to solve the mysteries of theology. But at the time of the English Schoolman, Duns Scotus (died 1308), there was a denial of the ability of reason to solve all mysteries. Biblical revelation was given a more prominent place and an emphasis was placed on 'will'. This Nominalistic school of thought, of which Occam and Biel were followers, had great influence on Luther since he was taught this point of view at the University of Erfurt. God, in his ultimate being, was thought of as will. God exercised his free will in determining, out of all the possible choices, what the order of the world should be. And, according to this thesis, the Roman Church was also here because God willed it so. Thus man was to follow the *ordo salutis* of the Roman Church.

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[9] Ibid., pp. 159-160.

Scotus believed that man had only lost his 'supernatural righteousness' through the Fall. There remained in man a 'synteresis', a faculty of the will which enabled man, however feebly, to will the good.[10] There was also a tendency toward evil in man. This was labelled as 'concupiscence'. It was not sin itself but only the 'tinder of sin' which must be yielded to in order to become actual sin.[11] Thus man also had free will, just as did God. Man had sufficient free will to refrain from evil and at least attain 'attrition', that is, dread over sin. An act of free will, such as attrition, produced the merit of fitness (*meritum de congruo*). It was just for God to reward this merit by imparting grace. Grace, for Scotus, was the *habitus* of love, infused in man and added to his will. This made man's works more meritorious in the sight of God, especially man's active righteousness or love of God. Now man had reached the level of worthiness (*meritum de condigno*). God must therefore reward these works commensurately with the fullness of the saving grace in Christ.[12] Thus, works could be done before grace according to man's free will in order to merit grace. Then grace was added to man's will in order to produce works of even greater merit. An understanding of this theological system is crucial to an understanding of Luther's spiritual Anfechtung. He found that he could not meet the demand of works without grace, much less reach the level of works with grace. Scotus' teaching also played a part in Luther's predestination Anfechtung. Since God had established all things according to His will and it was His will that grace should be given only to the elect, the matter of salvation was God's arbitrary decision.[13]

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[10] E. Gordon Rupp, *The Righteousness of God* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1953), p. 150.

[11] John von Rohr, "The Sources of Luther's Self-Despair in the Monastery," *The Journal of Bible and Religion*, XIX (January 1951), 9.

William Occam, the pupil of Duns Scotus, also held that man can prepare the way for God's saving grace. Man, in his free will, is capable of doing good by himself, even to the point of achieving a real contrition, or heartfelt sorrow over sin. By his own determination man could reach the level of the meritum de congruo which would cause God to come to his assistance and with this co-operating grace he could win the second step, the meritum de condigno.[14] Yet, Occam differed from Scotus in the matter of predestination. Salvation was not completely arbitrary. It depended upon God's foreknowledge of the use which a man might make of the ordo salutis of the Roman Church. That order was part of God's will and He was bound to mete out reward according to the merit gained through the use of that order.[15]

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[12] Reinhold Seeberg, Text-Book of the History of Doctrines (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1952), II, 202.

[13] Schwiebert, p. 168.

[14] Ibid., p. 169.

Luther's teachers at Erfurt had studied with Gabriel Biel, a student of Occam. Biel went even further in his claims for man. Schwiebert quotes a passage from Biel which he claims Luther probably knew from memory.

> The human will can love God above all things through its own natural powers. The sinner is able to remove the hindrances to grace, because he is able to keep from sinning and commiting sinful acts, yea, to hate sin and to will not to sin. By the removal of the impediments and by the good steps toward God made by his own free will he can acquire the merit de congruo, the first grace in the turning toward God.[16]

According to Biel, therefore, salvation is even more dependent on man's contribution. The only question about predestination to salvation involves the instability of man's free will. "No one is certain that he will not, prior to his death, fall into mortal sin and no forgiveness will be available."[17]

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[15] Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Der Einflusz der Anfechtungserfahrung auf den Prädestinationsbegriff Luthers," Kerygma und Dogma, III (1957), 112.

[16] Schwiebert, p. 169.

[17] Pannenberg, p. 113.

It is obvious that the theological context in which Luther was schooled placed a great deal of emphasis on the ability of man through his own free will to attain the first step toward God, the *meritum de congruo*. Duns Scotus said that man could at least attain attrition, a dread over sin. William Occam held that man could achieve real contrition or heartfelt sorrow over sin. And Gabriel Biel insisted that man could love God above all things. After man had achieved attrition, contrition, or love of God, God would grant His grace to help him attain the second step of *meritum de condigno* beyond which the full grace of Christ could be granted to him. All of this played a part in Luther's spiritual *Anfechtung*. He did not find it possible to make even the first step toward God.

In the matter of predestination there were two schools of thought. In the cases of Occam and Biel, man contributed to the cause of salvation. This was a synergistic point of view which posited predestination to salvation because of the foreseen merit of man. The other point of view, held by men like Augustine and Scotus, was deterministic since God was the absolute and total cause of predestination. These two points of view contributed to Luther's predestination *Anfechtung*.[18] Even though he came to reject the synergistic point of view, he still had to face the possibility that God had not elected him to salvation.

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

The Sources and Growth of a New Theology

Luther felt trapped in a theological system which offered no solution to his spiritual problems. Another theological system of thought came into being which eventually afforded new insights into the relation between man and God. The other theology grew out of, alongside of, and in critical interaction with the old Scholastic theology. The new theology emerged most prominently in 1518 when Luther's most significant reformation insight occurred.[19] Luther's new theological insights continued to grow even after 1518 but here the interest is in examining the sources of his new theology and the elements of it which were present prior to 1518. The elements of the new theology which were present prior to 1518 were often half-formed and still couched in terms of the older theology, but their presence meant the possibility of productive and unique insights for Luther.

Luther himself mentions three sources as the most influential for his own theology. He mentions them in the _Preface to the Complete Edition of a German Theology_ in 1518. He credits the book, _A German Theology_, a work by an unknown German mystic, as having a great influence on him. "No book except the Bible and St. Augustine has come to my attention from which I have learned more about God, Christ, man, and all things."[20] Thus the German mystics, along with Augustine and the Bible, were prominent sources of Luther's new theology. The German school of mystics headed by John Tauler (1300-1361) had the most influence on Luther. He was particularly impressed with the emphasis of the mystics on the necessity of a spiritual rebirth of despair before one could be united with God.

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[19] _Infra_, p. 76, for reasons for accepting 1518 as the most plausible date for the insight that occurred during Luther's _Turmerlebnis_.

> Like the mystics, Luther was most concerned that the sinner should find a way out of sin and to salvation in communion with God - in other words, that he should annihilate his own personality and substitute God's. He agreed, for example, with Tauler's instructions that the sinner should be humble, faithful, penitent, joyful in poverty, and eager to return to God by whom he had been created.[21]

Yet, even though Luther appreciated the 'wisdom of experience' emphasized by the mystics he does not stress this in his writings. He put more emphasis on the doctrine that resulted from experience, especially justification by faith. He also emphasized the active love of the child of God to others in contrast to the mystical passivity (Gelassenheit), contemplation, and ecstasy of the mystics.[22]

A second source of Luther's theology was Augustine. He was the principal guide through the complicated maze of Scholastic theology back to the Biblical concepts. Luther often quotes Augustine. He was especially indebted to Augustine's The Spirit and the Letter. It was on the distinction between letter and spirit that Luther based his later distinction between Law and Gospel.[23] It is to that same work of Augustine that Luther returns after the insight of his Turmerlebnis.

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[20] LW 31, 75.

[21] Ibid., 73. The analysis is that of Harold Grimm in his introduction to Luther's Preface to the Complete Edition of a German Theology.

[22] Ibid., 74.

> Later I read Augustine's The Spirit and the Letter, where contrary to hope I found that he, too, interpreted God's righteousness in a similar way, as the righteousness with which God clothes us when he justifies us. Although this was heretofore said imperfectly and he did not explain all things concerning imputation clearly, it nevertheless was pleasing that God's righteousness with which we are justified was taught.[24]

Augustine did teach that it is only by the grace of God and not by works that man is justified. He did teach that righteousness is given only to faith. But the imperfection and lack of clarity in Augustine to which Luther refers is the teaching that the imputation of righteousness is but the beginning of righteousness in man's life by which he is enabled to become more and more righteous in his deeds. The imputation of righteousness, according to Augustine, is not the full forgiveness of God in Jesus Christ. Thus Augustine taught that justification is by grace alone but not entirely by faith alone.[25]

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[23] Gerhard Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), p. 110.

[24] LW 24, 337.

[25] Seeberg I, pp. 348 and 352; cf., previous critique of Schwiebert, supra, p. 22.

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Nevertheless, it was Augustine who lead Luther back to Paul and the Biblical emphasis on justification by faith.

It was not true, as some have assumed, that Luther had no access to the Bible during his days in the monastery. One of the first things that the Augustinians did for the novice was to present him with a copy of the Bible bound in red leather. Luther read the Bible avidly and knew much of it by heart. In one of his table talks in 1531, he says:

> If I had kept at it, . . . I would have become exceedingly good at locating things in the Bible. At that time no other study pleased me so much as sacred literature. With great loathing I read physics, and my heart was aglow when time came to return to the Bible . . . I read the Bible diligently. Sometimes one important statement occupied all my thoughts for a whole day.[26]

Just when Luther began to accept Scripture as the basis for his own theology and the source of criticism toward other theologians is difficult to say. It may have been during the academic year of 1508-1509, the first year of his teaching at the University of Wittenberg. This assumption is based on the fact that when Luther went back to Erfurt in 1509 to lecture on The Sentences of Peter Lombard, his marginal notes indicate that he had progressed to the point of criticizing the Schoolmen on the basis of the Latin Vulgate.[27] It seems obvious, then, that Luther had begun to use Scriptures as a basic source long before he understood what it all meant and where it would lead. He also had yet to master the languages of the Old and New Testaments in order to become the exegete he later turned out to be. Luther's continued study of the Bible was aided by his work on the doctorate and his teaching from the Bible at the University of Wittenberg. Roland Bainton suggests that Staupitz may have suggested to Luther in 1511 that he study for the doctorate in order that Luther might find answers to his agonizing questions.

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[26] LW 54, 14.

[27] Schwiebert, p. 158.

> Staupitz knew . . . that Luther would be helped by the subject matter of his teaching. The chair designed for him was the one which Staupitz himself had occupied, the chair of the Bible. One is tempted to surmise that he retired in order unobtrusively to drive this agonizing brother to wrestle with the source book of his religion.[28]

The Bible, then, along with German mysticism and the theology of Augustine were primary sources for Luther's experiential and Biblical theology.

Basic elements of Luther's new theology were present before the momentous insight of 1518. This can be demonstrated by examining some of his writings prior to 1518. Starting with his views of man in the sight of God, it can be seen that his position of man as simul justus et peccator was present already in his Lectures on Romans, 1515-1516. "Therefore I am at the same time a sinner and a righteous man, for I do the evil and I hate the evil which I do."[29] But, as shall be noted at greater length later, Luther was still limited at this time by Augustinian conceptions. He says,

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[28] Roland H. Bainton, Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther (New York: Abingdon Press, 1950), p. 60.

[29] LW 25, 63.

"We are in part sinners and in part righteous."[30] Here he is still thinking of concupiscence as weakness in man which must be acceded to in order to become sin. But, as God forgives the guilt of giving in and gives grace to act righteously, man is on the way to becoming righteous. Luther has not yet reached the insight of the fully imputed righteousness of God in Christ through which full and free forgiveness is given to faith.

By 1516, in his comments on Romans, Luther also disagrees with the argument that man has been given a free will by which he either merits or fails to merit something.[31] He argues for the absolute will of God and the fact that what happens, happens by necessity.[32] Thus he is taking issue with men like Occam and Biel in their emphasis on free will. Therefore, it also follows that he would stress that the works of the Law are not necessary for salvation but only the righteousness of faith.[33] And Luther is already dealing with the concepts of active and passive righteousness in his Lectures on Romans, although it has not yet reached the fullness of his thought as presented in his Galatians commentary of 1535.

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[30] Ibid., 434.

[31] Ibid., 375.

[32] Ibid., 371.

[33] Ibid., 89.

> Through the fact that "God is justified" we are justified. And this passive justification of God by which He is justified by us is our active justification by God. For He regards that faith which justifies His words as righteousness, as it says in chapter 4:5 and in chapter 1:17, "The just shall live by faith."[34]

This is a half-way point regarding active and passive righteousness. For even though the believer's justification of God is something passive, that is, made possible by a gift of God, and therefore God acts to justify the sinner, there still is the implication that the believer plays some part in the process, at least to the extent of justifying God. In his _Lectures on Galatians_ in 1535 Luther declares the righteousness of faith to be completely passive with man playing no part in it at all.

Luther's later understanding of God in relation to man is also present in great measure prior to 1518. That God is to be known only through a cross and not through glory is plainly evident in many of his writings in 1516. The difference between a _theologia gloriae_ and a _theologia crucis_ is also quite obvious in the _Ninety-Five Theses_ of 1517 and the _Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses_ of 1518. The same is true of the _Heidelberg Theses_ of 1518. Luther's experience of coming to know God only through the agony of his own _Anfechtungen_ had powerfully shaped his _theologia crucis_ by this time. He also speaks of the alien and proper work of God in a sermon in 1516.

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[34] _Ibid_., 211.

> God's alien work, therefore, is the suffering of Christ and sufferings in Christ, the crucifixion of the old man and the mortification of Adam. God's proper work, however, is the resurrection of Christ, justification in the Spirit, and the vivification of the new man . . . .[35]

Related to this is the concept of the hiddeness of God of which he speaks in Romans in 1516. "For what is good for us is hidden, and that so deeply that it is hidden under its opposite."[36] The full thought of Luther on the hidden and revealed God came later in writings that occurred after he had resolved his Anfechtung on predestination. And the greatest of Luther's theological formulations, that of Law and Gospel, is also nascent in Romans when he says that,

> the Law shows sin and produces an anguished conscience but the Gospel supplies a remedy; the Law is evil and the Gospel good; the Law announces wrath but the Gospel peace; the Law oppresses the conscience but the Gospel frees it.[37]

In his Lectures on Hebrews in 1517-18 he says that Law and Gospel differ "that in the Law there are very many works - they are all external - but in the Gospel there is only one work - it is internal - which is faith."[38] Luther's full understanding of Law and Gospel was yet to come, an understanding in which the Gospel is completely divorced from being a grace that is coupled with the will of man to produce works of merit. But, as with the other theological concepts, the basis for new theological insight was there and Luther's Anfechtungen were the experiences out of which the new could come.

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[35] LW 51, 19.

[36] LW 25, 382.

[37] Ibid., 416.

[38] LW 29, 123.

Luther's Anfechtungen

What were the Anfechtungen which Luther experienced and out of which new insights came? In this section the Anfechtungen are presented in the general sequence in which they occurred along with the conditions, contents, and results.

Entrance into the Monastery

Although there is not much direct evidence from the early life of Luther about his state of mind or spiritual distress, there are reflections from his later years that give clues to earlier thoughts and problems. One such reflection is contained in a sermon from 1534. It gives the reason for Luther's entrance into the monastery.

> With reference to my previous experience, I was myself a monk for fifteen years and diligently all through these years read and did everything I could. Yet I was never able to console myself regarding my baptism, but always thought: "Oh, when will you once become

> pious enough and do enough to obtain a gracious God? Such thoughts drove me into the monastery.[39]

It does not seem surprising that Luther was bothered by the problem of finding a gracious God in view of the prevailing theological system of his day. As has been previously indicated, the emphasis was on doing those things which would merit the grace of God, and, having done that, to do works with the help of grace which would merit full salvation. It was very difficult to merit the grace of God in secular life, so the people were led to believe. It was much more possible to merit God's grace in the monastic life. So it was that, in a monastery as a celibate and ascetic monk, Luther tried to read and do everything he could in a diligent attempt to find a gracious God.

The incident that caused him to enter the monastery occurred in July of 1505. Luther spoke of the occasion in one of his table talks of 1539. He was walking near Stotternheim not far from Erfurt when a thunderbolt frightened him so much that in terror he shouted, "Help, dear Anne, I will become a monk."[40] Luther regarded the clap of thunder as a sign of divine wrath. It precipitated his

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[39] Martin Luther, "Von der heiligen Taufen Predigten," in D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus, 1910) 37. Band, 661. Quoted by Schwiebert, p. 142. Hereafter the Weimar edition of Luther's works will be referred to as WA, followed by the volume and page in Arabic numerals, e.g., WA 37, 661.

[40] TR IV, 4707. Quoted by Schwiebert, p. 137.

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decision to enter the monastery. The possibility of entering a monastery in order to solve his problem must have been on Luther's mind for some time.

> We are not apt to go wrong if we assume that a resolution which had long been prepared for in the inner struggles of the last month, but which had been repressed until now by doubts and scruples of one kind or another, suddenly came to expression in that moment of extreme nervous tension. For Luther was one of those men who made decisions only after long and tenacious struggles but whose decisions are crystallized abruptly in a moment of tempestous activity. We may conclude that, inwardly, he was already on the way to the monastery before the lightning flashed down on him at Stotternheim. The convulsive fear which seized him in that moment only hastened the decision but did not call forth the mood from which it sprang.[41]

Now the possibility became a reality. Luther had made his decision in a moment of stress and he was more deeply committed than ever to find a gracious God through the methods prescribed by the theological system of his day.

The First Mass

Even though Luther did his best to live the kind of life that would merit the grace of God, it was obvious that by the time of the celebration of his first mass on May 2, 1507, he still had not found a gracious God. The terrifying experience at Stotternheim had seemed a call from God, a call to enter the kind of monastic life which he had been taught to believe would lead to attainment of the grace of

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[41] Heinrich Boehmer, Martin Luther: Road to Reformation (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, The World Publishing Company, 1946), p. 34.

God. But at the time of his first mass his experience of doubt brought about by his father's challenge and the fear that he felt when facing God before the altar indicated that his call and monastic life had not resolved his problem.

Luther's father was not pleased that Martin had chosen the monastery. He had wanted Martin to become a lawyer. Even though he consented to be present at Luther's first mass he let his son know how unhappy he was about it. His father's challenge so bothered Luther that he mentioned it several times in his letters and table talks. In the Fall of 1533, Veit Dietrich recorded one of Luther's reminiscences about the incident:

> When he celebrated his first mass and asked his father why he was angry about the step he took, the father replied reproachfully, "Don't you know that it's written, Honor your father and your mother?" (Exod. 20:12) When he excused himself by saying that he was so frightened by a storm that he was compelled to become a monk, his father answered, "Just so it wasn't a phantom you saw!"[42]

Luther pleaded that he was compelled to become a monk. He had no choice. He repeated the same argument in a 1521 letter to his father.

> I told you that I have been called by terrors from heaven and that I did not become a monk of my free will and desire, still less to gain any gratification of the flesh, but that I was walled in by the terror and agony of sudden death and forced by necessity to take the vow.[43]

Luther was so determined to maintain the necessity and

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[42] LW 54, 109.

[43] LW 48, 322.

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validity of that call that he did not want to consider his father's challenge. In the same letter he goes on to say; "I was so sure of my own righteousness that in you I heard only a man, and boldly ignored you; though in my heart I could not ignore your word."[44]

The last phrase in the previous quotation indicates, however, that Luther's father had struck home. Perhaps the call was not from God and, if not, he was guilty of parental disobedience. In a letter to Philip Melanchthon in 1521 he went so far as to change the word 'phantom' to 'Satan' and thus revealed the true depth of his doubt about the call.

> I remember when I made my vow, my earthly father was terribly angry with this; after he was reconciled to the idea, I had to listen to the following: Let's hope that this was not a delusion from Satan. This word took such deep root in my heart that I have never heard anything from his mouth which I remembered more persistently. It seemed to me as if God had spoken to me from afar, through my father's mouth - it was late, yet it was enough to punish and admonish me.[45]

So, it was possible that he was being judged by God and not blessed by him. That fear of judgment became most evident when Luther reported in a 1537 table talk what occurred when he celebrated his first mass.

> Later when I stood there during the mass and began the canon, I was so frightened that I would have fled if I hadn't been admonished by the prior. For when I read the words, "Thee, therefore, most merciful Father," etc., and thought I had to speak to God without a mediator, I felt like fleeing from the world like Judas. Who can bear the majesty of God without Christ

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[44] *Ibid*.

[45] *Ibid*., 301.

> as Mediator? In short, as a monk I experienced such horrors; I had to experience them before I could fight them.[46]

Here is conclusive evidence of unresolved Anfechtung after two years in the monastery.

It was only after he had experienced the new insights of his reformation faith of 1518 and beyond that Luther could speak of the resolution of the Anfechtung which occurred at the time of his first mass. From the perspective of justifying faith in the Gospel he could admit to his father that his call into the monastery was wrong. It was not a call from God and it did result in disobedience to parental authority because of its coercion and source. He wrote his father in 1521 in the preface to his book On Monastic Vows:

> For my vow was not worth a fig, since by taking it I withdrew myself from the authority and guidance of the parent (to whom I was subject) by God's commandment; indeed it was a wicked vow, and proved that it was not of God not only because it was a sin against your authority, but because it was not absolutely free and voluntary. In short, it was taken in accordance with the doctrines of men and the superstition of hypocrites, none of which God has commanded.[47]

The "doctrines of men and the superstition of hypocrites" could never accomplish what they had promised. When Luther had found a gracious God through faith in the Gospel he could look back in pity and say in 1521;

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[46] LW 54, 234.

[47] LW 48, 332.

> How many do you think would have said the vow had they known that they would acquire neither righteousness nor salvation through this vow? . . . They vow they will become good through these works but they don't think even once of justifying faith.[48]

But once one has been freed from compulsion and delusion, vows can be freely taken. He tells Melanchthon:

> No law or slavery is positively abolished just because it is harmful and adverse but rather because it should be a free matter; all laws are even confirmed because we establish the Law by faith. Therefore, the law of vows will stand together with the freedom of the gospel, indeed, it will even be made firm by it.[49]

It was in the freedom of the Gospel that Luther could be sure of his call and free from the charge that he was disobedient to his father. He spoke of this to his father in the preface to _On Monastic Vows_.

> But am I not robbing you again of your right and authority? No, for your authority over me still remains, so far as the monastic life is concerned; but this is nothing to me anymore, as I have said. Nevertheless (God), who has taken me out of the monastery, has an authority over me that is greater than yours; you see that he has placed me now not in a pretended monastic service but in the true service of God. Who can doubt that I am in the ministry of the Word? And it is plain that the authority of parents must yield to this service, for Christ says, "He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me." Not that this word destroys the authority of parents, for the Apostle (Paul) often insists that children should obey their parents; but if the authority of parents conflicts with the authority or calling of Christ, then Christ's authority must reign alone.[50]

Thus the resolution of the _Anfechtung_ at the time of his first mass meant that Luther first had to find a gracious God through justifying faith in the Gospel. Then he could be sure of his call by an accepting God. He could also be free from the fear of his father and able to accept his calling without reservation.

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[48] _Ibid._, 300.

[49] _Ibid._, 298-299.

[50] _Ibid._, 335.

Spiritual *Anfechtungen*

Types of *Anfechtungen*

The *Anfechtungen* which Luther experienced in the monastery before and after his first mass were many and varied. It is difficult to classify the types since Luther was not entirely consistent in speaking of his *Anfechtungen* over the course of his long career.[51] Early in his career, in 1516, Luther referred to two types of suffering.[52] The first is physical suffering and involves physical goods, things, the body and reputation. Such suffering happens to carnal men and causes them to become impatient and give up hope. The second is the suffering of the conscience and spirit through which all of one's self-righteousness and wisdom is stripped away. The first of these sufferings did not afflict Luther significantly. It was not a true Anfechtung since it did not attack conscience and faith. In fact, he was critical of those who made so much over bodily struggles, especially carnal lust, that they could not understand temptation in any other way. In his 1534 commentary on Psalm 90, Luther took the church fathers to task for such a narrow definition of temptation. It caused them to distort the nature of man and the message of the Scriptures.

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[51] Scholars vary in their enumeration of the types of Luther's *Anfechtungen*, ranging in number from two to six. John von Rohr speaks of the two types of unworthiness and predestination in "The Sources of Luther's Self-Despair in the Monastery," p. 6; Erich Vogelsang lists the three types of bodily, spiritual and predestination in *Der Angefochtene Christus bei Luther*, pp. 10-11, 31; Lennart Pinomaa, following Vogelsang, gives the three types of the carnal, the spiritual and those pertaining to election in *Faith Victorious*, p. 90; Paul Bühler enumerates six types of *Anfechtungen* through the flesh, from the world, with sin, life and the Word, with death, with predestination and the personal in *Die Anfechtung bei Luther* (Zurich: Zwingli Verlag, 1942).

[52] *LW* 25, 293.

> Because the doctors of the church usually took into account only carnal considerations and were unable to apply Scriptures to those more latent and spiritual corruptions of human nature, they also deal quite carelessly with the most important doctrines of Scripture.[53]

While Luther was in the monastery he despaired even of his good friend Staupitz who seemingly could not understand that his temptations were not carnal but deeply spiritual. He said in one of his table talks:

> I often made confession to Staupitz, not about women but about really serious sins (rechten knoten). He said, "I don't understand you." This was real consolation! Afterward when I went to another confessor I had the same experience. In short, no confessor wanted to have anything to do with me. Then I thought, "Nobody has this temptation except you," and I became as dead as a corpse.[54]

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[53] LW 13, 95.

[54] LW 54, 94.

The temptations that really bothered Luther were those that assaulted the conscience and spirit. These Anfechtungen were later divided by Luther into two forms; tentationes de indignitate and tentationes de praedestinatione.[55] The first of these forms, which will be called spiritual Anfechtungen, involved the sense of unworthiness due to the demands of God's Law upon the person and his inability to meet those demands. The second form, the predestination Anfechtung, arises out of the fear that, even though one may become worthy, God may not have arbitrarily elected him to salvation. These are the two basic types of Anfechtungen which shall be dealth with at length. They are Luther's own classification and they had great consequences for his life.

The Intensity of the Anfechtungen

The spiritual Anfechtungen occurred as Luther seriously attempted to find a gracious God through the theological system he had been taught. Later, in 1535, he looked back with a critical eye at the deadly trap in which he had been caught.

> Therefore the dangerous and the wicked opinion of the papists is to be condemned. They attribute the merit of grace and the forgiveness of sins to the mere performance of the work. For they say that a good work performed before grace can earn a "merit of congruity": but once grace has been obtained, the work that follows deserves eternal life by the "merit of condignity." If a man outside a state of grace and in mortal sin

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[55] TR V, 5897; cf., von Rohr, p. 6, and Pannenberg, p. 110.

> performs a good work by his own natural inclination - such as reading or hearing Mass, giving alms, etc. - this man deserves grace "by congruity." Once he has obtained grace this way, he goes on to perform a work that merits eternal life "by condignity." Now in the first case God is not indebted to anyone, but because He is good and righteous, it is proper for him to approve such a good work, even though it is performed in mortal sin, and to grant grace for such a deed. But once grace has been obtained, God has become a debtor and is obliged by right to grant eternal life. For now this is not only a work of the free will, carried out externally; but it is performed in the grace that makes a man pleasing before God, that is, in love.[56]

But Luther stated that while he was in the monastery for twenty years he tried to perform the works that would cause God to grant him grace. He fasted, prayed, read Mass daily and pleaded; "All this I have done; now please consider it, and be gracious to me."[57] But all his efforts did not achieve the purpose for which they were intended. Luther could never overcome the effect of 'concupiscence,' the force which kept him from refraining from evil and made it impossible for him to do the good works which would cause God to be gracious to him. He confessed in 1535:

> I tried many methods. I made confession every day, etc. But none of this did any good, because the desires of the flesh kept coming back. Therefore I could find no peace, but I was constantly crucified by thoughts such as these: "You have committed this or that sin; you are guilty of envy, impatience, etc. Therefore it was useless of you to enter this holy order, and all your good works are to no avail."[58]

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[56] LW 26, 124.

[57] LW 24, 229.

[58] LW 27, 73.

Men like Scotus and Occam only seemed to make the situation worse.

> They said that this love which is given by God is not necessary to obtain the grace of God, but that even by his own natural powers a man is able to produce a love for God above all things.[59]

For Luther, who could not find it in himself even to do the good works necessary to get to the first level of the 'merit of congruity,' the claim that Scotus and Occam made that one should be able to attain the 'merit of condignity' by his own power of love was doubly damning.

The intensity of the spiritual Anfechtungen of unworthiness which Luther experienced is detailed in a remarkable description in his Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses. Although he puts it in terms of someone else's experience, a number of scholars count it as a reflection of Luther's own experience.[60] In this account of his own experience Luther is disputing the claim of the indulgence sellers that men can escape the punishment of purgatory. Since such experience of punishment has been felt by the living the dead will surely experience them also. Only those who have had no experience such as he has had could make claims about

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[59] LW 26, 128.

[60] Cf., Gerhard Ebeling, "Luther," in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Vierter Band (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960), col. 497; and E. Gordon Rupp, "Luther's Ninety-Five Theses and the Theology of the Cross," in Luther for an Ecumenical Age, edited by Carl S. Meyer (St. Louis" Concordia Publishing House, 1967), p. 74.

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the lack of punishment.

> I myself "knew a man" (II Cor. 12:2) who claimed that he had often suffered these punishments, in fact over a very brief period of time. Yet they were so great and so much like hell that no tongue could adequately express them, no pen could describe them, and one who had not himself experienced them could not believe them. And so great were they that, if they had been sustained for half an hour, even for one tenth of an hour, he would have perished completely and all of his bones would have been reduced to ashes. At such a time God seems terribly angry, and with him the whole creation. At such a time there is no flight, no comfort within or without, but all things accuse. At such a time as that the Psalmist mourns, "I am cut off from thy sight" (cf., Ps. 31:22), or at least he does not dare to say, "O Lord, . . . do not chasten me in thy wrath" (Ps. 6:1). In this moment (strange to say) the soul cannot believe that it can ever be redeemed other than that the punishment is not yet completely felt. Yet the soul is eternal and is not able to think of itself as being temporal. All that remains is the stark-naked desire for help and a terrible groaning, but it does not know where to turn for help. In this instance the person is stretched out with Christ so that all his bones may be counted, and every corner of the soul is filled with the greatest bitterness, dread, trembling, and sorrow in such a manner that all these last forever.
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> To use an example: If a ball crosses a straight line, any point of the line which is touched bears the whole weight of the ball, yet it does not embrace the whole ball. Just so the soul, at the point where it is touched by a passing eternal flood, feels and imbibes nothing except eternal punishment. Yet the punishment does not remain, for it passes over again. Therefore if that punishment of hell, that is, that unbearable and inconsolable trembling, takes hold of the living, punishment of the souls in purgatory seems so much greater. Moreover, that punishment for them is constant. And in this instance the inner fire is much more terrible than the outer fire. If there is anyone who does not believe that, we do not beg him to do so, but we have merely proved that these preachers of indulgence speak with too much audacity about many things of which they know nothing or else doubt. For one ought to believe those who are experienced.[61]

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[61] LW 31, 129-130.

The sellers of indulgences were purveyers of a *theologia gloria*, insisting that God can be known through peaceful paths paved with money. Luther's experience led him to insist instead that God is known through a *theologia crucis*.

The 1518 Resolution of the Spiritual *Anfechtung*

Luther did experience the resolution of his *tentatione de indignitate*. His most complete account of it is in the *Preface to the Latin Writings* in 1545. But before presenting Luther's account of the experience it is important to understand the theological content involved. In his 1535 *Lectures on Galatians* are found some of Luther's most pertinent comments regarding the theology involved, especially the understanding of righteousness, Gospel and faith. He pointed out that he was taught not only that God demands that His Law be kept,

> but He requires in addition that you keep the Law in love - not the natural love that you have but a supernatural and divine love that He himself confers. What is this but to make God a tyrant and tormentor who demands of us what we cannot produce?[62]

For Luther, it was impossible enough to keep the Law but to demand that it be kept through a supernatural love was even more impossible. Yet a righteous God demanded a righteous people who kept the Law in love. This only made of the Gospel a new demand. What should have been a gift of God's grace after one attained the level of the 'merit of condignity' became a requirement for a higher form of love toward God than ever before. This was true even though it was taught that it was the just and righteous God who actively infused love into the one who was worthy of it. This, it was said, made it possible for the worthy one to actively justify God and thus be justified himself. But what if one could not attain the level of worthiness necessary for the infusion of love? Did this not mean God's judgment? Did this not mean that the Gospel differed little from the Law? And not only was the Gospel affected but also faith. Faith was not sufficient without love. As Luther stated it, we men are required

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[62] *LW* 26, 128.

> to have a supernatural quality infused into us from heaven, namely, love, which they call the formal righteousness that informs and adorns faith and makes it justify us. Thus faith is the body the shell, or the color: but love is the life, the kernel or the form.[63]

Thus righteousness was not only a quality of God but it was also his active infusion of love into the worthy one, a righteous act revealed by the Gospel which made it possible for the believer to love God and thus be justified. But what of the one who could not attain the level of worthiness at which such love was infused that enabled one to love God as God demanded? For him God's righteousness was a judgment, the Gospel was a revelation of that more impossible demand

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[63] LW 26, 129.

and faith was useless. That understanding of the theological content clarifies Luther's 1545 description of his experience in 1518.

> Meanwhile, I had already during that year returned to interpret the Psalter anew. I had confidence in the fact that I was more skilful, after I had lectured in the university on St. Paul's epistles to the Romans, to the Galatians, and the one to the Hebrews. I had indeed been captivated with an extraordinary ardor for understanding Paul in the Epistle to the Romans. But up till then it was not the cold blood about the heart, but a single word in Chapter 1 (:17), "In it the righteousness of God is revealed," that had stood in my way. For I hated that word "righteousness of God," which, according to the use and custom of all the teachers, I had been taught to understand philosophically regarding the formal or active righteousness, as they called it, with which God is righteous and punishes the unrighteous sinner.
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> Though I lived as a monk without reproach, I felt that I was a sinner before God with an extremely disturbed conscience. I could not believe that he was placated by my satisfaction. I did not love, yes, I hated the righteous God who punishes sinners, and secretly, if not blasphemously, certainly murmuring greatly, I was angry with God, and said, "As if, indeed, it is not enough, that miserable sinners, eternally lost through original sin, are crushed by every kind of calamity by the law of the decalogue, without having God add pain to pain by the gospel and also by the gospel threatening us with his righteousness and wrath!" Thus I raged with a fierce and troubled conscience. Nevertheless, I beat importunately upon Paul at that place, most ardently desiring to know what St. Paul wanted.
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> At last, by the mercy of God, meditating day and night, I gave heed to the context of the words, namely, "In it the righteousness of God is revealed, as it is written, 'He who through faith is righteous shall live.'" There I began to understand that the righteousness of God is that by which the righteous lives by a gift of God, namely by faith. And this is the meaning: the righteousness of God is revealed by the gospel, namely, the passive righteousness with which merciful God justifies us by faith, as it is written, "He who through faith is righteous shall live." Here I felt that I was altogether born again and had entered paradise itself through open gates. There a totally other face of the entire

> Scripture showed itself to me. Thereupon I ran through the Scriptures from memory. I also found in other terms an analogy, as, the work of God, that is, what God does in us, the power of God, with which he makes us strong, the wisdom of God, with which he makes us wise, the strength of God, the salvation of God, the glory of God.
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> And I extolled my sweetest word with a love as great as the hatred with which I had before hated the word "righteousness of God." Thus that place in Paul was for me truly the gate to paradise. Later I read Augustine's _The Spirit and the Letter_, where contrary to hope I found that he, too, interpreted God's righteousness in a similar way, as the righteousness with which God clothes us when he justifies us. Although this was heretofore said imperfectly and he did not explain all things concerning imputation clearly, it nevertheless was pleasing that God's righteousness with which we are justified was taught. Armed more fully with these thoughts, I began a second time to interpret the Psalter.[64]

After the resolution of the _Anfechtung_ Luther understood righteousness, Gospel and faith in a new way. The righteousness of God was an entirely passive righteousness from man's point of view. It was given by God and not actively merited by man nor an active justification of God once it had been given to man. It is the imputation of righteousness to men and the forgiveness of sins for the sake of Christ.[65] The Gospel reveals the gift of righteousness because it reveals Christ. Faith receives the gift of righteousness in Christ. Faith receives Christ.

> Therefore faith justifies because it takes hold of and possesses this treasure, the present Christ. . . . This is the formal righteousness on account of which a man

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[64] _LW_ 34, 336-337.

[65] _LW_ 26, 133.

> is justified; it is not on account of love, as the sophists say.[66]

In the light of these new understandings Luther repudiated the old theological definitions which he had learned.

> With Paul, therefore, we totally deny the 'merit of congruity' and the 'merit of condignity'; . . . For God has never given anyone grace and eternal life for the merit of congruity or the merit of condignity.[67]

That whole theological scheme came from "smug people, who have never struggled with any temptations or true terrors of sin and death,"[68] and had made up those empty dreams out of their own heads.

The Anfechtung of 1518, or the 'tower experience' (Turmerlebnis), was so significant for Luther that he spoke of it many times. He gave another account of it in 1532 in a conversation recorded by Conrad Cordatus. In this account, God as the righteous one is stressed. The implication is that God must punish the one who cannot become righteous because he is not worthy of the infusion of God's love.

> The words 'righteous' and 'righteousness of God' struck my conscience like lightning. When I heard them I was exceedingly terrified. If God is righteous (I thought), he must punish. But when by God's grace I pondered, in the tower and heated room of this building, over the words, 'He who through faith is righteous shall live' (Rom. 1:17) and the 'righteousness of God' (Rom. 3:21), I soon came to the conclusion that if we, as righteous men, ought to live from faith and if the righteousness of God should contribute to the salvation of all who believe, then salvation won't be our merit but God's mercy. My

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[66] Ibid., 130.

[67] Ibid., 125-126.

[68] Ibid., 127.

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> spirit was thereby cheered. For it's by the righteousness of God that we're justified and saved through Christ. These words (which had before terrified me) now became more pleasing to me. The Holy Spirit unveiled the Scriptures for me in this tower.[69]

Here Luther came to the conclusion that man is saved by faith. If it is faith that saves, then it is not works or love. If righteousness contributes to salvation, then righteousness cannot be wrath or judgment. Therefore, righteousness is what God gives to faith through Christ.

Another account is that recorded in 1538 by Anthony Lauterbach. At the first, the righteousness of God is an avenging anger or wrath which is revealed through the Gospel. Again, the implication is that the anger or wrath is against the one who cannot merit the infusion of love which makes one righteous.

> That expression 'righteousness of God' was like a thunderbolt in my heart. When under the papacy I read, 'In thy righteousness deliver me' (Ps. 31:1) and 'in thy truth,' I thought at once that this righteousness was an avenging anger, namely, the wrath of God. I hated Paul with all my heart when I read that the righteousness of God is revealed in the gospel (Rom. 1:16,17). Only afterward, when I saw the words that follow - namely, that it's written that the righteous shall live through faith (Rom. 1:17) and in addition consulted Augustine, was I cheered. When I learned that the righteousness of God is his mercy, and that he makes us righteous through it, a remedy was offered to me in my affliction.[70]

Here the remedy offered to Luther was that righteousness is mercy, not wrath or judgment. God makes righteous by giving to faith what Christ has done.

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[69] LW 54, 193-194.

[70] Ibid., 308-309.

Luther's new understanding of man's relation to God completely overthrew any idea of merit, any idea of man's contribution to salvation. His idea of the Christian faith was now something entirely different as he said in 1535.

> Now the true meaning of Christianity is this: that a man first acknowledge, through the law, that he is a sinner, for whom it is impossible to perform any good work. . . .
>
> The second step is this: If you want to be saved your salvation does not come by works; but God has sent his only Son into the world that we might live through Him. He was crucified and died for you and bore your sins in His own body (I Peter 2:24). Here there is no "congruity" or work performed before grace, but only wrath, sin, terror, and death. Therefore the law only shows sin, terrifies, and humbles; thus it prepares us for justification and drives us to Christ. For by His Word God has revealed to us that He wants to be a merciful Father to us. Without our merit - since, after all, we cannot merit anything - He wants to give us forgiveness of sin, righteousness and eternal life for the sake of Christ.[71]

The Predestination Anfechtung

In his 1518 resolution of the spiritual Anfechtung, Luther explicitly rejected any contribution on the part of man toward salvation. There was no merit, either of 'congruity' or 'condignity'. Righteousness was passive as far as man was concerned. Salvation was entirely the work of God. Faith accepted the gift of God. It was a rejection of a synergistic point of view. The only other alternative open to anyone who began with God as first cause, as did the

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[71] LW 26, 126-127.

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Scholastics and the early Luther, was that of determinism. God was not only the total cause of salvation but also the total cause of predestination. He arbitrarily elected some for salvation and others for damnation. Thus the one who rejected any kind of synergism was faced with determinism in the matter of predestination. Such a person had to deal with the question of whether or not God wanted to save him. Luther put the question in its' most acute form in his comments on Psalm 22 in Operationes in Psalmos, 1519-21. "Now here, no one doubts that God 'can' save, 'knows' how to save, and 'wills' to save; but the question to the soul is, whether he 'wills' to save *him*."[72]

The question was raised very sharply for Luther because he insisted that all things happen by the necessity of God's will. It is God's will that the elect be saved by grace. Predestination prepares for grace. Grace becomes effective to the elect. If that were not so, then all things are not in God's hands and God's promises could not be trusted. Luther emphasized necessity already in his 1515-16 Lectures on Romans.

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[72] Martin Luther, The Pious and Learned Commentary of Martin Luther on the First Twenty-Two Psalms, in Select Works of Martin Luther, translated by the Rev. Henry Cole (London: W. Simpkins and R. Marshall, 1826), IV, 388. Hereafter the translation of Luther's Operationes in Psalmos, 1519-21, by Henry Cole will be referred to as Cole, followed by the volume in Roman numerals and the page in Arabic numerals, e.g., Cole IV, 388. The Cole translation is used because the American edition of Luther's Works does not, and will not, include a translation of the Operationes in Psalmos, 1519-21.

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> The elect are not saved by chance, but by necessity. . . . He saves us not by our merits but purely by his own election and immutable will, . . . But now He shows that we are saved by his immutable love. And thereby He gives approval not to our will but to His own unchanging and firm will of predestination.[73]

That all things happen by necessity was even more strongly emphasized in Luther's Bondage of the Will, 1525. There he completely denied any freedom of the will. He argued that just as persons do not come into being by their own free will, so nothing can be done by free choice. All is done as God has foreknown and He leads persons to act by His infallible and invincible counsel and power. If that was not true, Luther insisted, then Paul's whole argument in defense of grace was meaningless.[74] He admitted that such a point of view was offensive.

> I myself was offended more than once, and brought to the very depth and abyss of despair, so that I wished I had never been created a man, before I realized how salutary that despair was, and how near to grace.[75]

The despair was deepened with the realization that Christ did only as the Father decreed. Salvation was through faith in Christ, but it could be true that Christ could not save the one who believed in Him because that person was not one of the elect. Luther indicated the terror of that dilemma in Psalm 22 of Operationes in Psalmos.

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[73] LW 25, 371.

[74] LW 33, 191.

[75] Ibid., 190.

> The _fifth_ terror is when the soul thinks within itself thus, that Christ does nothing but that which God has ordained that he should do. . . . Here, therefore, it is concluded that Christ is the head only to the elect, and that by the immutable decree of God: and here the soul is brought to that highest of all perils, predestination.[76]

How did Luther find a way out of "that highest of all perils?"

The initial attempt by Luther to resolve the _Anfechtung_ of predestination involved pointing to the wounds of Christ.[77] The reason for pointing to the wounds of Christ was to indicate that the individual's own suffering was similar to that of Christ. In that the individual suffered as Christ suffered, it was a sign of election. Luther learned that approach from Staupitz. In his sermons Staupitz would point his listeners to the wounds of Christ. Staupitz indicated that:

> No one is saved without _Anfechtung_. And he who does not have any should look for some. The similarity of our _Anfechtung_ trials with those of Jesus protects us against despair in those _Anfechtung_: for in that God leads us into _Anfechtung_ he makes us uniform with Jesus. And this is the way he saves us.[78]

By pointing the troubled Luther to the wounds of Jesus, Staupitz said that Luther in his conformity with Christ had found a sign of salvation. Yet there was no absolute certainty of election through conformity with Christ. Staupitz agreed with the Scholastics that without an extraordinary revelation there simply was no absolute certainty of one's election. Conformity with Christ could, at best, give a presumed certainty. One could not simply draw the conclusion: I am tempted like Jesus; therefore I am elected.[79] Thus the quieting of doubts about election was not solely connected with conformity with Christ. One could not be absolutley certain about the will of the hidden God. But one could gain some certainty through the use of the available and accessible means of grace in the church. There was some certainty there because God had made the means of grace a part of his plan of salvation.[80] Therefore, Staupitz utilized conformity with Christ coupled with use of the means of grace to quiet doubts about election, but without absolute certainty.

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[76] Cole IV, 387.

[77] Cf., _TR_ II, 2645b. Quoted by Pannenberg, p. 120.

[78] _Ibid._, 121.

Conformity with Christ did not ultimately prove sufficient for Luther, nor did the lack of absolute certainty. First of all, conformity with Christ could only mean that one was judged by a model that could not be perfectly followed. "If the tempted Christ is only example and teacher, then his life remains his own, leaving me alone and helpless, yes, still more: Christ as model . . . is law-giver and judge."[81] Christ was a model for Luther to a certain extent but, ultimately, He had to be more than a model and, in the final resolution of the predestination Anfechtung, He proved to be

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[79] Ibid., 121.

[80] Ibid., 122.

[81] WA 40^2, 42. Quoted by Vogelsang, p. 54.

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so for Luther. Secondly, Luther could not live with doubt. He was critical of that teaching of the church in one of his sermons on the Gospel of John in 1537. "Yes, they even teach the propriety of doubt: they say that it is impossible for men to be certain of being in a state of grace and of having the Holy Spirit."[82] Yet as a pious monk, Luther had believed in the propriety of doubt. He was never so presumptuous as to believe that he had satisfied God and was in a state of grace and in the company of the elect.

No, for Luther, there had to be the certainty of faith. And faith never doubts that what God does is righteous. The faithful believer wills what God wills even if the will of God is hidden. The role of faith in overcoming the Anfechtung of predestination is clearly indicated in Luther's comments on verses seven and eight of Psalm 22 in Operationes in Psalmos, 1519-21. The lengthy description of the Anfechtung is given here in order to present the experience in Luther's own words. The seventh and eighth verses of Psalm 22 state, "All they that see me laugh me to scorn: they shoot out the lip, they shake the head, saying, He trusted on the Lord that he would deliver him: let him deliver him, seeing he delighted in him."[83] These words of the Psalmist had great significance for Luther because they are quoted in Matthew 27:39 and are applied to Christ. But they are also applied to the Christian who suffers what Christ suffered.

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[82] LW 24, 129.

[83] Holy Bible, King James Version.

> We have here, therefore, represented unto us, as in a picture, that last war and conflict wherein we contend with the devil, and so, as it were, with God himself and all creatures, in the hour of death: where Satan, with his last, and therefore, his most skillfully marshalled forces, makes his attack upon us. . . . But here faith and hope, which ought to fight, are themselves attacked; and so, there is a conflict about the conflict! there is war about waging another war! a fighting that it might be allowed us to fight! a resisting him who would dissuade us from resisting! He, therefore, is first to be overcome by greater labor who would draw us away from fighting than he with whom we have to fight![84]

Here Luther was indicating that one may have overcome the tentationes de indignitate but the faith and hope resulting from that resolution are attacked because God may not, after all, have elected the person to salvation. Satan's attempts to destroy faith and hope must first be defeated so that faith and hope can continue to overcome the doubt that God is a gracious God. Luther then went on to summarize the six terrors contained in the two verses.

> Let us consider this whole army of Satan's terrors, which strives to work despair in those who are at the point of death. The first is, they are seen by all. The second is, they are laughed at to scorn. The third is, all shoot out their lips at them. The fourth is, they move their heads at them. The fifth is, they hear them say with a taunt, "He hoped in God: let him deliver him now." The sixth is, they hear them say with a taunt, "Let him deliver him, seeing he delighted in him."[85]

Luther expanded on each of the six terrors involved in the predestination Anfechtung.

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[84] Cole IV, 384.

[85] Ibid., 384-385.

> The first terror is then, when the eyes of the soul are opened, and it feels that it stands naked, and is made manifest in the sight of the whole creation, together with the shame of its actions and ill-spent life. And here even that soul which was the best and most honorable in the world, is now found to be vile, foul, and full of shame, and finds no hiding-place or refuge where it can cover itself. . . . Here it is that they know what it is that is said, 'All see me.'[86]

The first terror involved the sense of complete nakedness and exposure before everyone. There was nothing that could be hidden.

> The second terror is, 'when all these things laugh you to scorn;' for they not only do not cover the soul in this state, but deride it. . . . For when the soul is covered with shame on account of its evil deeds and ungodly life, every sight of every creature that is seen will seem to have a voice in it reproaching the person and upbraiding him for his wicked life, and deriding him for his folly in not doing otherwise, and not doing better while his life was granted him.[87]

Added to the sense of nakedness and shame was the seeming derision of every creature in creation. All creation conspired to point the finger of guilt.

> The third terror (if these two are not enough, and if the soul is strong in faith, and is able to overcome them in a measure,) advances to greater lengths, and begins to carry on the siege with the most alarming terrors of the Scriptures. . . . None but the most threatening and terrible portions are brought forth, together with the most awful examples of divine wrath . . . . And when these words are thus injected into the soul, it is an easy matter (and is always the case) for the natural infirmity and scrupulousness of each man's own conscience to fall in with them, and says, 'Thou art just such an one.' - And this is what David here says, "They shoot out their lips."[88]

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[86] Ibid., 385.

[87] Ibid., 385-386.

[88] Ibid., 386.

The accusation of God through the word of the scriptures was added. This only intensified the feeling of anguish and terror of conscience for the conscience could only agree with such accusations.

> The fourth terror is when they 'move the head;' that is, if the soul strives to support itself with the consolation of the Gospel of Christ, who is the head of all, against the violence of the angry and killing law and its darts maliciously and wrongly pointed by Satan, Satan here moves his head, and renders it doubtful and uncertain.[89]

Here began the predestination *Anfechtung*. The one who had found consolation in the Gospel as a resolution of the spiritual *Anfechtung* began to have doubts that the saving grace of Christ was for him.

> The fifth terror is when the soul thinks within itself thus, that Christ does nothing but that which God has ordained that he should do . . . . Hereby Christ is denied to be the head, and the hope is fixed in God alone, (or absolutely,) that he would cause Christ to be given. And here the matter is carried on without a Mediator, and there is a disputing about the good-pleasure and the will of God. . . . Here, therefore, it is concluded that Christ is the head only to the elect, and that by the immutable decree of God: and here the soul is brought to the highest of all perils, predestination. And this is what is intended by the words which are here represented as said in the tauntings of the adversaries, "He trusted in God that he would deliver him." As if they had said to the poor soul, 'That Christ is not thine thou plainly seest, because thou art forsaken, and art in doubt, whether God accounts thee among the number of the elect, to whom Christ is the head, or not.' And from this doubt the soul is driven into that last evil which now follows.[90]

The doubt that Christ is for him increased and the only appeal was to the hidden will of God, that He did indeed include him in the elect. But his forsaken state seemed to indicate otherwise.

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[89] *Ibid*.

[90] *Ibid*., 387.

> The sixth and last evil, then, is where there is a conclusion arising from the 'doubt' last mentioned, - namely, the soul concludes now, that he is not predestinated unto salvation. And as the preceding terror the gates of hell were opened, and a taste of hell was felt; so in this last evil and peril the soul seems to be wholly thrust into and swallowed up of hell, and the pit seems to shut its mouth upon it, and it seems as if it were almost fixed as an inhabitant of hell. And this feeling the terrors and demons produce when they say, "Let him deliver him, seeing he delighted in him." . . . Now here, no one doubts that God 'can' save, 'knows' how to save, and 'wills' to save; but the question to the soul is, whether he 'wills' to save him. Here, therefore, the adversaries raise the doubt, and try to make him think that all hopes are vain. . . . Here these blasphemies and murmurings, and cursing are almost within the very gates of hell; and God begins to be considered unjust, savage, and cruel; and all those other things which accompany such thoughts.[91]

The doubts that were part of the fifth terror were now confirmed by the conclusion that the person was not predestinated unto salvation. The soul now began to hate God with a passion because of his hidden and arbitrary decree. That was the depth of the predestination Anfechtung.

> What then shall the soul do that feels itself overwhelmed and close bound in these straits? - Before all things, let it take heed that it dispute not with devils and evil cogitations concerning all these things: let it give no answer, but remain dumb to all these things which are objected to it, and suffer them to pass by. . . .
>
> And so here, also, Christ is wholly silent, and does not answer a syllable to all these blasphemies, for an example unto us that we should do the same: for we shall overcome these evils in no other way than that in which Christ overcame them. Though it is a hard thing to keep silence and to remain wholly quiet, and permit all these

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[91] *Ibid.*, 388.

> most irritating and most bitter suggestions and sayings to pass by. . . . For this silence, which is so salutary to the soul, Satan cannot in any way endure, and this it is that he endeavors to disturb by all manner of torment. Let the one thus tempted, therefore, never lose sight of this example of silence given us by Christ.[92]

The only possible response was silence. There was no other way to deal with an unresolvable dilemma. Christ's action is pointed to as a pattern for overcoming the predestination Anfechtung. Christ had shown the way in which the Anfechtung could be overcome. It was not simply the case, as was stated before, that there could be certainty simply because the believer suffered as Christ suffered. The sufferer had to do what Christ had done. And what is it that came forth from the silence?

> And then, let him fight with faith against faith. For as faith acts upon things not seen, and is the substance of things hoped for; here we have need of faith only, and that faith which enables the man to believe, that God does, and will do, with him everything that is most just, whether he be saved, or whether he be lost. And here it is, that the glory and praise of God remain in our mouth, while we ascribe unto God nothing but righteousness in all his will, even though human sense and reason, and the persuasion of devils, powerfully drive us to the contrary. And, it is impossible that he should perish, who thus ascribes glory to God and justifies him in all his work and all his will: as it is said, I Sam. 2., "Him that honoreth me, I will glorify," etc.[93]

Out of it came the faith which trusted the invisible will of God and fought against the faith which wanted to depend on visible assurances. Everything else may point to the contrary but the faith which trusts God continued to believe that what the hidden God did was right, whether the person was saved or lost. But, at the same time, it was impossible for such an one to perish because he willed what God willed and praised him for it.[94] Thus it was faith, 'blind' faith, which overcame the Anfechtung. In this, there was no partial certainty. There was an unlimited certainty.

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[92] Ibid., 388-389.

[93] Ibid., 389.

The resolution of the predestination Anfechtung described in the 1519 comment on Psalm 22 represented an advance over the 'blind' faith which Luther had earlier held. In his 1515-16 Lectures on Romans Luther had stopped with the 'blind' faith that was willing to let the person perish if that was God's will. There he noted that there were three degrees of the company of the elect. "The third degree is the best and highest of them, who in effect resign themselves to hell if God so wills, as is probably the case with many at the hour of death."[95] Later, Luther went beyond even the 'blind' faith of Psalm 22, a faith in the invisible God, to the concrete will of God as revealed in Jesus Christ. God's concrete will was Christus pro nobis.[96] The revealed will of God in Christ shows that he wants to save, not damn. Faith trusts the revealed will and promise of God in Christ and in this way the will of the believer is at one with the will of God. Luther already pointed to this more adequate resolution of the predestination Anfechtung in a 1519 Sermon on Preparation for Death.

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[94] Pannenberg, p. 123.

[95] LW 25, 378.

[96] Pannenberg, p. 126.

> Therefore fix your eyes upon the heavenly picture of Christ, the Christ who for your sake went to hell and was rejected by God as one damned to eternal perdition, as he cried on the cross, "Eli, Eli, lama sabacthani." "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" Behold, in that picture your hell is overcome and your election assured, so that if you but take care and believe that it happened for you, you will certainly be saved in that faith. Do not therefore permit this to disappear from sight. Cling to Christ and not to your own resources, and you will be in him forever.[97]

Luther repeated this emphasis on the revealed will of God in Christ in a table talk in 1540 where he said,

> I was troubled . . . by the thought of what God would do with me but at length I repudiated such a thought and threw myself entirely on his revealed will. We can't do any better than that. The hidden will of God can't be searched out by men.[98]

Luther went on to say that,

> We have enough to learn about the humanity of Christ, in whom the Father revealed himself. But we are fools who neglect the revealed Word and the will of the Father in Christ, and, instead, investigate mysteries which ought only to be worshipped.[99]

Thus it was in the oneness of the Son with the Father, the oneness of the revealed will of God with the hidden will of God that Luther ultimately overcame the Anfechtung of predestination.

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[97] WA 2, 690. Quoted by Pinomaa, p. 99.

[98] LW 54, 385.

[99] Ibid.

In so doing, Luther formulated a new doctrine of predestination. He overcame the causal factor of Scholasticism and also broke away from the parallel structure of election and rejection. The salvation to which God predestined was not just a future and unknown event but it was already present in Christ. God wills that all men be saved through Christ. The human being who rejected the gift of God in Christ bore the responsibility for being lost. Thus election and rejection did not go back to the same source - God.

> Because Luther viewed predestination as the personal inclining of God in Christ, he could combine the pure gift character of salvation with the universality of the divine will in Christ on the one hand and the guilt of the lost one for his rejection.[100]

Luther's Growth Through Recurring Anfechtungen

The Date of the Resolution of the Spiritual Anfechtung

As was stated previously, many of the elements of Luther's Reformation theology were present prior to the resolution of his spiritual Anfechtung as reported by Luther in his 1545 Preface to the Latin Writings. The position presented in this paper has been, in fact, that unless there had been a new theology growing out of, alongside of, and in critical interaction with the old Scholastic theology there could not have been new and unique theological insights. The scholarly discussion and dispute regarding the date of the event to which Luther referred in 1545 is additional evidence that a new theology was growing alongside the old. The dispute is caused, in part, by the fact that scholars find the theological elements to which Luther referred in 1545 already present prior to 1518, the date which seems to be indicated by Luther in the Preface. But it has been pointed out in a previous part of this paper, those elements and concepts were not understood in the same sense as they were after the resolution of his spiritual Anfechtung. They were still colored and modified by the old Scholastic notions. This was especially true of the understanding of the righteousness of God, of the Gospel and of faith. Although Luther had spoken of and used these concepts prior to the resolution of his spiritual Anfechtung in 1518, it was only after that resolution that he understood the righteousness of God as an entirely passive righteousness in Christ revealed by the Gospel and given to man through faith.[101]

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[100] Pannenberg, p. 130.

It is understandable that scholars would question the accuracy of a man's memory when he recounts an event some thirty years after it had occurred. It is even more understandable when one realizes that Luther fixed no date to the event but only referred to the time he began the second interpretation of the Psalter. Gerhard Ebeling indicates the difficulties involved in the dating.

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[101] Supra, p. 50.

> The dating of this experience has given rise to many different suggestions, because the indications of the date in the context of the reminiscence of 1545 are ambiguous, and their verification in earlier testimonies, depending upon the standard one applies, is doubtful. Attempts to fix the date have varied between the extremes of 1512 and 1519, although the majority of scholars tend to place it in the year 1514.[102]

Ebeling is not certain that it is worthwhile to attempt to fix the date of Luther's experience. He feels it should not be viewed in isolation from Luther's theological development, a development which proceeded over a period of time, and is evidenced in his writings.

William Landeen makes much the same point concerning Luther's theological development. Commenting on the 1545 statement, Landeen focuses on the theological concepts present in Luther's writings prior to 1518.

> His statement is clear-cut, precise, moving, and bears no trace, as has been charged against him, of a faulty memory. But it does raise serious difficulties of interpretation. If Luther did not fully understand Romans 1:17 until 1518, what are we to do with his serious discussions of sin and righteousness in his lectures on the Psalms, especially Psalm 31 and Psalm 71, where he was surely working toward an understanding of this scripture, and, more specifically, his lucid, careful, and incisive comments on sin and righteousness in comments on Romans, Galatians, and Hebrews, where we meet his virtually complete framework of religious thought. For by 1518 Luther had formulated his views on such subjects as original sin, election and predestination, at the same time just and sinner, the law and the gospel, the hidden God and the theology of the cross. It seems difficult to assert that he did not understand Romans 1:17 and yet had already developed a firm belief

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[102] Ebeling, Luther, p. 41.

> on these fundamental doctrines in his theology. Actually, it places last the full discovery of his great doctrine of righteousness by faith alone in his religious development into a Reformer. It would, then, form the capstone in the spiritual arch which he had been building.[103]

While there is disagreement with Landeen that Luther had fully formulated his views on many theological subjects by 1518, e.g., predestination, his mention of the many theological elements present prior to 1518 and his assertion that the full discovery of righteousness by faith alone formed a capstone are helpful findings. Implicit in his resume of theological concepts already present is the assumption that the capstone of 1518 would not have been possible if the rest of the arch had not been built.

Uuras Saarnivaara, in Luther Discovers the Gospel, also agrees that the experience referred to in the 1545 document is a culmination of Luther's theological development resulting in the Reformation insight of justification by faith. Prior to that time Luther had held the Augustinian conception of justification as a gradual healing process with the non-imputation of sins as a supplement.[104] By contrast, Luther gained the insight that

> God justifies the sinner by graciously imputing, or reckoning, the merits of Christ to him as his righteousness. Justification is not a change in man, but

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[103] William Landeen, Martin Luther's Religious Thought (Mountain View, California: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 1971), p. 45.

[104] Uuras Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the Gospel (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1951), p. 41.

> the gracious declaration of God by which He pronounces righteous the sinner who in himself is not righteous.[105]

Saarnivaara goes on to state that, "From another point of view, the content of the discovery was the 'Lutheran' distinction between the Law and the Gospel."[106] A third point that Saarnivaara makes is that Luther's experience in the tower was not his conversion.

> It was the final exegetico-religious discovery of the evangelical way of salvation. We say exegetico-religious, because it was not simply an exegetical discovery of the true teaching of Scripture on this point; neither was it a mere subjective personal experience.[107]

In view of the above criteria, Saarnivaara arrives at the conclusion that Luther was correct in indicating that the date of his discovery was late in the year 1518.

Saarnivaara takes issue with those who would date the discovery earlier. He clusters the scholars and their dating into four categories and indicates why the conclusions of the first three categories cannot be correct. The four categories and the reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with them follows. The scholars included in each category are listed in the footnotes. Additional scholars have been added to some categories in order to update Saarnivaara's listing.[108]

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[105] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[106] *Ibid.*

[107] *Ibid.*

[108] Saarnivaara's list of dates and scholars appears on pp. 48-49. The bibliographic form follows Saarnivaara.

1. Luther's discovery took place while he was preparing his first lecture on the Psalms, between the late fall of 1512 and the summer of 1513.[109]

2. The "Tower Experience" took place during Luther's first lectures on the Psalms 1513-15.[110]

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[109] Scholars included here are: H. Boehmer, *Luthers erste Vorlesung* (Leipzig, 1924), pp. 37, 52, and *Der Junge Luther* (Gotha, 1925), pp. 110 ff.; Fr. Loofs, "Luthers Rechtfertigungslehre," *Mitteilungen der Luther-Gesellschaft*, 1924, p. 84; J. McKinnon, *Luther and the Reformation*, Vol. I, "Early Life and Religious Development" (London, 1925), p. 51; H. Wendorf, "Der Durchbruch der neuen Erkenntnis Luthers im Lichte der handschriftlichen Ueberlieferung," *Historische Vierteljahrschrift*, 1932, pp. 315 ff.; A. Hamel, *Der Junge Luther und Augustin* I-II (Guetersloh, 1934 & 1935), p. 197; R. Bainton, "Luther's Struggle for Faith," *Church History*, Vol. XVII, 1948, p. 194; T. McDonough, *The Law and the Gospel in Luther* (Oxford, 1963), p. 17.

[110] The scholars included here are: E. Hirsch, "Initium theologiae Lutheri," *Festgabe für Julius Kaftan* (Tuebingen, 1920), p. 161 (the new conception appears for the first time in the explanation of Psalms 31/32); J. v. Walter, "Der Abschluss der Entwicklung des jungen Luther," *Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie*, I (1923), pp. 424 ff. (accepts the results of Hirsch); R. Fife, *Young Luther* (New York, 1928), p. 179 ff. (during the first lectures on the Psalms); E. Vogelsang, *Die Anfänge von Luthers Christologie* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1929), pp. 4, 10, 59, 81 (the first clear expression of the new conception is to be found in the explanation of Psalms 71/72); M. Reu, *Luther's German Bible* (Columbus, Ohio, 1934) pp. 106, 136 (accepts the results of Vogelsang); Eino Sormunen, *Jumalan armo* II (Helsinki, 1934), p. 47, and *Kerjäläisiä me olemme* (Helsinki, 1947), p. 60 (during the first lectures on the Psalms, 1513-14); L. Pinomaa, "Lutherin reformatoorism murroksen ajankohta," (The Date of Luther's Reformation Crisis), *Teologinen Aikakauskirja*, No. 1, 1941 (Helsinki), and *Der exiztenzielle Charakter der Theologi Luthers* (Helsinki, 1940), pp. 131 ff. (the results of both Boehmer and Vogelsang are correct in their own ways); P. Watson, *Let God Be God* (London, 1948), p. 28 (accepts Hirsch's and Vogelsang's position); G. Rupp, *Luther's Progress to the Diet of Worms* (London, 1951), p. 38 and *The Righteousness of God* (London, 1953), pp. 136 & 137 (sometime during his lectures on the Psalms, 1514); E. Schwiebert, *Luther and His Times* (St. Louis, 1950), p. 288 (when he was working on the 71st Psalm, some time in the

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3. Luther's discovery occurred sometime during the years 1514-16.[111]

4. Luther is right in stating that his "tower experience" took place toward the end of 1518.[112]

Saarnivaara concludes that the first dates cannot be correct because Luther's first lectures on the Psalms are in perfect harmony with Augustine's commentary on the Psalms. From Luther's words, "We are delivered from unrighteousness by righteousness, just as we are relieved from sickness by health, and from ignorance by knowledge," it is evident that Luther, Saarnivaara concludes, still understands justification to be a gradual process of healing from the

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fall of 1514); R. Prenter, *Spiritus Creator* (Philadelphia, 1953), p. xvi (during his lectures on the Psalms, 1513-15); E. Erikson, *Young Man Luther* (New York, 1958), p. 204 (during Luther's work on Psalms lectures of 1513-15).

[111] Included in this category are such men as: Preserved Smith, *The Life and Letters of Martin Luther* (Boston, 1911), p. 23 (took place sometime before 1515) and "A Decade of Luther Study," *Harvard Theological Review*, 1921, p. 112 (when Luther began to lecture on Romans, in the late spring or early summer of 1515); A. Kurz, *Die Heilsgewissheit bei Luther* (Gütersloh, 1933), pp. 180 ff. (soon after the end of Luther's lectures on Romans, in the autumn of 1516); A. V. Mueller, *Luthers Werdegang bis zum Turmerlebnis* (Gotha, 1920), pp. 122, 136 (at the end of 1514, while preparing his lectures on Romans); H. J. Iwand, *Rechtfertigungslehre und Christusglaube* (Leipzig, 1930), p. 33 (after a lengthy period of academic teaching); P. Hacker, *The Ego in Faith* (Chicago, 1970), p. 33 (during the lectures on Hebrews, probably October, 1517).

[112] Scholars included here are: Th. Harnack, *Luthers Theologie* I (München, 1927, original ed., 1862), pp. 8, 34; H. Grisar, *Martin Luthers Leben und Sein Werk* (Freiburg im Bresigau, 1926), p. 97; U. Saarnivaara, *Luther Discovers the Gospel* (St. Louis, 1951), p. 103; E. Bizer, *Fides ex Auditu* (Moers, 1958); W. Landeen, *Martin Luthers Religious Thought* (Mountain View, Calif., 1971), p. 49.

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corruption of sin.[113] The summary of Saarnivaara's objections to the first two datings is:

> 1. He (Luther) understands justification as a change of heart in man, that is, as a gradual renewal. Therefore he teaches that man can never reach the point where he can say that he is already righteous. It will remain a matter of becoming righteous.
>
> 2. He does not yet possess a clear understanding of imputation. True, he speaks of it, but his conception of it does not correspond with his mature view.
>
> 3. The proper distinction between Law and Gospel is unknown to Luther. He is still in the phase of his development in which he does not make a distinction between Moses and Christ except as to time and perfection, as he says in one of his table talks.[114]

In regard to the third possible date, Saarnivaara concedes that Luther had made some advances in his thought, especially in his Lectures on Romans in 1515-16. But, "Luther's basic conception of justification is as yet essentially Augustinian or about the same as that which is expressed in his lectures on the Psalms."[115] In Romans Luther still speaks of the gradual process of being made righteous rather than the later concept of imputed righteousness. One instance of this is in Luther's remarks that "we are in part sinners and in part righteous."[116] The implication is that believers are sick persons in the process of getting well. Luther's favorite Biblical story for this is the story of the Good Samaritan.

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[113] Ibid., p. 66.

[114] Ibid., p. 71.

[115] Ibid., p. 82.

[116] LW 25, 434.

When the Good Samaritan poured wine on the man he found at the road side, the man did not immediately get well but began to do so. "Thus our sick man is both weak and getting well."[117] Because of such remarks, Saarnivaara concludes that Luther's concept of justification is still of the pre-Reformation type in the Lectures on Romans. After Romans, Luther lectured on Galatians (from October 27, 1516 to March 13, 1517) and on Hebrews (from March 16, 1517 to March 27, 1518). His lectures on Galatians and on Hebrews, Saarnivaara concludes, present nothing new in regard to justification.[118]

However, in Luther's lectures on the Psalms in 1519-21, Saarnivaara finds confirmation of the breakthrough to the Reformation understanding of justification by faith. Luther remarks that his understanding of the righteousness of God has caused difficulties for some and is in conflict with the understanding of others. Thus he indicates his awareness of his disagreement with the Roman Church on the meaning of this concept. Luther asserts that the righteousness of God is the imputed righteousness of Christ, revealed in the Gospel and bestowed on the sinner as a free gift. He says:

> The righteousness of God . . . should . . . be understood to mean not that by which God Himself is righteous and by which He judges the ungodly, as is the popular opinion, but, as St. Augustine states in his treatise On The Spirit and the Letter, that by which God justifies man,

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[117] Ibid., 340.

[118] Saaranivaara, p. 88.

> namely, that very mercy or justifying grace by which we are reckoned righteous before God.[119]

This basic point, among others, causes Saarnivaara to conclude that Luther's resolution of the spiritual Anfechtung which he recounts in 1545 occurred before his second commentary on the Psalms and after his earlier lectures on the Psalms, Romans, Galatians, and Hebrews. It is also important to note that Saarnivaara, along with Landeen, Ebeling and others, agrees that Luther's 1518 resolution is a culmination of many previous insights and marks a high point in his theological development.

Recurring Anfechtungen Beyond 1518

The resolution of the spiritual Anfechtung of 1518 did not mean a cessation of Anfechtung for Luther. It has already been pointed out that Luther next had to deal with the predestination Anfechtung. When he had resolved that Anfechtung there were others that he had to face. They were caused by challenges to his position as a reformer, by troubling circumstances, and by reversion to old ways of thinking.

In the first instance, Luther found his calling as reformer challenged. In 1521, in what could be called his Berufsanfechtung, Luther wrote of external attacks that became internal Anfechtung.

> I myself experience daily how extremely difficult it is to lay aside a conscience of long standing, one that has

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[119] WA 5, 144. Quoted by Saarnivaara, pp. 98-99.

> been fenced in by man-made ordinances. O with how much greater effort and labor, even on the basis of the Holy Scriptures, have I been barely able to justify my own conscience; so that I, one man alone, have dared to come forward against the pope, brand him as the Antichrist, the bishops as his apostles, and the universities as his brothels! How often did my heart quail, punish me, and reproach me with its single strongest argument: Are you the only wise man? Can it be that all the others are in error and have erred for so long a time? What if you are mistaken and lead so many people into error who might all be eternally damned? Finally, Christ with his clear, unmistakable Word strengthened and confirmed me, so that my heart no longer quails, but resists the arguments of the papists, as a stony shore resists the waves, and laughs at their threats and storms![120]

This Anfechtung was resolved, as Luther says, when he was strengthened through Christ. In a later remembrance in 1533 Luther resolved the same type of Anfechtung by an insight into the certainty of his calling. It is reminiscent of his reply to his father regarding the certainty of a calling.

> Now I have other temptations from the devil. He often throws this up to me: "How many people must you have led astray!" A magistrate and a doctor must be sure that they are called by God, otherwise one is lost. . . . One should be glad, therefore, to have a brother who says, "Brother, do this, for it is the call of your superior or of God (which is a call of faith) or of an equal (which is a call of love)." Nobody realizes how great and how necessary a place is occupied by the calling, by saying to someone, "Do this." If a man is fitted for an office and waits to be called, he does well, and Paul says that he desires a noble task (I Tim. 3:1).[121]

Further Anfechtungen were caused by troubling circumstances. One such troubling circumstance was the martyrdom of some of the followers of the Reformation. Roland Bainton implies that such martyrdom was the cause of one of the severest upheavals in Luther's life. On July 16, 1527, Luther suffered from a spiritual Anfechtung followed by a severe illness.[122] Luther reproached himself for not being worthy of shedding his blood as many of his fellow confessors of the gospel had done.[123] It may have been the imprisonment and impending execution of Leonhard Kaiser that prompted the Anfechtung. Kaiser was burned at the stake at Scharding in Bavaria on August 16, 1527, for his adherence to the evangelical doctrine. Luther had written him a letter on May 20 to console him during his imprisonment.[124] Luther later makes mention of Kaiser in his lectures on I Timothy begun in January of 1528. Luther speaks of Paul's comfort to Timothy to strengthen him in time of affliction. The comfort consists in acknowledging that one who teaches and confesses the Word will be afflicted. However, he does not have to fear the affliction because the Father will strengthen the one who makes a good confession. It is in this context that he mentions the good confession of Leonhard Kaiser.[125] Luther says that any faithful follower will be afflicted but the affliction is resolved through increased faith in the Father's good will.

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[120] LW 36, 134.

[121] LW 54, 95.

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[122] LW 49, 169, n. 10.

[123] Roland H. Bainton, Here I Stand (New York: Abingdon Press, 1950), pp. 359-360.

[124] LW 28, 375, n. 19.

[125] Ibid., 375.

Still other _Anfechtungen_ were caused by the return of old patterns of thought. In a conversation on February 19, 1533, Luther complained of aches and pains. He felt that such pains were caused by the spiritual anguish of getting trapped in the Law again.

> I believe firmly that I don't have these headaches and stomach pains because I work too hard, although this contributes somewhat, but rather because of my thoughts in spiritual assaults. . . . My temptation is this, that I don't think I have a gracious God. This is (because I am still caught up in) the law. It is the greatest grief, and, as Paul says, it produces death (II Cor. 7:10). God hates it, and he comforts us by saying, 'I am your God.' I know his promise, and yet should some thought that isn't worth a fart nevertheless overwhelm me, I have the advantage (that our Lord gives me) of taking hold of his Word once again. God be praised, I grasp the First Commandment which declares, 'I am your God (Ex. 20:2). I'm not going to devour you. I'm not going to be poison for you.'[126]

Luther points out that he resolved such continuing _Anfechtungen_ by grasping the promise of God again and again. The reason that such _Anfechtungen_ continued to recur is that the believer is still flesh. As Luther said,

> Sin still clings to the flesh and continually accuses and troubles the conscience. So long as the flesh remains there remains the Law, the custodian who continually terrifies and distresses the conscience with his demonstrations of sin and his threats of death.[127]

The continuing influence of the flesh means that half of the person is warring against the other half.

> We are opposed by half of our very selves, namely by reason and all its powers. Moreover, because the flesh

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[126] _LW_ 54, 74-75.

[127] _LW_ 26, 349-350.

> cannot believe for sure that the promises of God are true, it resists the spirit. Therefore it contends against the spirit, and, as Paul says, holds the spirit captive (Rom. 7:23) to keep it from believing as firmly as it wants to (Gal. 5:17). This is why we continually teach that the knowledge of Christ and of faith is not a human work but utterly a divine gift; as God creates faith, so he preserves us in it. And just as He initially gives us faith through the Word, so later on He exercises, increases, strengthens, and perfects it in us by the Word.[128]

Luther had experienced the gift nature of faith so he stresses that the resolution of the continual struggle between flesh and spirit lies in the giving and strengthening of that gift of faith by God again and again.

Spiritual Growth Through Resolution of Recurring *Anfechtungen*

It might seem that the recurrence of *Anfechtung* means the absence of faith. But that is not the case. Flesh and *Anfechtung* exist at the same time with righteousness and the certainty of salvation. Certainty dominates in spite of the struggle.[129] If there is a negative side to recurring *Anfechtungen* because of the continuing presence of flesh and sin, there is also a positive side.

> Namely, they are at the same time the way of growth of the new man. . . . The old man groans in the *Anfechtung* but he should go under in this. If the sinner in tribulation is patient and waits on the Hand of God which works in him, he is established and acquires hope, faith, and love, which becomes his in the *Anfechtung*.[130]

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[129] Horst Beintker, *Die Überwindung der Anfechtung bei Luther* (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1954), p. 184.

[130] *Ibid*., p. 188.

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Luther does not stress the continuing vexation of the Anfechtung but the overcoming of the Anfechtung. He says,

> I have experienced how much difficulty this business has caused me. For I cannot repel Satan as I would like. . . . Thanks be to God, however, for preserving us in the Word, in faith, and in prayer! . . . One should rely on the power of Christ. When we are weak, He is strong; and through us weaklings He always conquers and triumphs.[131]

In another place he says there is an advantage to Anfechtungen.

> Satan continually mounts new battles against us. It is a real advantage to us that with his plots he attacks and exercises us in this way, for by this means he confirms our doctrine and increases faith in us. We have often been struck down in this battle, and we are still being struck down; but we are not destroyed (II Cor. 4:9). For Christ has always led us in triumph, and He is still triumphing through us (II Cor. 2:14). From this we gain the firm hope that through Christ we shall eventually emerge as victors over the devil.[132]

As Christ helps the struggling one to overcome there is growth in faith and a firmer grasp of the conscience upon Christ. Christ

> comes to us spiritually every day, causing us to grow in faith and in our knowledge of Him. Thus the conscience takes hold of Christ more perfectly day by day; and day by day the law of flesh and sin, the fear of death, and whatever other evils the Law brings with it are diminishing.[133]

The preceding quotation from Luther indicates the importance of the control of the conscience by Christ. Conscience is a central concept in the theology of Luther.[134] But, even though it is a central concept for him, Luther is not always precise in his use of the term. He sometimes used 'heart' as a parallel concept to conscience. He does so in his Romans lectures of 1515-16.

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[131] LW 26, 196.

[132] Ibid., 193.

[133] Ibid., 349-350.

[134] Günter Jacob, Der Gewissensbegriff in der Theologie Luthers, in Beiträge zur Historischen Theologie (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1929), No. 4, 1.

> To be sure, from our conscience we get only thoughts of accusation, because our works are nothing in the presence of God . . . . Whence shall we take thoughts to defend us? Only from Christ, and only in Him will we find them. For if the heart of a believer in Christ accuses him and reprimands him and witnesses against him that he has done evil, he will immediately turn away from evil and will take his refuge in Christ and say, "Christ has done enough for me. He is just. He is my defense. . . ." Thus we can say, "God is greater than our heart" (I John 3:20).[135]

In a later statement Luther links not only 'heart' but 'understanding' with conscience. In commenting on Psalm 18, verse 28, in Operationes in Psalmos (1519-21) he says:

> And what is this 'candle' of ours which is lighted by the illumination of the Word? It is without doubt our heart; and whether you call it the conscience or the understanding it is all one and the same thing.[136]

Plainly, Luther is using conscience in a broad and yet very significant way. Günter Jacob says that the conscience, for Luther, means the very essence of the man.[137] Gerhard Ebeling points out that 'conscience' for Luther means a man's inmost being. The struggle for control of the conscience is a struggle for control of a man. Such control has powerful consequences also for the outward and visible life of a man.[138] Paul Althaus also asserts this central meaning of conscience in the thought of Luther. The battle of accusing powers is fought in the conscience. "Since God's wrath strikes man in his conscience, it must also be overcome in the conscience; it is overcome when the conscience grasps Christ in faith."[139]

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[135] LW 25, 188.

[136] Cole IV, 241.

[137] Jacob, p. 6.

But, for Luther, it was not only the initial grasping of Christ by the conscience that was important. Important also is the continual and growing control of the conscience by Christ. Nowhere is this more evident in the writings of Luther than in his introduction to the 1535 Lectures on Galatians.

> We have said above that in a Christian the Law must not exceed its limits but should have its dominion only over the flesh, which is subjected to it and remains under it. When this is the case, the Law remains within its limits. But if it wants to ascend into the conscience and exert its rule there, see to it that you are a good dialectician and that you make the correct distinction. Give no more to the Law than it has coming, and say to it: "Law, you want to ascend into the realm of the conscience and rule there. You want to denounce its sin and take away the joy of my heart, which I have through faith in Christ. You want to plunge me into despair, in order that I may perish. You are exceeding your jurisdiction. Stay within your limits, and exercise your dominion over the flesh. You shall not touch my conscience. For I am baptized; and through the Gospel I have been called to a fellowship of righteousness and eternal life, to the kingdom of Christ, in which my conscience is at peace, where there is no Law but only the forgiveness of sins, peace, quiet,

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[138] Ebeling, Luther, pp. 261-262.

[139] Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), p. 216.

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> happiness, salvation, and eternal life. Do not disturb me in these matters. In my conscience not the Law will reign, that hard tyrant and cruel disciplinarian, but Christ, the Son of God, the King of peace and righteousness, the sweet Savior and Mediator. He will preserve my conscience happy and peaceful in the sound and pure doctrine of the Gospel and in the knowledge of this passive righteousness."[140]

In sum, the meaning of conscience for Luther is this: conscience is the center of being; control of the conscience determines the existence of a man; control does not mean obliteration of opposing forces since man is both/and, not either/or; thus, the Law still judges the flesh and controls it so that it can be kept in check; but the Gospel as a passive (externally given) righteousness and forgiveness must more and more dominate the conscience so that the person has "forgiveness of sins, peace, quiet, happiness, salvation and eternal life."

A final aspect of growth through the resolution of recurring _Anfechtung_ is the recognition that God is the ultimate source of _Anfechtung_. It is He who permits it for the good and growth of the believer. Luther came to this understanding only after the resolution of many _Anfechtungen_. But even after such experiences, he could ascribe the origin of _Anfechtung_ to different sources, especially when he was in the midst of _Anfechtung_. C. Warren Hovland points out, for instance, that Luther ascribes many sources to the temptation of Jacob.

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[140] _LW_ 26, 11.

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> In one passage it is 'the devil,' in another it is 'God,' in another 'the Lord,' twice he uses the phrase, 'an angry God,' in another it is 'the Son of God,' and in still others it is 'Christ himself.'[141]

For the most part, Luther ascribes the source of Anfechtung to Satan or to God. He ascribes the source to Satan, for instance, in his comments on Isaiah 38:17 in his lectures of 1527-28. "When sickness and misfortunes come Satan, too, soon comes and troubles the conscience, and for that reason a Christian must fight with his conscience and with his body."[142] Further on in the same series of lectures Luther says in connection with Isaiah 53:5:

> Satan can turn antidotes into poison and hope into despair. For when a Christian hears these supreme consolations and then sees how weak he is with regard to his faith in them he soon thinks that they do not apply to him. In this Satan can turn consolation into distress.[143]

From these two statements it is obvious that Luther sees the role of Satan as instrumental in turning external problems into internal Anfechtung and in turning consolation into despair. On the other hand Luther can ascribe some of the same afflicting activities to God. When God is the source of the Anfechtung he takes many forms. Hovland indicates that God, for Luther, can take the form of a judge, an enemy, the tempter, the hidden one, and the arbitrary one.[144]

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[141] Hovland, p. 56, referring to WA 24, 574, 577; 44, 97; 24, 578; and 44, 100.

[142] LW 16, 343.

[143] LW 17, 224.

Who or what, then, is the ultimate source of Anfechtung for Luther? Erich Vogelsang, in his analysis of Luther, understands him to be saying that God is the ultimate source. He quotes from Luther's commentary on the Lord's Prayer: "God sends the temptation so that man learns to understand himself and God."[145] Paul Bühler, in his volume on Die Anfechtung bei Luther concludes;

> At the end it is realized that the devil is only a creature of God. The devil is fully subordinate to God. All comes from God, even all sorrow . . . is only sent from him. There is value in recognizing that perhaps man himself makes a devil out of God.[146]

A third opinion is given by Horst Beintker after his examination of Luther.

> One can no more say . . . that the real Anfechtung is from the devil but one recognizes in the overcoming of the Anfechtung that God sends it as a test. The fruitfulness of these temptations is the recognition that God himself stands behind them.[147]

Perhaps Luther himself best answers the question as to the source of Anfechtung and, in so doing, indicates his own growing insight in his commentary on Psalm 90 (1534-35).

> But He (God) is compelled to take recourse to these works also for the reason that we have indicated above. He does not want us to follow the example of the Manicheans

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[144] Hovland, pp. 49-58

[145] Vogelsang, p. 58.

[146] Bühler, p. 211, referring to WA 42, 553.

[147] Beintker, pp. 93-94.

> and imagine that there are several gods: one, the source of all good; the other, the source of all evil. God wants us to regard the evils we experience as coming to us with His permission. If He had not permitted it, the devil would never have afflicted Job so fearfully (Job 1:12). God permits evils to come to us; for it is His will that, when we have been chastened, we cast ourselves on His mercy.[148]

Thus the God who permits affliction to occur is the ultimate source of Anfechtung. His purpose is always to help the afflicted one to grow in faith and confidence in His mercy. Luther's experience taught him that.

Luther's Theological Interpretation of the Resolutions of His Anfechtungen

The resolutions of Luther's various Anfechtungen resulted in new and creative insights. The insights required theological interpretation over a period of time. As Luther experienced new insights the interpretations changed. Due to the experience out of which the resolutions came there was a dialectical nature to the interpretations, i.e., both the negative aspects experienced in the first phase of the Anfechtung and the positive results experienced in the resolution of the Anfechtung were included. The resolution of the Anfechtung did not eliminate the negative aspects but retained them in a new relation of tension with the positive aspects. Even though resolution meant that the positive aspects predominated, the paradoxical presence of the negative was still acknowledged. In fact, the negative aspects were

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[148] LW 13, 135.

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essential to positive outcomes. Without Anfechtung there could be no breakthrough to new and positive insights. Therefore, Luther's theological interpretations took into account both the negative and the positive. His interpretations spoke of the negative and positive aspects of man in the sight of God as well as the negative and positive aspects of God in relation to man.[149]

Man in the Sight of God

Sinner/Saint

The first of the contrasting aspects in Luther's theological interpretation of man is that of sinner and saint or simul justus et peccator. This interpretation receives first attention because it appeared in Luther's exposition of Romans in 1515-16.

> It is here that Luther gives classic and basic expression to the Christian's existence as 'unsaintly sinner.' Nowhere in Christian literature do the antinomies present in the Christian life emerge more vigorously.[150]

Luther expresses this antinomy in his remarks on Romans 7:16 as he personalizes what Paul says: "Therefore I am at the same time a sinner and a righteous man, for I do the evil and I hate the evil which I do."[151] He gives further expression to the same thought in the scholia on Romans 4:7: "He is at the same time both a sinner and a righteous man; a sinner in fact, but a righteous man by the sure imputation and promise of God that he will continue to deliver him from sin."[152]

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[149] Ebeling, Luther, p. 211. He suggests that Luther's theological points of view can be treated in this two-fold manner.

[150] Ernest B. Koenker, "Man: Simul Justus et Peccator," in Accents in Luther's Theology, edited by Heino Kadai (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1967), p. 100.

It is vital for man to acknowledge that he is sinner and saint. As Luther puts it:

> The saints are always sinners in their own sight, and therefore always justified outwardly. . . . I use the term 'inwardly' (intrinsice) to show how we are in ourselves, in our own eyes, in our own estimation; and the term 'outwardly' (extrinsice) to indicate how we are before God and in His reckoning.[153]

To be a sinner in one's own eyes is to add a third simul to the other two. One is always to be a sinner, always to be penitent, always to be righteous.[154] Repentance for sins stands between the opposites and operates as another simul.[155] It is by repentance that sin is acknowledged and righteousness becomes possible.

It is also vital to recognize that the polarities in man are those of the whole man. Luther marvels at Paul's expression in Romans 7:25: "So then, I of myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin."

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[151] LW 25, 63.

[152] Ibid., 260.

[153] Ibid., 257.

[154] Ibid., 434.

[155] Koenker, p. 101.

> This is the most expressive statement of all. Note that one and the same man at the same time serves the law of God and the law of sin, at the same time is righteous and sins! For he does not say: "My mind serves the law of God," nor does he say: "My flesh serves the law of sin," but: "I, the whole man, the same person, I serve a twofold servitude."[156]

It is not possible to divide man into two distinct and separate aspects for while he is simul justus et peccator he is also simul justus et peccator.[157]

But if there is an emphasis in Luther on the whole man, is there also an emphasis on being wholly a sinner and wholly righteous at the same time? In his comments on Romans, Luther has not reached his mature thought on this matter. He says, "We are in part sinners and in part righteous."[158] Therefore, one only has "the beginning of righteousness."[159] He expresses this view because he is still following Augustine at this time (1516) in his view of concupiscence and in his view of the partial imputation of righteousness.

Luther late came to view concupiscence as sin itself rather than as 'tinder' for sin which must be acceded to in order to become sin. He did this because his own experience showed him the all-pervasive nature of his own concupiscence

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[156] LW 25, 336.

[157] Regin Prenter, Spiritus Creator (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1953), p. 32.

[158] LW 25, 434.

[159] Ibid., 260.

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which resulted in his inability to do the works necessary for meritum de congruo. He also came to emphasize the completeness of Christ's righteousness because of his experience in the resolution of his spiritual Anfechtung. It is for these reasons that Luther later asserted the totality of being a sinner and the totality of being righteous. In the third disputation against the antinomians in 1538, Luther states:

> For this is true, that by the divine reckoning we are in fact wholly righteous ('totaliter justi'), even though sin is still present. . . Thus we are in fact and wholly sinners ('totaliter peccatores').[160]

The opposition is between two complete entities, an opposition of true opposites; and this in the same person. Luther recognized the totality of these contrasting aspects in man in his own experience. It is only when complete 'sinnerliness' is acknowledged that one can, by the grace of God, be regarded as 'saintly.'

Slave/Free/Slave

The second of the contrasting aspects in man is that of slave/free/slave. Man's own will is in slavery to sin before God but becomes free through forgiveness to do the will of God and, in love, becomes slave to all men. From a chronological point of view the free/slave pairing should be treated first since the principal source for this theological interpretation is Luther's The Freedom of a Christian, written in 1520. His fullest treatment of the slave/free aspects is in The Bondage of the Will, published in 1525. However, a theological point of view dictates that the relation of man to God be treated first and then the resulting relation to other men.

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[160] WA 39^1, 553, 564. Quoted by Koenker, p. 113.

In The Bondage of the Will Luther deals with the paradox of knowing one is a slave to sin in relation to God so that one can be forgiven by God and freed to do His will. The illusion of the freedom of the will must be destroyed so that one is really free to do the will of God. Luther had anticipated the argument over the freedom of the will in his Romans lectures of 1515-16. There he took issue with the argument that

> man has been given a free will by which he either merits or fails to merit something. The answer: The free will without grace has absolutely no power to achieve righteousness, but of necessity it is in sin.[161]

But it was Erasmus of Rotterdam who precipitated the full-scale debate on the freedom of the will when he published his De libero arbitrio in 1524. Erasmus argued for his definition of free choice which was: "By free choice in this place we mean a power of the human will by which man can apply himself to the things which lead to eternal salvation, or turn away from them"[162] Luther took vehement issue with that definition and defended his opposition to it.

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[161] LW 25, 375.

> Therefore it is not irreverent, inquisitive, or superfluous, but essentially salutary and necessary for a Christian, to find out whether the will does anything or nothing in matters pertaining to eternal salvation. Indeed, as you (Erasmus) should know, this is the cardinal issue between us, the point on which everything in this controversy turns. For what we are doing is to inquire what free choice can do, what it has done to it, and what is its relation to the grace of God.[163]

Luther's argument about slavery of the will is, as indicated above, "in matters pertaining to eternal salvation." "Salvation is beyond our powers and devices, and depends on the work of God alone." It follows, then, that "when God is not present and at work in us everything we do is evil and we necessarily do what is of no avail for salvation."[164] In relation to God there is no choice but to admit a slavery of the will. One cannot even remain neutral.

> It is, moreover, a mere dialectical fiction that there is in man a neutral and unqualified willing, nor can those who assert it prove it. . . . The truth of the matter is rather as Christ says: "He who is not with me is against me." (Luke 11:23) He does not say: "He who is not with me is not against me either, but neutral."[165]

There is an area of life in which Luther is willing to admit freedom of choice.

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[162] LW 33, 102-103.

[163] Ibid., 35.

[164] Ibid., 64.

[165] Ibid., 115.

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> Free choice is allowed to man only with respect to what is beneath him and not what is above him. That is to say, a man should know that with regard to his faculties and possessions he has the right to use, to do, or to leave undone, according to his own free choice, even though this is controlled by the free choice of God alone, who acts in whatever way he pleases.[166]

Thus Luther does not deny that man can choose between different courses of action in the conduct of life. He is not denying moral responsibility for human actions. These aspects of life fall outside his discussion on the slavery of the will.[167]

In his summary of De servo arbitrio Luther lists five reasons why his case against the freedom of the will is unanswerable. The first is based on God's predestination of all things. Everything takes place as He wills it. Reference has been made to the part this assumption played in Luther's predestination Anfechtung. Secondly, since Satan as ruler of the world does not let men go unless he is forced by the power of the Spirit, there is no free choice. A third argument, undoubtedly based on his personal experience with spiritual Anfechtung, is that original sin has so ruined men that even Christians have a great deal of struggle. Therefore, those without the Spirit cannot possibly be good but only evil. The fourth argument is based on historical experience. The Jews sought righteousness and attained unrighteousness. Therefore, man without grace can will nothing but evil. The Gentiles, who pursued ungodliness, attained righteousness freely and unexpectedly. The final argument is based on Christ. Belief that he has redeemed men by his blood means that the whole man was lost. Not to admit this is to make Christ superfluous or the redeemer only of the lowest parts of man. That is blasphemy and sacrilege.[168] Luther insists on the bondage of the will for the sake of God's freedom and Christ's honor. Gerhard Ebeling indicates that Luther also insists on the bondage of the will for the sake of the freedom of the conscience.

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[166] Ibid., 70.

[167] Ebeling, Luther, p. 218.

> Thus it is a fact, though it sounds strange, that it is faith itself which, acknowledging that free will is nothing, sets the conscience at liberty, and so makes it free to recognize the validity of the illusion of the freedom of the will within the limits imposed upon it. And it is faith, giving due place to God, which gives the freedom to ignore God in a way which is in accordance with the will of God and limited by it.[169]

The freedom to do the will of God results in a voluntary slavery to others. Near the beginning of The Freedom of a Christian, Luther beautifully and simply states the paradoxical theme of the treatise.

> A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. A Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all.
>
> These two theses seem to contradict each other. If, however, they should be found to fit together they would serve our purpose beautifully. Both are Paul's own statements, who says in I Cor. 9 (:19), "For

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[168] LW 33, 293.

[169] Ebeling, Luther, pp. 219-220.

> though I am free from all men, I have made myself a slave to all," and in Rom. 13 (:8), "Owe no one anything, except to love one another."[170]

In relation to the first statement, that a Christian is perfectly free lord of all, Luther emphasizes that every Christian is a king and a priest. By faith he is exalted above all things so that he is subject to nothing, indeed, everything must serve him in obtaining salvation. The Christian is also a priest who is worthy to appear before God to pray for others and to teach others. Faith in Christ makes Christians fellow-kings and fellow-priests with Christ.[171]

However, the Christian is also the dutiful servant of all and that for two reasons. The first is the necessity to control the body.

> Although, as I have said, a man is abundantly and sufficiently justified by faith inwardly, in his spirit, and so has all that he needs, except insofar as this faith and these riches must grow from day to day even to the future life; yet he remains in this mortal life on earth. In this life he must control his own body and have dealings with men. Here the works begin: here a man cannot enjoy leisure; here he must indeed take care to discipline his body by fastings, watchings, labors, and other reasonable discipline and to subject it to the Spirit so that it will obey and conform to the inner man and faith and not revolt against faith and hinder the inner man, as it is the nature of the body to do if it is not held in check.[172]

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[170] LW 31, 344.

[171] *Ibid.*, 354-355.

[172] *Ibid.*, 358-359.

Luther is here pointing to the continuing influence of sin in the life of the Christian, an influence which must be kept under control. The Christian must remember that he is sinner as well as saint.

The second reason that the Christian is the dutiful servant of all is the need of other men.

> A man does not live for himself alone in this mortal body to work for it alone, but he lives also for all men on earth; rather, he lives only for others and not for himself. To this end he brings his body into subjection that he may the more sincerely and freely serve others.[173]

Christ is the model for the Christian in serving others.

> Although the Christian is thus free from all works, he ought in this liberty to empty himself, take upon himself the form of a servant, be made in the likeness of men, be found in human form, and to serve, help, and in every way deal with his neighbor as he sees that God through Christ has dealt and still deals with him. This he should do freely, having regard for nothing but divine approval.[174]

Thus there is no need or compulsion to serve the neighbor and yet the neighbor is to be served. Gerhard Ebeling states that there is a paradoxical unity in the concepts of freedom and obligation. "The freedom which a Christian has through faith is freedom to render the service of love. And it is only the service of love if it is carried out in freedom."[175]

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[173] Ibid., 364.

[174] Ibid., 366.

[175] Ebeling, Luther, p. 212.

In sum, the contrasting aspects of slave/free/slave must be recognized and distinguished so that, on the one hand, the faith relation to God is retained and, on the other hand, loving service to men is rendered. Luther states it best when he says:

> We conclude, therefore, that a Christian lives not in himself, but in Christ and in his neighbor. Otherwise he is not a Christian. He lives in Christ through faith, in his neighbor through love. By faith he is caught up beyond himself into God. By love he descends beneath himself into his neighbor.[176]

Active/Passive

The third pairing of contrasting aspects in man involves active and passive righteousness. The most striking statements of Luther concerning active and passive righteousness are in his introduction to the Galatians commentary of 1535. He did, however, refer to the same concepts earlier in his career but used them in a different manner. He made reference to them in his 1515-16 Lectures on Romans.[177] There he had not yet arrived at his mature thought in the matter. He spoke of passive justification as that justification of God by the believer made possible by the gift of God. Active justification was God's justification of the person because he had justified God. At that time Luther still felt that man played a part in the matter of justification. By

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[176] LW 31, 371.

[177] Supra, p. 33.

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1535 there is no mention of a human contribution to the justification process.

In his "Argument of St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians" which introduces the 1535 commentary Luther begins by making a distinction between four kinds of righteousness. There is political righteousness which is carried out by people in political and civic structures. There is ceremonial righteousness which is conducted under the auspices of the church. There is the righteousness of the Law or the Decalogue as taught by Moses. Finally, there is the righteousness of faith or Christian righteousness.

> But this most excellent righteousness, the righteousness of faith which God imputes to us through Christ without works, is neither political nor ceremonial nor legal nor work-righteousness, while all others, listed above, are active. For here we work nothing, render nothing to God; we only receive and permit someone else to work in us, namely, God. Therefore it is appropriate to call the righteousness of faith or Christian righteousness "passive."[178]

All activities of men are counted as 'active' righteousness. They count for nothing in the relation to God. What God does to justify men is 'passive' as far as men are concerned since they contribute nothing towards it. Luther's use of the term 'passive' rings true to his own experience. In the spiritual Anfechtung God's righteousness came to him when he had given up and become passive and quiet. Luther envisions that others might ask incredulously:

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[178] LW 26, pp. 4-5.

> Then do we do nothing and work nothing in order to obtain this righteousness? I reply: Nothing at all. For this righteousness means to do nothing, to hear nothing, and to know nothing about the Law or about works but to know and believe only this: that Christ has gone to the Father and is now invisible; that He sits in heaven at the right hand of the Father, not as Judge but as one who has been made for us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption from God (I Cor. 1:30); in short, that He is our High Priest, interceding for us and reigning over us and in us through grace.[179]

All of this is not to say that active righteousness has no place. Its place is with the 'old man.' It is important that human society be ordered and governed by political righteousness. It is even possible to use ceremonial righteousness as long as one does not teach that its performance merits grace. And there is also a necessary function for the work demanded by the Law.

> Works and performance of the Law must be demanded in the world as though there were no promise of grace. This is because of the stubborn, proud and hard-hearted, before whose eyes nothing must be set except the Law, in order that they may be terrified and humbled. For the Law was given to terrify and kill the stubborn and to exercise the old man.[180]

But care must be taken not to keep up the pressure on the 'old man' beyond the point of preparation for 'passive' righteousness.

> Therefore, when I see that a man is sufficiently contrite, oppressed by the Law, terrified by sin, and thirsting for comfort, then it is time for me to take the Law and active righteousness from his sight and to set forth before him, through the Gospel, the passive righteousness which excludes Moses and the Law and

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[179] *Ibid.*, 8.

[180] *Ibid.*, 6.

> and shows the promise of Christ, who came for the afflicted and for sinners.[181]

This, too, was true to Luther's experience. The Law could bring a man to his knees, but only the Gospel could lift him up through the Promise of Christ.

To keep up the pressure of the Law is to needlessly torment the conscience of man. When a man is confronted by the demand to measure up, his tendency is to look at his own life and judge whether it is good or bad. Human reason, Luther says, looks at its own active righteousness and ends up with a troubled, confounded and frightened conscience. In that case, the Law and not the Gospel has control of the conscience. There is only one way out of the impasse for the afflicted conscience and that is through passive righteousness. The conscience must say:

> I do not seek active righteousness. I ought to have and perform it; but I declare that even if I did have it and perform it, I cannot trust in it or stand up before the judgment of God on the basis of it. Thus I put myself beyond all active righteousness, all righteousness of my own or of the divine Law, and I embrace only that passive righteousness which is the righteousness of grace, mercy, and the forgiveness of sins.[182]

Thus the conscience is comforted, peaceful and confident in the passive righteousness given by God through Christ.

In addition to the differences between active and passive righteousness, old man and new man, terrified conscience and comforted conscience, there is the difference of two worlds, the heavenly and the earthly. Active righteousness has to do with earth, passive righteousness with heaven. But earth and heaven are not irrevocably split. He who has the passive, heavenly righteousness is motivated to do good works on the earth.

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[181] *Ibid*., 7.

[182] *Ibid*., 5-6.

> When I have this righteousness within me, I descend from heaven like the rain that makes the earth fertile. That is, I come forth into another kingdom, and I perform good works whenever the opportunity arises. If I am a minister of the Word, I preach, I comfort the saddened, I administer the sacraments. If I am a father, I rule my household and my family, I train my children in piety and honesty. If I am a magistrate, I perform the office which I have received by divine command. If I am a servant, I faithfully tend to my master's affairs.[183]

So there is a necessary function for both active and passive righteousness but the functions of each must be kept clear or else a man will end up with the damning pressure of the Law and a terrified conscience.

Works/Faith/Works

The final group of contrasting aspects in man according to Luther's theological interpretation comprises works/faith/works. The need for understanding the proper relation between works and faith was occasioned by the argument of the 'sophists,' as Luther called them, that we are justified by works. In Galatians 5:6, Paul says, "For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is of any avail, but faith working through love."[184] Luther complains that:

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[183] *Ibid.*, 11-12.

> The sophists apply this passage in support of their doctrine that we are justified by love or by works. For they say that even when faith has been divinely infused - and I am not even speaking of faith that is merely acquired - it does not justify unless it has been formed by love. They call love "the grace that makes one acceptable," namely that justifies, to use our term, or rather Paul's. . . . In this manner they completely transfer justification from faith and attribute it solely to love as thus defined. And they claim that this is proved by St. Paul in this passage - "faith working through love" - as though Paul wanted to say: "You see, faith does not justify; in fact, it is nothing unless love the worker is added, which forms faith."[185]

He points out that the 'sophists' also used Romans 13:10 in the same way.

> The sophists took the statement of Paul, "Love is the fulfilling of the Law" (Rom. 13:10), and by misinterpreting it they argued: "If love is the fulfilling of the law, then love is righteousness. Therefore if we love, we are righteous."[186]

Because of his experience in the spiritual Anfechtung Luther had completely repudiated the idea of love as that infused quality at the level of the meritum de condigno which made a person worthy of being accepted by God. It is faith, not love, that marks the relation to God.

It is obvious that Paul urges good works in his letter to the Galatians. In 5:13, he says, "through love be servants of one another."[187] And in 5:14 he points out that it is God's Law that is involved in carrying out good works; "For the whole law is fulfilled in one word: you shall love your neighbor as yourself."[188] However, Luther insists, sin gets in the way and makes the keeping of the Law impossible. He knew this to be true because he had gone that route before.

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[184] LW 27, 28.

[185] Ibid.

[186] Ibid., 16.

> Of course, we should keep the Law and be justified in keeping it; but sin gets in the way. The Law prescribes and commands that we love God with all our heart, etc., and our neighbor as ourselves (Matt. 22:37-39); but from this it does not follow: "This is written, and therefore we love." You cannot produce anyone on earth who loves God and his neighbor as the Law requires. . . . And thus our corrupt love of ourselves is so powerful that it greatly surpasses our love of God and of our neighbor. . . . Therefore it is a great error to attribute justification to a love that does not exist or, if it does, is not great enough to placate God; for, as I have said, even the saints love in an imperfect and impure way in this present life, and nothing impure will enter the kingdom of God (Eph. 5:5).[189]

But even beyond the impossibility of finding anyone who can measure up, there is the infinitely worse situation of robbing men of their freedom of conscience in Christ. In Galatians 5:1, Paul says: "For freedom Christ has set us free; stand fast therefore."[190] For Luther this freedom is a freedom from the wrath of God; a freedom of the conscience.[191]

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[187] *Ibid.*, 48.

[188] *Ibid.*, 55.

[189] *Ibid.*, 63-64.

[190] *Ibid.*, 3.

[191] *Ibid.*, 4.

That freedom stands in constant danger of being lost. When Paul says, "And do not submit again to a yoke of slavery,"[192] Luther comments:

> He (Paul) commands them to stand, because it is very easy to lose all this either by carelessness and smugness or by a relapse from grace and faith into the Law and works. But because to reason this does not seem dangerous, since reason vastly prefers the righteousness of the Law to the righteousness of faith, therefore he denounces the Law of God with great indignation; contemptuously and scornfully he calls it a "yoke," in fact, a "yoke of slavery." . . . For the false apostles minimized the importance of the promise and magnified the Law and its works. . . . Paul says the exact opposite. "Those who teach the Law in this way," he says, "do not set consciences free; they ensnare them. They ensnare them in a yoke, indeed in a yoke of slavery."[193]

Luther had been under that yoke of slavery for years and knew its agony and frustration.

Instead of being ensnared by the yoke of the Law, Christians are to walk by the Spirit. Paul says in Galatians 5:16, "But I say, walk by the Spirit, and do not gratify the desires of the flesh."[194] For Luther, Paul's admonition to "walk by the Spirit" is an appeal above the Law to fulfill the Law through the Spirit of God. The Spirit sets up the struggle with the flesh in order that God may prevail and the flesh fail. Luther explains what Paul means when he counsels walking by the Spirit.

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[192] Ibid., 7.

[193] Ibid.

[194] Ibid., 63.

> Thus he has not forgotten the matter of justification. For when he commands them to walk by the Spirit, he clearly denies that works justify. It is as though he were saying: "When I speak about the fulfilling of the Law, I do not intend to say that we are justified by the Law. But what I am saying is that there are two contrary guides in you, the Spirit and the flesh. God has stirred up a conflict and fight in your body. For the Spirit struggles against the flesh, and the flesh against the Spirit. All that I am requiring of you now - and, for that matter, all that you are able to produce - is that you follow the guidance of the Spirit and resist the guidance of the flesh. Obey the former and fight against the latter.[195]

In the Anfechtung involving flesh and Spirit it is not as though there were two equal powers contending for control with neither able to win. The Spirit of God will overcome the Anfechtung. Luther is confident that "our righteousness is more abundant than our sin, because the holiness and righteousness of Christ, our Propitiator, vastly surpasses the sin of the entire world."[196] This is to say, as does Robert Bertram;

> To "walk by the Spirit" is that behavioral fact of the Christian life which is signalled by a struggle, but a struggle in which the one power has the upper hand, exercises the executive office of the ego, though perhaps not much more than that.[197]

The Christian who 'walks by the Spirit' is one who is free in the conscience but bound in the body.

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[195] Ibid., 65-66.

[196] Ibid., 68.

[197] Robert Bertram, "The Radical Dialectic Between Faith and Works in Luther's Lectures on Galatians (1535)," in Luther for an Ecumenical Age, edited by Carl S. Meyer (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1967), p. 233.

> Therefore the godly should remember that for the sake of Christ they are free in their conscience before God from the curse of the Law, from sin, and from death, but that according to the body they are bound; here each must serve the other through love, in accordance with this commandment of Paul. Therefore let everyone strive to do his duty in his calling and to help his neighbor in whatever way he can.[198]

The neighbor is any human being, especially one who needs help. Even someone who has harmed or injured the Christian has not ceased to be a neighbor. Fault-finding is out of order in serving the neighbor. Many people forget this, Luther says, and look for faults and blemishes in others.

> You will find many mockers so inhuman and spiteful that they do not refer to the objects of their malice by their proper names but describe them with some contemptuous nickname like 'Cockeyed' or 'Hooknose' or 'Bigmouth.'[199]

Serving others in love means serving everyone in love, even a 'Bigmouth.'

Works and faith, then, are to be kept distinct and in proper relation to one another. Not to do so is to forget that sin makes it impossible for man to keep the Law and to ensnare his conscience in the delusion that he must keep trying. It is to forget that necessary Anfechtung between flesh and Spirit and let flesh reign to the ruin of man. Luther sums it up best in a positive way in commenting on "faith working through love."

> Paul is describing the whole of Christian life in this passage; inwardly it is faith toward God, and

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[198] LW 27, 49-50.

[199] Ibid., 59.

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> outwardly it is love or works toward one's neighbor. Thus a man is a Christian in a total sense: inwardly through faith in the sight of God, who does not need our works; outwardly, in the sight of men, who do not derive any benefit from faith but do derive benefit from works or from love.[200]

God in Relation to Man

Glory/Cross

Turning now to the contrasting aspects of Luther's view of God in relation to man, the first contrasts are a theology of glory and a theology of the cross. They form a bridge between the two groups of contrasts since a theology of the cross pertains as much to man in the sight of God as to God in relation to man. Luther's *theologia crucis* emerged in 1516 in letters, sermons and lectures. It is implicit in the *Ninety-Five Theses* of 1517 and is clearly expressed in the *Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses* in 1518. Luther also expressed this theology in the *Heidelberg Disputation* which he prepared for debate during the chapter of his order in April, 1518.[201]

The theology of the cross is involved in the problem of knowing God. The solution to the problem of knowing God is a paradox.[202] Some men seek to know God by philosophical reflection or contemplation on created reality. The attempt to do this is part of a 'theology of glory.' Anyone who attempts such an approach to God cannot be called a theologian. Luther says in Thesis Nineteen of the Heidelberg Disputation: "That person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks upon the invisible things of God as though they were clearly perceptible in those things which have actually happened."[203] Luther undoubtedly had in mind the Scholastic theologians of the Via Antiqua who preceded theologians of the Via Moderna such as Duns Scotus. Theologians of the Via Antiqua assumed that reason could determine truth about God. Such theologians were plainly questing after the eternal power and deity of God through God's creation and the events of history. Even one of the disciples was a theologian of glory, said Luther. When Philip asked, "Show us the Father," (John 14:8) he was talking according to a theology of glory.[204] Such a theology comes from a person who "prefers works to sufferings, glory to the cross, strength to weakness, wisdom to folly, and, in general, good to evil."[205] That is why

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[200] *Ibid.*, 30.

[201] E. Gordon Rupp, "Luther's Ninety-Five Theses and the Theology of the Cross," in *Luther for an Ecumenical Age*, edited by Carl S. Meyer (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1967), p. 69.

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[202] Heino Kadai, "Luther's Theology of the Cross," in Accents in Luther's Theology, edited by Heino Kadai (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1967), p. 240.

[203] LW 31, 52.

[204] Ibid., 53.

[205] Ibid.

Luther says in Thesis Twenty-One of the Heidelberg Disputation, "A theology of glory calls evil good and good evil."[206] Everything is the reverse of what it ought to be.

The theologian of the cross is one who knows God through the visible and manifest sufferings of the cross. Luther states this in Thesis Twenty of the Heidelberg Diputation: "He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross."[207] In the cross is seen the weakness and folly of God, the humility of shame and suffering. Christ answered that theologian of glory, Philip, by saying:

> "Philip, he who has seen me has seen the Father." (John 14:9) For this reason true theology and recognition of God are in the crucified Christ, as it is also stated in John 10 (John 14:6): "No one comes to the Father, but by me," "I am the door" (John 10:9), and so forth.[208]

"A theology of the cross calls the thing what it actually is," states Luther in the second part of Thesis Twenty-One of the same document.

> Therefore the friends of the cross say that the cross is good and works are evil, for through the cross works are dethroned and the Old Adam, who is especially edified by works, is crucified. It is impossible for a person not to be puffed up by his good works unless he has first been deflated and destroyed by

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[206] Ibid.

[207] Ibid., 52.

[208] Ibid., 53.

> suffering and evil until he knows that he is worthless and that his works are not his but God's.[209]

Luther plainly spells out the necessity of a personal 'life of the cross' based, undoubtedly, on his own Anfechtung.

It was to the idea of life without a cross that he objected most strenuously in the Ninety-Five Theses. The indulgence hawkers were promising life without suffering, a life of peace. The last four theses of the Ninety-Five Theses state his objection to this promise.

> 92. Away then with all those prophets who say to the people of Christ, "Peace, peace," and there is no peace! (Jer. 6:14)
>
> 93. Blessed be all those prophets who say to the people of Christ, "Cross, cross," and there is no cross!
>
> 94. Christians should be exhorted to be diligent in following Christ, their head, through penalties, death, and hell;
>
> 95. And thus be confident of entering heaven through many tribulations rather than through the false security of peace (Acts 14:22).[210]

The sellers of indulgences were promising a peace which could only turn out to be a false security and would ultimately end in eternal damnation. Christians, on the other hand, knew that they should follow Christ in suffering and thus be confident of being with Him in that place where, finally, there is no cross.

Luther could speak from his own experience about the necessity of internal suffering. In Thesis Fifteen of the

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[209] Ibid.

[210] LW 31, 33.

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Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses he speaks of the fears and horror of purgatory as part of this life. Gordon Rupp comments:

> That the good fight of faith is a battle, often an agony, belongs to Luther's doctrine of _Anfechtung_. At this time he underlines the anguish that may come to souls in this life and which is a foretaste of eternal torment. . . . Luther attacked the externalization of the notion of punishment, especially in regard to purgatory, and regarded this as one of the most mischievous errors of the indulgence sellers. For Luther it is fear and despair that are the true pains of purgatory and hell.[211]

It is at this point in his _Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses_ that Luther relates his famous 'I knew a man' passage, a passage many think describes his own experience of intense _Anfechtung_.[212]

The contrasting aspects of a theology of glory and a theology of the cross have a great deal to do with the revelation of God and the way in which He can be understood. God cannot be understood apart from the afflictions of the cross. As Regin Prenter says:

> The statement, "God revealed himself in the cross of Christ," has a double meaning. In the first place it means: "The love of God toward sinners is only recognizable in the love with which the Son of God took upon himself the punishment for all our sins upon the cross." In the second place it means: "This love of God, which is manifested in the cross, is only appropriated by us in so far as we are willing to take up our own cross. Since Christ actually bore our

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[211] Rupp, "Luther's Ninety-Five Theses and the Theology of the Cross," p. 74.

[212] _Supra_, p. 46.

> punishment upon his cross, to hate our own cross is at the same time to hate his, and to love his cross is at the same time to love our own."[213]

One way in which Luther himself stated the latter portion of Prenter's comment is that one "cannot understand Scripture or the fear and love of God" without Anfechtung.[214] Therefore, a theology and life of the cross are essential for salvation.

Alien/Proper

The second pair of contrasts in Luther's view of God is that of His alien and proper work, his opus alienum and opus proprium. These contrasts are closely related to the theology of the cross as are the contrasts of the hidden and revealed God. All three pairs of contrasts could be regarded as parallel concepts. In an early sermon in 1516 Luther speaks of God's alien and proper work in a way that indicates the close relation to his theology of the cross.

> God's alien work, therefore, is the suffering of Christ and sufferings in Christ, the crucifixion of the old man and the mortification of Adam. God's proper work, however, is the resurrection of Christ, justification in the Spirit, and the vivification of the new man, as Rom. 4(:25) says: Christ died for our sins and was raised for our justification. Thus, conformity with the image of the Son of God (cf. Rom. 8:29) includes both of these works.[215]

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[213] Regin Prenter, Luther's Theology of the Cross (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), p. 4.

[214] Supra, pp. 17-18.

[215] LW 51, 19.

The sufferings of Christ and the similar sufferings of the Christian constitute the alien work of God. The idea of the alien and the proper work of God came from Isaiah 28:21. There Luther found a pregnant phrase which he continued to use through his lifetime. Isaiah 28:21 reads: "For the Lord will rise up as on Mount Perazim, he will be wroth as in the valley of Gibeon; to do his deed - strange is his deed! and to work his work - alien is his work!"[216] In his Lectures on Isaiah in 1527-28, Luther comments on this passage:

> It is as if he were saying: "Because you scoff at the Word, the Lord is forced to do a strange work, namely, to judge and to destroy." For the proper work and nature of God is to save. But when our flesh is so evil that it cannot be saved by God's proper work, it is necessary for it to be saved by His alien work. Because in good times we stroll and stray from the Word . . . we must be disciplined by various afflictions so that we may be saved by God's alien work. . . . So you see that our flesh is outwardly indulgent when it is without the cross, and therefore various afflictions are necessary to control that flesh.[217]

Luther is pointing out, as he did in the theologia crucis, that men have a penchant for seeking God through easy and peaceful means. Even those who have come to know God in Jesus Christ tend to fall back into such a rut. The result is spiritually disastrous and experientially untrue. Men know God only through suffering.

Early in his career Luther spoke of the way that God can use the Gospel in a strange or alien way. In the same sermon

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[216] Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version.

[217] LW 16, 233-234

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from St. Thomas' Day in 1516 Luther says that the Gospel can be viewed as having a proper and an alien work. The Gospel's proper work is to proclaim the proper work of God, that is, His grace in Jesus Christ.

> But the strange work of the gospel is to prepare a people (cf. Luke 1:17) perfect for the Lord, that is, to make manifest sins and pronounce guilty those who were righteous in their own eyes by declaring that all men are sinners and devoid of the grace of God (cf. Rom. 3:23). But such a message may appear to be the worst kind of message, and therefore one might much rather call it a Cacangelium, i.e., bad news, sad news.[218]

This is one of the rare occasions in which Luther speaks of the Gospel in such a manner. In his mature theology of later years the Cacangelium is always the Law.

God also uses the devil for his alien purpose. Luther speaks of this in his Lectures on Hebrews in 1517-18.

> God's proper work . . . is "life, peace, joy" and the other fruits of the Spirit in Gal. 5:22. Yet in this the Lord "exalted His holy One" (Ps. 4:3) and is "wonderful among all His saints" (Ps. 68:35) that He destroyed the devil, not by a work of God but by a work of the devil himself. For this is the most glorious kind of victory, namely, to pierce the adversary with his own weapon and to slay him with his own sword, as we sing: "He fell prostrate on his darts." For in this way God promotes and completes His work by means of an alien deed, and by His wonderful wisdom He compels the devil to work through death nothing else than life, so that in this way, while he acts most of all against the work of God, he acts for the work of God and against his own work with his own deed. For thus he worked death in Christ, but Christ completely swallowed up death in Himself through the immortality of His divinity and rose again in glory.[219]

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[218] LW 51, 20.

[219] LW 29, 135.

In this description of the way in which God uses the devil for his own 'alien' purposes, Luther is again reflecting his own experience whereby Anfechtungen which seemingly were the work of the devil turned out to be the work of God for Luther's own good.

The contrasts in God of his alien and proper work were a theological theme which Luther continued to use in his writings. In his commentary on Psalm 90 in 1534-35 he again uses the concept of the alien and proper work of God.

> God indeed also claims for Himself the work of slaying man, as we have heard above (v. 13). In Scripture God expressly says: "I kill and I make alive" (Deut. 32: 39). But Isaiah distinguishes between these works of God and says that some are His "alien" works and others are his "natural" works (Is. 28:21).
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> The latter are God's works of grace, according to which He forgives sins, pronounces sinners just, and saves those who believe in Christ.
>
> God's "alien" works are these: to judge, to condemn, and to punish those who are impenitent and do not believe. God is compelled to resort to such "alien" works and to call them his own because of our pride. By manifesting these works He aims to humble us that we might regard Him as our Lord and obey His will.[220]

Luther knew whereof he spoke. He had experienced the 'alien' work of God in his Anfechtungen. He knew, as Regin Prenter says,

> the inner conflicts are God's opus alienum, which prepares the way for his opus proprium. He takes away all peace from the conscience in order to give it peace.

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[220] LW 13, 135.

> This is the order of salvation of God. He puts to death before He makes alive.[221]

One cannot know God and be in a saving relation to Him without this realization.

Hidden/Revealed

A third way of theologically interpreting the contrasting aspects in God is to speak of Him as the hidden and revealed God: deus absconditus and deus revelatus. The biblical basis for this expression is found in Isaiah 45:15: "Truly, Thou art a God who hidest Thyself."[222] Luther comments on this verse: "Since faith is the conviction of things not seen, the opposite must appear to be the case."[223] The same idea of the hiddeness of that which is ultimately good is expressed earlier in Luther's Lectures on Romans in 1515-16.

> For what is good for us is hidden, and that so deeply it is hidden under its opposite. Thus our life is hidden under death, love for ourselves under hate for ourselves, glory under ignominy, salvation under damnation, our kingship under exile, heaven under hell, wisdom under foolishness, righteousness under sin, power under weakness. And universally our every assertion of anything good is hidden under the denial of it, so that faith may have its place in God . . . .[224]

Such an assertion again reflects Luther's experience of coming to know God through Anfechtung. Only when everything seems to be the opposite of what it should be and one is reduced to nothingness, can the insight of faith dawn and give light. Nowhere does Luther say this more forcefully than in his comments on Psalm 117 in 1530.

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[221] Prenter, Spiritus Creator, pp. 15-16.

[222] LW 17, 131.

[223] Ibid., 132.

[224] LW 25, 382.

> Now what is true of grace is also true of God's faithfulness or truth. Outwardly his grace seems to be nothing but wrath, so deeply is it buried under two thick hides or pelts. Our opponents and the world condemn and avoid it like the plague or God's wrath, and our own feeling about it is not different.
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> Peter truthfully says (2Peter 1:19) that the Word is like a lamp shining in a dark place. Most certainly it is a dark place! God's faithfulness and truth always must first become a great lie before it becomes truth. The world calls this truth heresy. And we, too, are constantly tempted to believe that God would abandon us and not keep His Word; and in our hearts He begins to become a liar. In short, God cannot be God unless He first becomes a devil. We cannot go to heaven unless we first go to hell. We cannot become God's children until we first become children of the devil. All that God speaks and does the devil has to speak and do first. And our flesh agrees. Therefore it is the Spirit who enlightens and teaches us in the Word to believe differently. By the same token the lies of this world cannot become lies without first having become truth. The godless do not go to hell without first having gone to heaven. They do not become the devil's children until they have first been the children of God.[225]

There is a remarkable reversal when the godless assume they are godly and it ultimately turns out that they are without God. It is a very discomforting outcome for what seemed to be a comfortable situation. But how does the one who initially assumes that he is without God find comfort? Luther replies:

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[225] LW 14, 31.

> But it is comforting to him who can grasp it, if he is sure that all is God's grace and truth, even when it seems to be the opposite, and if he can then say in spiritual defiance: "I know well that God's Word must first become a great lie, even in myself, before it can become truth. I also know that the devil's word must first become the delicate truth of God before it can become a lie. I must grant the devil his hour of godliness and ascribe devilhood to our God. But this is not the whole story. The last word is: "His faithfulness and truth endure forever."[226]

Luther expresses confidence that God finally emerges from his hiddeness and reveals himself. He had experienced it many times. Thus he has the confidence to say, "His faithfulness and truth endure forever."

There is a place in Luther's writings, however, in which he speaks of a God who does not reveal himself, one who remains hidden. Whereas in the other writings Luther speaks of a God who finally reveals himself in spite of alien works and hiddeness, in _The Bondage of the Will_ he speaks of a God who remains hidden behind the revelation. As Paul Althaus says,

> The hiddeness Luther describes in _The Bondage of the Will_ . . . is not the coincidence of revelation and of hiddeness but God's hiddeness behind and beyond revelation in the mystery which forms the background of his almighty double-willing and double-working of salvation and damnation. 'God himself' is to be found behind and beyond the word and not in it.[227]

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[226] _Ibid._, 32.

[227] Althaus, p. 277.

Luther himself speaks of this God who remains hidden by making a distinction between the God who is preached and the God who is hidden.

> For it is this that God as he is preached is concerned with, namely, that sin and death should be taken away and we should be saved. For "he sent his word and healed them" (Ps. 107:20). But God hidden in his majesty neither deplores nor takes away death, but works life, death, and all in all. For there he has not bound himself by his word, but has kept himself free over all things.
>
> Diatribe, however (meaning Erasmus' *de libero arbitrio*), deceives herself in her ignorance by not making any distinction between God preached and God hidden, that is, between the Word of God and God himself. God does many things which he does not disclose to us in his word; he also wills many things which he does not disclose himself as willing in his word; but he wills it according to that inscrutable will of his.[228]

This is a remarkable statement and many Luther scholars have tried to understand Luther's reasoning at this point. John Dillenberger says that the doctrine of predestination plays a significant part here. Luther does not speculate on the nature of predestination. He simply acknowledges "the hidden character of God's activity in the world as anchored in God behind his revelation. Here there was to be respect but not inquiry."[229]

Dillenberger's remarks do not, however, reveal the whole purpose of Luther. Luther was also convinced that an under-

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[228] *LW* 33, 140.

[229] John Dillenberger, *God Hidden and Revealed* (Philadelpia: Muhlenberg Press, 1953), p. 150.

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standing of the full hiddeness of God had meaning for the faith of the elect.

> God has assuredly promised His grace to the humble (I Peter 5:5), that is, to those who lament and despair of themselves. But no man can be thoroughly humbled until he knows that his salvation is utterly beyond his own powers, devices, endeavors, will, and works, and depends entirely on the choice, will, and work of another, namely, of God alone. . . . But when a man has no doubt that everything depends on the will of God, then he completely despairs of himself and chooses nothing for himself but waits for God to work; then he has come close to grace, and can be saved.
>
> It is thus for the sake of the elect that these things are published, in order that being humbled and brought back to nothingness by this means they may be saved.[230]

The hiddeness of God, then, strips a man of any illusions concerning his own ability and reduces him to nothingness. As Paul Althaus says,

> The knowledge that God has man's salvation and damnation completely in His hand and that he chooses and rejects by his own free will, completely frees a man from the delusion that he could contribute something to his own salvation. . . . Only this can destroy man's final self-trust before God.[231]

Luther experienced this in the predestination Anfechtung. Such an Anfechtung brings a man 'close to grace' and makes possible the radicalness of a faith that believes what God has revealed of himself in Jesus Christ even though there still remains a hiddeness to His divine will.[232]

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[230] LW 33, 61-62.

[231] Althaus, p. 283.

[232] Supra, pp. 65-67.

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Law/Gospel

The final and most important theological interpretation of the contrasts in God is that of Law and Gospel. It is the most important because Luther used Law and Gospel as the most consistent expression of his mature theology. The importance that Luther ascribes to the distinction between Law and Gospel can be seen in one of his table talks late in life (1542-43).

> I lacked nothing before this (i.e., for an understanding of Rom. 1:17) except that I made no distinction between law and Gospel. I regarded both as the same thing and held there was no difference between Christ and Moses except the times they lived and their degree of perfection. But when I discovered the proper distinction - namely, that the law is one thing and the Gospel is another - I made myself freed.[233]

The distinction between law and Gospel replaced an earlier distinction of Augustine between the letter and the Spirit.[234] Law and Gospel became the foremost expression of Luther's theology, says Horst Beintker, because it came out of and was rooted in his Anfechtung.[235] And a Roman Catholic scholar has come to the conclusion that the Law-Gospel experience

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[233] LW 54, 442-443.

[234] Ebeling, Luther, p. 110.

[235] Beintker, p. 92.

"is not a mere aspect of Luther's theology but the very heart and core of his basic conviction."[236]

It has already been pointed out that Luther used Law and Gospel in early writings such as Romans (1515-16) and Hebrews (1517-18) even though he had not yet divorced the Gospel from a grace coupled with the will of man to produce works of merit.[237] After 1518 he continued to use Law and Gospel as a prominent theological expression. In The Freedom of a Christian in 1520 he stated that the entire Scripture is divided into two parts: commandments and promises. The commandments show what ought to be done but do not give the power to do it. They teach man his inability and lead him to despair. But in the promises God fulfills His demands and gives the Christian freedom from law and works.[238] In his writing Against Latomus in 1521, Luther says: "We therefore have two goods of the gospel against the two evils of the law: the gift on account of sin, and grace on account of wrath."[239] In The Bondage of the Will Luther accused Erasmus of failure to distinguish between law and Gospel in de libero arbitrio because Erasmus assumed that when God tells man what he ought to do this same command gives the power to do it. Luther insisted that,

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[236] Thomas M. McDonough, O. P., The Law and the Gospel in Luther (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 146.

[237] Supra, pp. 34-35

[238] LW 31, 348-349.

[239] LW 32, 228.

> by the words of the law man is warned and instructed as to what he ought to do, not what he is able to do; their purpose is that he may know his sin, not that he may believe himself to have any power.[240]

In 1527-28 he again pointed out the centrality of Law and Gospel in his Lectures on Isaiah.

> This is the summary of Scripture: It is the work of the Law to humble according to history, externally and internally, physically and spiritually. It is the work of the Gospel to console, externally and internally, physically and spiritually.[241]

In his Lectures on Galatians of 1535, one of his greatest expressions of Law and Gospel, Luther spoke of the distinction of Law and Gospel as a recent discovery and one so important that it must not be lost. He lamented that for many centuries there had been a remarkable silence about Law and Gospel in the schools and churches.

> This situation has produced a very dangerous condition for consciences; for unless the Gospel is clearly distinguished from the Law, Christian doctrine cannot be kept sound. But when this distinction is recognized, the true meaning of justification is recognized.[242]

Luther's understanding and use of Law and Gospel reveals a very complex pattern of thought. Some of that complexity is indicated in his references to the use of the Law by the devil while at the same time admitting that both Law and Gospel come from God.[243] Or, another indication of the complexity is shown by his insistence that the same word of God can be both Law and Gospel. This is especially true of Luther's use of the First Commandment. That means, as Paul Bühler notes, that one must distinguish between form and function. The word can have the same form, e.g., the First Commandment, but have a different function depending upon the person whom it affects.[244] There is a difference in the effect upon a believer and a non-believer. For the anguished believer, command and assurance are woven together in the First Commandment. God overcomes doubt by commanding the believer to see Him as loving Father-God using all his authority as Creator to do so.

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[240] LW 33, 127.

[241] LW 16, 327.

[242] LW 26, 313.

[243] Ibid., 10.

> See what a gracious God and Father we have, who does not only assure us of forgiveness of sins, but also commands concerning the most serious sin that we should believe it is forgiven, and urges us with the same command to have a happy conscience . . . .[245]

Not to believe is a sin against the First Commandment, therefore the command to believe must be taken seriously.

Jaroslav Pelikan states the differing functions in this way:

> To the believer the threats of God were a consolation, because he knew that God spoke of His word of threatening in order to console, as He crucified Christ in order to make Him alive. And to the wicked the consolations of God were a threat, because by this Word

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[244] Bühler, p. 118.

[245] WA 2, 717. Quoted by Ronald Hals, "Luther and the First Commandment," in Interpreting Luther's Legacy, edited by Fred W. Meuser and Stanley D. Schneider (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1969), p. 7.

> God made the wicked even more smug and thus destroyed him or let him destroy himself. The same Word of God was thus both Law and Gospel.[246]

Ordinarily, Law and Gospel can be distinguished from each other without too much confusion. Luther made distinctions between various uses of the Law. He spoke of the political law, the ceremonial law and the Law of Moses. But, for the most part, he spoke of the Law as having two uses.

> Here one must know that there is a double use of the Law. One is the civic use. God has ordained the civic laws, indeed all laws, to restrain transgressions. Therefore every law was given to hinder sins. The other use of the Law is the theological or spiritual one, which serves to increase transgressions. This is the primary purpose of the Law of Moses, that through it sin might grow and be multiplied, especially in the conscience. . . . Therefore the true function and the chief and proper use of the Law is to reveal to man his sin, misery, wickedness, ignorance, hate and contempt of God, death, hell, judgment, and the well-deserved wrath of God.[247]

The Law serves its theological use when it acts on the person *coram Deo*, in the sight of God. Then it reveals sin, condemns the 'old man' in every human being and accuses and crushes the flesh.[248]

The Gospel shows the promise of Christ who came for afflicted sinners. It bestows the righteousness of Christ and makes a 'new man' ruled by the Spirit rather than the flesh.[249] The crucial aspect in the life of man is the control of the conscience.[250] If the Law ascends into the conscience and rules there, a man is lost. But when the Gospel and Christ rule the conscience there is forgiveness, peace, quiet, happiness, salvation and eternal life.[251]

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[246] Jaroslav Pelikan, *Luther the Expositor* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1959), p. 65.

[247] *LW* 26, 308-309.

[248] *Ibid.*, 6 & 9.

> This does not mean that the conscience does not feel the terrors of the Law at all. Of course it feels them. But it means that the conscience cannot be condemned and brought to the point of despair by such things. . . . Regardless of how terrified the Christian is by the Law and how much he acknowledges his sin, he does not despair; for he believes in Christ into whom he has been baptized and through whom he has forgiveness of sins.[252]

Luther's words indicate two things that are true of the Christian. The first is that the Law is still present and necessary because the flesh must be kept under control. But Law and flesh cannot be allowed to control the conscience. They must be put down so that Gospel and Spirit can rule. This dialectic is constant in the life of the Christian. "He never gets 'beyond it' to a situation where he can speak of a difference of 'before' and 'after' with regard to his knowledge of the Law."[253] Luther knew what it meant to struggle because of Law-flesh and Gospel-Spirit.

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[249] *Ibid*., 7 & 9.

[250] *Supra*, pp. 80-84.

[251] *LW* 26, 11.

[252] *Ibid*., 447.

[253] Gerhard O. Forde, *The Law-Gospel Debate* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1969), p. 230.

> I know how often I suddenly lost sight of the rays of the Gospel and of grace, which have often been obscured for me by thick, dark clouds. In other words, I know how slippery the footing is even for those who are mature and seem to be firmly established in matters of faith. . . . When in a struggle we should use the Gospel, which is the Word of grace, consolation and life, there the Law, the Word of wrath, sadness and death precedes the Gospel and begins to raise tumult.[254]

For Luther, as for all Christians, the experience and understanding of God is capsuled in the dialectic of Law and Gospel. But faith grows through such experiences because God's grace breaks through again and again in the Gospel.

Summary and Analysis of Luther's Experience and Theology

In summarizing Luther's experience and theology the first thing to note is the existence of two theological systems early in his career. One system was the Scholastic theology in which he had been schooled. The other was his own growing theology, a theology more Biblical than the one he had been taught. Scholastic theology emphasized the ability of man through his own free will to refrain from sin and make the first step toward God, the *meritum de congruo*. At that point God would grant His grace to help man reach the second step of *meritum de condigno*, beyond which the full saving grace of Christ could finally be granted. In the matter of predestination there were two schools of thought in Scholasticism. In the one view man contributed to the cause of his election to salvation. This was the synergistic view in which man is elected to salvation because of foreseen merit on his part. The other point of view was deterministic since God was the absolute and total cause of predestination to salvation or damnation.

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[254] *LW* 26, 63-64.

Luther's growing theological system had its origins in the German mystics, St. Augustine, and the Bible. From the mystics he learned the importance of despair as part of spiritual rebirth. From Augustine he learned that man is justified by grace and not by works. He also learned that righteousness is given only to faith even though Augustine taught that it was only the beginning of righteousness and not the full imputation of it. However, Augustine led Luther back to the Bible and to St. Paul. Luther's early lectures on the Biblical books of Psalms, Romans, Galatians, and Hebrews were instrumental in the formulation of his theology. Thus there were a growing number of elements of his theology present prior to his major Reformation insight in 1518. He viewed man as sinner and saint even though as only partly sinner and partly saint in his early view. He also disagreed with the view that man had a free will and said that man was a slave to sin and could only be free by God's grace in the Gospel. Present also were the beginnings of the distinction between active and passive righteousness on the part of man. And there was the emphasis that the works of the Law could not save, only the righteousness of faith. He viewed God as one who could not be known in glory but only through the cross, both Christ's and the Christian's. He also insisted that God's alien work of suffering and affliction was necessary so that His proper work of saving could be accomplished. There was some indication of the nature of God as hidden and revealed although the full expression of this had to wait until later. He also expressed the concepts of Law and Gospel although Gospel was still a grace that was coupled with the will of man enabling him to do works of merit. It was the presence of these elements of his theology prior to 1518 which led many scholars to question the accuracy of Luther's 1545 recollection of his basic spiritual Anfechtung. However, there is every indication that Luther is correct in indicating that the date was late in 1518, before he began his second commentary on the Psalms. It is not surprising that many elements of his theology were present prior to 1518. Their presence was necessary in order to critically interact with the Scholastic theology and produce new and creative insights.

In view of the teaching of Scholastic theology it is little wonder that Luther was plagued with the problem of finding a gracious God. This problem was at the heart of his Anfechtung. He attempted to find a solution to the problem by entering the monastery in 1505. His experience in the thunderstorm prompted him to enter the ascetic life, a life which the church taught as being more conducive to finding a gracious God than secular life. His entrance into the monastery committed him more than ever to finding a gracious God through the Scholastic theological system. But it was obvious that by the time of his first mass in 1507 he had not found that gracious God. His experience of doubt caused by his father's challenge and his experience of fear when facing God at the altar showed this to be true. It was only after he had found a gracious God through justifying faith in the Gospel that he could be certain of his call by an accepting God. Then he could also be free from the fear of having been disobedient to his father and be able to accept his calling without reservation.

There were two basic types of Anfechtung which troubled Luther. The first was the spiritual Anfechtung which involved a sense of unworthiness of the grace of God (tentationes de indignitate). The second was the predestination Anfechtung in which there was doubt that God had elected him to salvation (tentationes de praedestinatione). Over a period of time, Luther successfully resolved these Anfechtungen and achieved new theological insights. The spiritual Anfechtung was prompted by the Scholastic understanding of righteousness, Gospel and faith. A righteous God demanded a righteous people who kept the Law in love. This love was a supernatural love given in the Gospel after the person had reached the level of worthiness (meritum de condigno). The love that was infused by God was more important than faith since it enabled the person to love God above all things. For Luther, who found that concupiscence made it impossible for him to refrain from sin and thus take even the first step

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toward God (*meritum de congruo*), the demand of a righteous God that He be loved with a supernatural love made God's righteousness a judgment, the Gospel a new demand, and faith useless. Luther raged against a God who was judgmental when he wanted him to be gracious.

After the resolution of the *Anfechtung* Luther understood righteousness, Gospel and faith in a new way. The righteousness of God was an entirely passive righteousness from the human point of view. It was the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of righteousness to men for the sake of Christ. The Gospel revealed the gift of righteousness because it revealed Christ. Faith received the gift of righteousness in Christ. Thus Luther came to a new understanding of the relation to God and repudiated the Scholastic system in which he had been schooled.

In resolving the spiritual *Anfechtung* Luther had rejected the synergistic view that said God elected to salvation in view of man's merit. The only recourse then open to him was determinism, i.e., that God arbitrarily elected some to salvation and others to damnation. Even though he had broken through to a new understanding of faith in the grace of God in Christ, he was tormented by the question of whether or not God had elected to give that saving grace to him. Luther's initial attempt to resolve the *Anfechtung* through conformity with Christ in his suffering failed because Christ could not be perfectly followed nor was there absolute certainty of salvation through conformity or any other means. The

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resolution that Luther speaks of in the comments on Psalm 22 involves faith that trusts that what the invisible God does is right. He will not let the believer perish. But that resolution was later changed to faith in the concrete will of God as revealed in Jesus Christ. The revealed will of God in Christ shows that He wants to save. There is still a hiddeness to the will of God but that cannot be known nor should it be of concern to the believer because God's hidden and revealed will are one and the same in Christ. In his resolution of the predestination _Anfechtung_ Luther broke with the deterministic Scholastic notions. Salvation was not just a future hope but a present reality in Christ. Salvation and damnation do not go back to the same source. The person who rejects God's salvation in Jesus Christ is responsible for his own damnation.

The resolutions of the spiritual and predestination _Anfechtungen_ did not mean a cessation of _Anfechtung_ for Luther. There were recurring _Anfechtungen_ caused by challenges to his calling as reformer, by the troubling circumstances of martyrdom of confessors of the Gospel, and by reversion to old legalistic ways of thinking that lost sight of the Gospel. But such recurring _Anfechtungen_ did not mean loss of faith. They recurred because of the on-going struggle between flesh and Spirit and were occasions for growth. Each new resolution of _Anfechtung_ meant a firmer grasp of the conscience on Christ so that the Gospel more and more controlled life. Growth also meant the ability to recognize God as the ultimate source of Anfechtung. He permits them for the good and growth of the believer.

The insights gained from Luther's Anfechtungen required theological interpretation over a period of time. As some insights changed, theological intepretation also changed. Luther's theological interpretations of man and God are stated in terms of a dialectic which incorporates both the negative and positive aspects of man and God. Both aspects are necessary. Both were experienced in the Anfechtungen. Both are held together in creative tension. Luther viewed man as both sinner and saint because of the presence of flesh and Spirit; as slave to sin, free in the Gospel, but slave to the needs of others; as one who wants to be saved through his own active righteousness but can only be saved through the passive righteousness of God; as one who thinks works will save,but who is really saved only by faith so that he can work for others. He viewed God as one whose glory is sought by men but He can only really be known through the cross; as one who does seemingly alien works of affliction so that he can do his proper work of saving; as one who seems hidden in wrath and judgment but reveals himself as gracious in Jesus Christ; and as one who demands and judges by the Law only to forgive and save by the Gospel.

With the picture of Luther's experience of Anfechtung, resolution, and interpretation before us it is possible to analyze the steps in the total experience. This analysis at the experiential level is necessary for the task of correlation with the social psychological positions presented in the third part of this paper. The first step in the experience is the active struggle of Anfechtung. In this step two opposing points of view are in conflict. In the spiritual Anfechtung Luther wanted a gracious God but what he experienced was a judging God. God, he had been taught, was righteous. He judged sinners who could not meet the demand to love Him. Yet the Scholastic theologians taught that man could do works that God acknowledges, adds His grace so that love is possible, and then grants full salvation in Christ. But Luther found that he had no ability to do works that God must acknowledge. Sin was too all-pervasive. Therefore, the righteous God whom he wanted to be gracious and accepting could only judge and reject him. He hated God. "I did not love, yes, I hated the righteous God who punishes sinners," he said.[255] In the predestination Anfechtung the conflict revolved around the question of whether God willed to save Luther. As he said, "Now here, no one doubts that God 'can' save, 'knows' how to save, and 'wills' to save; but the question to the soul is, whether he 'wills' to save him."[256] Certain Scholastic theologians had taught that predestination to salvation was entirely God's arbitrary decision, a decision hidden until the end of life. One could have a degree of certainty of being saved if one suffered as Christ suffered and made use of the sacraments of the church. But this point of view was in conflict with Luther's position that no one could perfectly conform to Christ and that faith should be absolutely certain of salvation. As long as there was an inability to conform and an uncertainty about salvation the struggle continued. Did God will to save him or not?

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[255] Supra, p. 50.

[256] Supra, p. 55.

The second step in the total experience is passive resignation. This is in contrast to the active struggle of the first step. The problem is insoluble by any rational means. In the account from Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses, Luther describes what happens at this step: "All that remains is the stark-naked desire for help and a terrible groaning, but it (the soul) does not know where to turn for help."[257] In the spiritual Anfechtung he describes himself as "meditating day and night."[258] In the table talk from 1532 he says, "I pondered, in the tower and heated room of this building."[259] In the account of the predestination Anfechtung he reflects on what the afflicted soul should do.

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[257] Supra, p. 47.

[258] Supra, p. 50.

[259] Supra, p. 52.

> Before all things let it take heed that it dispute not with devils and evil cogitations concerning all these things: Let it give no answer but remain dumb to all these things which are objected to it, and suffer them to pass by. . . .it is a hard thing to keep silence and to remain wholly quiet, and permit all these most irritating and most bitter suggestions and sayings to pass by.[260]

The third step is the arrival of an unexpected insight which affords an immediate resolution of the Anfechtung. In the spiritual Anfechtung Luther expresses the immediate insight as one in which he

> began to understand the righteousness of God is that by which the righteous lives by a gift of God, namely by faith. And this is the meaning: the righteousness of God is revealed by the Gospel, namely, the passive righteousness with which merciful God justifies us by faith . . .[261]

The key insight revolved around a new understanding of the righteousness of God in which righteousness became a gift of God to man, not a demand of God upon man. The Gospel reveals the gift of righteousness and is not the infusion of the love demanded by God. And it is gift-receiving faith that provides the right relation to God, not work-producing love. In short, righteousness was now put into the theological framework of Luther in which the man who could only sin was given the gift of God's righteousness as revealed in Jesus Christ through the Gospel and received by faith. Now God was gracious. The old theological system was discarded

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[260] Supra, pp. 63-64

[261] Supra, p. 50.

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and the new one took another step toward completion. In the predestination Anfechtung the insight which occurred is one in which faith overcame uncertainty.

> Here we have need of faith only, and that faith which enables the man to believe, that God does, and will do, with him everything that is most just . . . And, it is impossible that he should perish, who thus ascribes glory to God and justifies him in all his work and all his will.[262]

However, this insight was not the most satisfying nor final resolution of the predestination Anfechtung. The final insight was that the will of God is revealed in Jesus Christ and this means that God most certainly wills to save him who believes. The hidden will and the revealed will are one in Christ.

The fourth step is the long-range theological interpretation of the insights which occurred. Luther's full expression of his theology took time. In Luther's view of man in the sight of God, the view of man as sinner and saint, though expressed as early as 1515-16, reached its fullest expression of man being totally sinner and totally saint possibly as late as 1538 in the third disputation against the antinomians. The view of man as a slave to sin and yet free in the Gospel found its greatest exposition in 1525 in The Bondage of the Will, while the view of man as free lord of all, but dutiful servant to all, was best described in The Freedom of a Christian in 1520. The view of man involving

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[262] Supra, p. 64.

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active and passive righteousness was expressed in incomplete fashion in the Romans lectures of 1515-16 and received its fullest exposition in the 1535 Lectures on Galatians. And, though there were earlier statements of the role of works and faith in the life of man, one of the greatest interpretations is also in the second Galatians commentary. In Luther's theological interpretation of God, the view of God as revealed in the cross and not in glory was set forth as early as 1516 but is more fully discussed in the 1518 Heidelberg Disputation. The view of God as one who does his alien work in order to perform his proper work was also described as early as 1516 but continued to be refined and interpreted as late as the commentary on Psalm 90 in 1534-35. God as one who is hidden in judgment but revealed in grace was presented in the Lectures on Romans in 1515-16 but Luther states it most forcefully in The Bondage of the Will in 1525 and in his comments on Psalm 117 in 1530. And the final view of God as one who judges man through the Law but saves him through the Gospel receives an early but incomplete expression in the 1515-16 Lectures on Romans while reaching its fullest expression in the 1535 Lectures on Galatians. Luther's life-long work was the interpretation of the insights gained from his Anfechtungen. It is no surprise, therefore, that his best and most mature theology was written in the latter part of his life.

Before moving to the social psychological positions which will be examined as to their helpfulness in understanding and explaining Luther's experience and theology, the criteria by which their helpfulness will be judged must be set forth. A prerequisite for correlation of any of the social psychological positions to that of Luther is the availability of data at the descriptive-experiential level. The following criteria derived from the Luther material are at the descriptive-experiential level. The criteria indicate that a social psychological position must do the following:

> It must take into account at least two frames of reference. Luther had two theological frames of reference - the Scholastic theology in which he had been trained and his own growing evangelical theology.
>
> It must explain the total experience of Anfechtung and its resolution indicating the dynamics involved in each of the four steps: active struggle, passive resignation, unexpected insight, and long-range theological interpretation.
>
> It must help in understanding the length of time involved in resolving the Anfechtung. Luther struggled over a period of years, reached incomplete conclusions, and achieved momentous insights. Yet he also experienced recurring Anfechtungen caused by challenges to his calling, the troubling circumstances of martyrdom, and reversion to old ways of thinking.
>
> It must allow for a resolution of Anfechtung which holds opposites in tension. Luther's insights and theological interpretations hold opposites together in a constructive and positive way.
>
> It must aid in maintaining the integrity of Luther's experience and theology of the impact of God in his life without reducing the experience and intepretations to social psychological terms.

These criteria will be applied after the presentation of each social psychological position.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORISTS

Introduction

In this chapter the positions of social psychological theorists is presented and analyzed. These positions are correlated with the experience and theology of Luther. As was stated in the opening chapter the experience common to both Luther and the social psychologists on which the correlation is based is that of creative intrapsychic conflict. Intrapsychic conflict does not deal with the gross actions of approach and avoidance of classic conflict theory but with inconsistencies in thought that cause internal conflict. Such conflict necessitates mental reorganization for successful resolution.

There are three categories of theorists considered in this chapter. The first category consists of cognitive consistency theorists. This is an overall term used by William J. McGuire to cover such theories as cognitive balance, cognitive congruity, and cognitive dissonance.[1]

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[1] William J. McGuire, "The Current Status of Cognitive Consistency Theories," in Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement, edited by Martin Fishbein (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 401-421.

The predominant method of resolving cognitive inconsistencies for these theorists is that of cognitive readjustment. This means that the theorists have limited themselves to the functions of the conscious mind and its cognitive operations.[2] A second emphasis of theorists in

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[2] This does not, however, entirely exclude feeling and action components in mental reorganization. Since most consistency theorists deal with attitudes and the way in which they can be changed, their definitions of attitudes reveal concern with more than just the cognitive component. Some theorists ascribe cognitive, affective, and action tendency components entirely to attitudes. Some ascribe only the affective to attitudes and reserve the cognitive and action tendencies for beliefs. Still others ascribe all three components to beliefs. An example of the first instance is the definition of attitudes given by Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey.

> An attitude can be defined as an enduring system of components centering about a single object: the beliefs about the object - the cognitive component; the affect connected with the object - the feeling component; and the disposition to take action with respect to the object - the action tendency component. (David Krech, Richard S. Crutchfield and Egerton L. Ballachey, Individual in Society (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962), p. 146.)

Thus, in this definition, beliefs are subsumed under attitudes as one component of an enduring system. Martin Fishbein takes exception to such a definition. He feels that it is not precise enough. Attitudes contain only the affective component while beliefs contain the cognitive and action tendency components. He states:

> Two persons are said to have the same attitude toward segregation but to hold different beliefs about it. Attitudes are learned predispositions to respond to an object or class of objects in a favorable or unfavorable way. Beliefs, on the other hand, are hypotheses concerning the nature of these objects and the types of action that should be taken with respect to them. (Martin Fishbein, "A Consideration of Beliefs and Their Role in Attitude Measurements," in Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement, edited by Martin Fishbein (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 257.)

With this distinction in mind, Fishbein says that "the this category is the human tendency to strive toward cognitive consistency. McGuire points out the "general proposition of the consistency theorists that inconsistency reduction is reinforcing," and that "there is a drive to reduce inconsistency to low or even zero levels."[3] The theorists included in this category

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attitude per se can only be reliably abstracted by considering the many beliefs an individual holds." (Ibid., p. 264.) An attitude, therefore, is a hypothetical variable, abstracted from many statements and actions of a person. Milton Rokeach goes even further than Fishbein and attributes all three components to beliefs. His definition of attitude is: "An attitude is a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner." (Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1969), p. 112.) For Rokeach, an attitude is an organization of beliefs and the beliefs contain the cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. If one is to accurately determine attitude then the beliefs making up that attitude must be taken into account. "An attitude, representing as it does an organization of beliefs, is not a single predisposition but a set of interrelated predispositions focused on an attitude object or situation." (Ibid., p. 119.) The only way in which the interrelatedeness can be taken into account is to determine what are the underlying beliefs - beliefs defined as cognitions, or expectancies, or hypotheses about the person and his world. With such diverse understanding of attitudes and their components, it is difficult to say that cognitive consistency theorists deal only with conscious cognition and not also with affect and action. However, despite the implicit involvement of the latter factors, consistency theorists usually restrict their research to empirically verifiable cognitive data.

[3] McGuire, p. 405. McGuire, however, points out other evidence that indicates the need to modify strictly held ideas of the need for consistency among human beings. There are newer 'complexity theories' which do not assume simple consistency.

> Complexity theory's romantic organism works on a quite different economy. It has a stimulus hunger, and exploratory drive, a need curiosity. It takes pleasure

are those who deal with cognitive balance, cognitive congruity, belief congruence, cognitive dissonance, and social judgment-involvement.

The second category of theorists are developmental. The theorists are concerned with the long-range growth and development of persons and the part that intrapsychic conflict plays in such growth. Erik Erikson and Jean Piaget are included in this category.

Since cognitive consistency theorists limit themselves to consistencies in conscious cognitions and developmental theorists deal with the ordered sequence of conflict in long-term growth, it is vital also to take into account the full range of the human personality and its mental operations. In searching for a name under which such theories could be categorized, it was determined to call them 'holistic' theories. This is admittedly a very broad category but Nevitt Sanford gives warrant for its use when he says; "If personality is conceived as anything more than a mere enumeration of elements, if the parts of

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> in the unexpected, at least in intermediate levels of unpredictability. It wants to experience everything; it shows alternation behavior; it finds novelty rewarding. (Ibid., p. 416.)

However, the fact that the unexpected is appreciated only in intermediate levels of unpredictability indicates the limitations of complexity theory and still keeps it within the larger bounds of consistency theory. In referring to theories which point out that consistency is not enough, Nevitt Sanford says that "the homeostatic principle is still of fundamental importance." (Nevitt Sanford, Self and Society (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. 36.)

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the personality are related by any operation other than mere addition, then holism is necessarily implied."[4] It is obvious that many theorists could be included in this category. The ones included in this chapter are those who deal with the full range of mental operations and thus are 'holistic' in dealing with intrapsychic conflict. The theorists included in this category are Ernst Kris, Lawrence Kubie, Harold Rugg, and Arthur Koestler.

The correlational model set forth in the opening chapter of this dissertation requires a two-level analysis. The two levels are the theoretical-interpretive and the experiential-descriptive. The latter level is the one at which correlation of intrapsychic conflict is attempted. The experiential-descriptive level of the Luther material was set forth in the preceding chapter and certain criteria were developed from it. It is more difficult to isolate the experiential-descriptive level of many social psychological theorists since they do not ordinarily give the experiential data upon which their theoretical interpretation is based. This is especially true of the cognitive consistency theorists. In many cases, the experiential-descriptive data has to be inferred. When experiential data is available, it is included. Some of the more lengthy experiential

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[4] Nevitt Sanford, Issues in Personality Theory (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1970), p. 76.

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descriptions are included in the appendices. Two such accounts included in the appendices are those of the experience of Mrs. Keech's group in When Prophecy Fails[5] and the experience of two groups of boys in The Robbers Cave Experiment.[6]

The correlational model also calls for determining the commonalities and differences between positions at the experiential-descriptive level. Correlation between positions is given at the conclusion of the presentation of each of the above categories of theorists. The criteria developed from the Luther material is used to determine how well the social psychological position correlates with and explains Luther's experience and theology.

Cognitive Consistency Theorists

Cognitive Balance

Cognitive balance is the first of the consistency theories to be treated since it is the earliest in origin. It originated with Fritz Heider in 1946.[7] In his theory

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[5] Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken and Stanley Schachter, When Prophecy Fails (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1964).

[6] Muzafer Sherif and Others, Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment (Norman, Oklahoma: Institute of Group Relations, University of Oklahoma, 1961).

[7] Fritz Heider, "Attitudes and Cognitive Organization," in Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement, edited by Martin Fishbein (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 37-41.

Heider makes a distinction between attitude relation and unit relation. Attitude is the positive or negative relationship of one person to another. Thus, if a person (p) has a positive relationship with another person (o) the relationship can be characterized as pLo with 'L' standing for a liking or loving relationship. A negative relationship can be characterized as p-Lo with '-L' indicating a negative relationship. Unit relations indicate the way in which the person (p) is united in any way to a person (o) or thing (x). A positive unit relation is characterized as pUx while a negative relation is characterized as p-Ux. A state of balance exists if p likes what he is united with in any way or if he dislikes what he is segregated from. Imbalance exists if he dislikes what he is united with in any way. Later balance theorists such as Abelson and Rosenberg drop the distinction between attitude and unit relationships. Roger Brown agrees that dropping the distinction is tenable since

> the tendency to balance liking and unity is so strong that a model can assume it to have always been perfectly accomplished and proceed as if the two analytically distinguishable relations were identical.[8]

Abelson and Rosenberg refined Heider's theory. They begin with the assumption that human thought must involve cognitive representations of 'things' and these 'things' are the elements of the cognitive system. Cognitive elements are linked by certain relations. They say;

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[8] Roger Brown, Social Psychology (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 575.

> Of all the conceivable relations between cognitive elements, we choose to consider only four: positive, negative, null, and ambivalent. These will be designated p, n, o, and a . . . . Ambivalent relations are defined as conjunctions of positive and negative relations.[9]

Cognitive units are built out of cognitive elements that are connected by a relation. The form of such a unit is ArB with A and B as cognitive elements and r as the relation. Such cognitive units come into existence in a variety of ways and, once in mind, can be manipulated in thought. When two old sentences are combined with an element in common, a new symbolic sentence is formed. When an individual thinks about a topic or an argument, new sentences are formed. For example, ApB and BpC will imply ApC or ApB and BnC will imply AnC. Both of the examples given are balanced. But an unbalanced or ambivalent relationship exists "if ApC and AnC are both implied, or if one is held initially and the other implied, then AaC."[10] The authors indicate that although they can formulate rules for the formation of new sentences and their relations, the results will not necessarily be logical. They give the example of India (A) opposing (n) U. S. Far Eastern policy (B). U. S. Far Eastern policy (B) is directed against (n) Communism (C). Therefore, India (A) is in favor of (p) Communism (C).

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[9] Robert P. Abelson and Milston J. Rosenberg, "Symbolic Psycho-Logic: A Model of Attitudinal Cognition," in _Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement_, edited by Martin Fishbein (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 342.

[10] _Ibid._, p. 344.

> Such reasoning would mortify a logician, yet it can be found in much this same form inside of millions of heads. Thus we speak of the formal system as psycho-logic rather than as logic.[11]

In balance theory there is balance among elements if all relations among 'good elements' are positive or null, all relations among 'bad elements' are negative or null. It is unbalanced when there is an ambivalent relation. How is the unbalanced state handled? First of all, Abelson and Rosenberg note, the person must be motivated to think about the area in which imbalance exists. If he does not do so, it will remain undiscovered. They go on to say;

> Assuming these necessary pre-conditions, suppose that an individual does come upon a cognitive inconsistency in his attitude. What can he do about it? Three things: (1) change one or more of the relations; (2) redefine, 'differentiate,' or 'isolate' one or more elements; (3) stop thinking.[12]

The example given is that of the Yale man who wants coeds at Yale but also wants good grades. He assumes that coeds and good grades do not go together. He can change a relation by saying either that he does not like coeds or

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 345.

[12] *Ibid.*

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does not like good grades. He can redefine coeds as no threat to good grades. He can differentiate grades by deciding that a 'C' grade is as good as an 'A' grade. Or, he can refuse to think about it. Whichever way a person chooses to restore the balance, Abelson and Rosenberg say that he will do it with the minimum number of changes necessary. This implies an economy of effort in achieving balance.

Balance theory has a certain amount of flexibility in the way in which imbalance is handled. This is to its advantage. However, that very flexibility means a loss of precision in predicting what direction change will take.[13] The following theory of cognitive congruity has more precision but loses flexibility in the process.

Cognitive Congruity

Whereas cognitive balance deals with elements and their relations, cognitive congruity deals with objects and their bonds. Osgood and Tannenbaum call their theory a principle of congruity.

> The principle of congruity in human thinking can be stated quite succinctly: changes in evaluation are always in the direction of increased congruity with the existing frame of reference.[14]

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[13] Cf., critique of Brown, p. 579.

[14] Charles E. Osgood and Percy H. Tannenbaum, "The Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change," in Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement, edited by Martin Fishbein (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 302.

The existing frame of reference of a person is made up of several variables: (a) existing attitude toward the source of a message; (b) existing attitude toward the concept evaluated by the source; and (c) the nature of the evaluating assertion which relates the source and concept in a message. The theory predicts that an assertion by a source about a concept will effect change on both source and concept rather than effect change on just the latter. Prediction about change must take several things into account.

> To predict the direction of attitude change from this general principle it is necessary to take into account simultaneously the existing attitudes toward each of the objects of judgment prior to reception of the message and the nature of the assertion which is embodied in the message. Attitudes can be specified as favorable (+), neutral (0), and unfavorable (-). Assertions can be specified as positive or associative (+) or negative or dissociative (-). They may also, of course, include evaluative loading (e.g., when X denounces Y, we have both a dissociative assertion and negative evaluation of Y). When attitudes toward both objects of judgments are polar, the nature of the assertion determines congruence or incongruence. For Eisenhower (+) to come out in favor of Freedom of the Press (+) is, of course, congruent with the existing frame of reference of most people in this country, but for the Daily Worker (-) to speak in favor of Freedom of the Press (+) is attitudinally incongruent. In this simplest of states in which human thinking operates, sources we like should always sponsor ideas we like and denounce ideas we are against, and vice versa.[15]

In order to determine the attitude of people toward various objects the authors use a semantic differential scale of seven steps. Step 4 in the scale represents a neutral position. There are three positive degrees (+3, +2, +1) and three negative (-1, -2, -3). Source and concept are congruent if they both have the same sign and are on the same step in the scale. There is some incongruity if both have the same sign but are not on the same step in the scale, e.g., Eisenhower (+3) makes a positive assertion (+) about Freedom of the Press (+1). There is great incongruity if source and concept have different signs and yet are linked by a positive assertion, e.g., the Daily Worker (-) makes a positive assertion (+) about Freedom of the Press (+). Such incongruity brings pressure for congruity. In the face of such pressure several things can be said about the susceptibility of objects to movement on the scale. First of all, the total movement of source and concept toward each other will equal the number of scale units which separate them. Thus Eisenhower (+3) and Freedom of the Press (+1) will move toward each other a total of two scale units to the point of maximum congruence. But, second of all, it is posited that Freedom of the Press will move more because it is the less polarized object. The more polarized object will move less. Thirdly, the higher the esteem in which Eisenhower is held, the more will be the movement of a concept he evaluates. This will make Freedom of the Press move even more. Finally, the theory states that Eisenhower will move to a less polarized position, will move lower on the scale, because

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 303.

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he has made a positive assertion about a concept lower on the scale than himself.[16]

There are two other modifications of the theory that need to be taken into account. The first is what the authors call the 'Assertion Constant.'

> In the special source-concept situation, we must take an additional factor into account - the fact that the assertion itself, whether positive or negative, typically applies to the concept rather than to the source. When X praises Y, the favorable effect of 'praise' applies chiefly to Y; when X denounces Y, similarly, the unfavorable effect of 'denounce' applies chiefly to Y. In other words, we must add to the equation predicting attitude change for concepts a constant ($\pm A$) whose sign is always the same as that of the assertion.[17]

The authors have computed the Assertion Constant at ± .17. The other modification that must be taken into account is that of 'incredulity.' Should Eisenhower (+3), for instance, make a favorable assertion (+) about the Daily Worker (-3) the effect on most people would be that of incredulity.

> Incredulity, to the extent it is present, will not only operate to 'damp' changes in attitude but should also appear in expressions of disbelief and rationalization. This makes it possible to ascertain the incredulity function independent of attitude change.[18]

The incredulity function appears in connection with highly polarized objects such as those mentioned in the example above.

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[16] Ibid., p. 311.

[17] Ibid., p. 307.

[18] Ibid.

There are many critics of congruity theory. Roger Brown accords it an intuitive soundness because it posits movement of both source and concept with the less polarized object having the greater pressure for change.[19] But he is critical of the inability of congruity to deal with multiple bonds as they appear in real life. He is also critical of the prediction of the theory that a highly valued source will fall in value when it makes a positive assertion of some object lower in value. This simply does not ring true.[20] Martin Fishbein is critical of this same aspect of congruity theory.

> Thus, if an individual originally believed that the object was associated with "extremely good things" and then learned some new beliefs associating the object with "slightly good things," according to most consistency theories these new beliefs (even though they associate the object with positively evaluated things) will actually serve to lower the individual's attitude.[21]

The reason for the above assumption, according to Fishbein, is that change is assumed to be a function of the mean amount of affect associated with a persons' beliefs. Fishbein's own corrective theory of 'cognitive summation' operates with the assumption of the total amount of affect.

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[19] Brown, p. 573.

[20] *Ibid*., p. 572.

[21] Martin Fishbein, "A Behavior Theory Approach to the Relations Between Beliefs About an Object and the Attitude Toward the Object," in *Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement*, edited by Martin Fishbein (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 398.

> That is, attitude change, as well as attitude per se, is viewed as a function of the total amount of affect associated with an individual's beliefs about the attitude object.[22]

Fishbein would say, for instance, that the individual learning a new belief that associates an attitude object with a positively evaluated concept will change his attitude in an even more positive direction.

Belief Congruence

Milton Rokeach is also critical of the congruity principle. He feels that its predictive capacity is hampered because it does not take more than the objects in question into account. He maintains that his own 'belief congruence' theory is more adequate.

> The congruity principle is an additive model that predicts the outcome of cognitive interaction solely from a knowledge of the direction and degree of polarization of the two stimuli considered in isolation. In contrast, the principle of belief congruence is a configurationist model asserting that the comparison processes cannot become activated until the two stimuli are linked together to form a unique gestalt and, consequently, the outcome of the cognitive interaction cannot be accurately predicted solely from a knowledge of the direction and intensity of the two stimuli considered separately.[23]

Rokeach derives the name 'belief congruence' from the observation that,

> We tend to value a given belief, subsystem, or system of beliefs in proportion to its degree of congruence

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[22] Ibid.

[23] Rokeach, p. 87.

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> with our own belief system and, further, that we tend to value people in proportion to the degree to which they exhibit beliefs, subsystems, or systems of belief congruent with our own.[24]

Therefore, any prediction about change must take into account the belief system of the person involved. The objects in question form a unique gestalt against the background of a belief system and that belief system plays a great part in what change will occur.

Rokeach, therefore, is critical of congruity theory in its ability to predict change. He is also critical of congruity theory's insistence that polarized objects will tend to move toward each other to the point of maximum congruity. For example, says Rokeach, if one strongly admires College Professors (+) and equally strongly deplores Extramarital Sexual Relations (-3) and then learns that the former approves of the latter, congruity theory would posit a compromise to zero or neutrality. Belief congruence, on the other hand, would make a prediction only when the belief system of the person doing the assessment is known and the result would rarely, if ever, be neutrality.[25]

The belief system is a major concept in Rokeach's theory. He has constructed a hypothetical model of the structure of the mind triggered by the studies on the authoritarian personality by Adorno and others. Rokeach's initial work on the structure of thought is The Open and Closed Mind.[26] For Rokeach there are three dimensions to the belief system; belief-disbelief, central-peripheral, and the time perspective.

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[24] _Ibid_., p. 83.

[25] _Ibid_., p. 89. Rokeach has evidently overlooked the correction for incredulity posited by Osgood and Tannenbaum.

> The belief system is conceived to represent all the beliefs, sets, expectancies, or hypotheses, conscious and unconscious that a person at a given time accepts as true of the world he lives in. The disbelief system is composed of a series of subsystems rather than merely a single one, and contains all the disbeliefs, sets, expectancies, conscious and unconscious that, to one degree or another, a person at a given time rejects as false.[27]

The belief-disbelief system has a structural arrangement with the possibility of communication between the parts even though not all of them are interconnected. Therefore, it should not be assumed that there is a neat interrelatedness among the parts. The central-peripheral dimension of the belief system also plays a significant part in Rokeach's theory. It includes the following:

> 1. A central region represents what will be called the persons' "primitive" beliefs. These refer to all the beliefs a person has acquired about the nature of the physical world he lives in, the nature of the "self," and of the "generalized other."

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[26] Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960).

[27] Ibid., p. 33.

> 2. An intermediate region represents the beliefs a person has in and about the nature of authority and the people who line up with authority, on whom he depends to help him form a picture of the world he lives in.
>
> 3. A peripheral region represents the beliefs derived from authority, such beliefs filling in the details of his world-map.[28]

The final dimension, the time-perspective, deals with the narrowness or the broadness of the time-perspective of the belief system.

> A broad time perspective is one in which the person's past, present, and future are all represented within the belief-disbelief system, and the person sees them as related to each other. A narrow time perspective is one in which the person overemphasizes or fixates on the past, or the present, or the future without appreciating the continuity and the connections that exist among them. Thus, in our view, persons who have a completely past-oriented, or present-oriented, or future-oriented time perspective are all seen to have equally narrow time perspectives even though the perceptions of the past or of the future may cover a very long time span.[29]

In his later work, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values, Rokeach reworked and expanded his understanding of the belief system.[30] He concentrates on the effect that a belief system has on change in beliefs. The more important beliefs are more resistant to change and their importance depends on their connectedness.

> The more a given belief is functionally connected or in communication with other beliefs, the more

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[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[30] Rokeach, *Beliefs, Attitudes and Values* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1969).

> implications and consequences it has for other beliefs and, therefore, the more central the belief.[31]

There are four criteria for connectedness.

> 1. Existential versus nonexistential beliefs. Beliefs directly concerning one's own existence and identity in the physical and social world are assumed to have more functional connections and consequences for other beliefs than those which less directly concern one's existence and identity.
>
> 2. Shared versus unshared beliefs about existence and self-identity. Beliefs concerning existence and self-identity may be shared or not shared with others. Those shared with others are assumed to have more functional connections and consequences than those not shared with others. Those shared with others are assumed to have more functional connections and consequences than those not shared with others.
>
> 3. Derived versus underived beliefs. Many beliefs are learned not by direct encounter with the object of belief but indirectly, from reference persons and groups. We refer to such beliefs as "derived beliefs." Derived beliefs are assumed to have fewer functional connections and consequences for other beliefs than the beliefs from which they are derived.
>
> 4. Beliefs concerning and not concerning matters of taste. Many beliefs represent more or less arbitrary matters of taste and are often so perceived by the individual holding them. Such beliefs are assumed to have relatively fewer functional connections and consequences for other beliefs than beliefs that do not represent arbitrary matters of taste.[32]

After setting forth his criteria for connectedness, Rokeach reconstructs his central-peripheral dimension of the belief system, amplifying it into five regions. Type A beliefs are Primitive Beliefs in which there is 100 per cent

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[31] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[32] *Ibid.*

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consensus. These are the most central beliefs that are learned by direct experience and are reinforced by a unanimous social consensus among all of one's reference persons and groups. They have an unquestioned, taken-for-granted character. Type B beliefs are Primitive Beliefs with Zero consensus. These beliefs are learned by experience but are private and not maintained by social consensus. They are incontrovertible and strongly held. Type C beliefs are Authority Beliefs which are non-primitive and are derived from reference persons and groups. They deal with the trustworthiness of authorities and determine who and what it is that one will accept as authority. Type D are Derived Beliefs which come from the authority one accepts. Both Types C and D are controvertible beliefs. The final type, Type E, are Inconsequential Beliefs which are more or less arbitrary matters of taste. They arise in direct contact with experience but they are not necessarily maintained by social consensus. They have few or no connections with other beliefs.

> In summary, a person's total belief system includes inconsequential beliefs, derived beliefs, pre-ideological beliefs about specific authority, and pre-ideological primitive beliefs, socially shared or unshared, about the nature of the physical world, society and self.[33]

The central-peripheral dimension of the belief system is used by Rokeach as a framework for research on attitude change. He makes a distinction between attitudes and values.

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[33] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

> An attitude is an organization of several beliefs focused on a specific object (physical or social, concrete or abstract) or situation, predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner.[34]

A value is of greater importance than an attitude. Rokeach says,

> I consider a value to be a type of belief, centrally located within one's total belief system, about how one ought or ought not to behave, or about some end-state of existence worth or not worth attaining.[35]

Values involving ideal modes of conduct are instrumental values while those involving ideal end-states of existence are terminal values. Instrumental values are such things as seeking truth and beauty, cleanliness and orderliness, sincere behavior, justice, reason, compassion, humility, respect, honor, and loyalty. Terminal values are security, happiness, freedom, equality, ecstasy, fame, power, and states of grace and salvation. Terminal values are more central to the belief system than instrumental values. Any inconsistencies involving such values will have the greatest overall effect on the person. The research reported in the following paragraphs indicates such involvement of terminal values.

Three groups of subjects, Control Group A and Experimental Groups B and C, first filled out attitude questionnaires concerning equal rights for Negroes, equal rights for other groups, and American policy in Viet Nam. A week later all three groups rank-ordered twelve terminal values which included the values of equality and freedom. After this, Control Group A was not given any further information. Experimental Group B was presented with information that showed how Michigan State University students ranked the twelve terminal values. To arouse feelings of inconsistency between two terminal values the experimenter drew attention to the fact that students ranked freedom first and equality sixth. The experimenter then suggested that students are more interested in their own freedom than they are in freedom for others since equality was ranked so much lower. Experimental Group C was given the same information as Group B but in addition was shown an inconsistency between an attitude and a value. They were shown that many of them had a positive attitude toward civil rights but still ranked equality sixth and freedom first. It was pointed out to them that those who were for civil rights were those who wanted freedom for others as well as for themselves while those who were against civil rights were really saying that they cared only for their own freedom. Post-tests on attitudes and values were administered three weeks and three months later. Experimental Group B showed significant positive increases in the ranking of equality. The positive increases were still there three months later. Experimental

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 124.

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Group C showed significant positive changes in the ranking of equality and also showed enduring changes in attitudes. For the students who had ranked equality high and nevertheless were anti-civil rights in attitude, the value remained unchanged but their attitude toward civil rights for Negroes increased significantly in a positive direction. For those who had ranked equality low but had nevertheless expressed sympathy for civil rights there was a significant rise for equality and significant descreases for such personal values as a comfortable life and true friendship. This group also became more positive in equal rights for others and more dovelike in regard to Viet Nam. These latter attitudes showed up three months later and indicated a 'sleeper' effect.[36] The experiment indicates that when inconsistencies within a person's own belief system are brought to consciousness, especially inconsistencies involving beliefs central to the system, there are significant and enduring changes toward congruence with the central beliefs.

Rokeach is not the only researcher who has sought to change attitudes by pointing out inconsistencies in belief systems. William J. McGuire has shown that opinions can be changed by the Socratic method of simply asking questions on related issues, sensitizing the individual to the fact that on the basis of his own premises his conclusions do not follow. "This sensitization," he states, "has proved sufficient to produce a significant trend toward internal consistency when the same beliefs are later tapped a second time."[37]

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[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 173-178.

Cognitive Dissonance

The main proponent of this theory is Leon Festinger. He assumes that the human organism tries to establish internal harmony, consistency, or congruity among its opinions, attitudes, knowledge and values. These latter are cognitive elements, elements comprising knowledge about the self, one's own behavior, and the surrounding environment. There is a drive toward consonance among these cognitions.[38]

> 1. Pairs of elements can exist in irrelevant, consonant, or dissonant relations.
> 2. Two cognitive elements are in an irrelevant relation if they have nothing to do with one another.
> 3. Two cognitive elements are in a dissonant relation if, considering these two alone, the obverse of one element follows from the other.
> 4. Two cognitive elements are in a consonant relation if, considering these two alone, one element follows from the other.[39]

Another way in which Festinger states the definition of dissonance is:

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[37] McGuire, p. 407.

[38] Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 260.

[39] Ibid.

> Two elements are in a dissonant relation if, considering these two alone, the obverse of one element would follow from the other. To state it a bit more formally, x and y are dissonant if not-x follows from y.[40]

Whenever there is dissonance there will be pressure to reduce that dissonance. The pressure to reduce dissonance is in direct proportion to the magnitude of the dissonance. The magnitude of dissonance is related to the importance of the elements to the person involved as well as the proportion of relevant elements in the person's cognitive system which are dissonant with the element in question.

The pressure to change naturally leads to consideration of the ways in which change can occur. Festinger speaks of three major ways in which this can be done.

1. By changing one or more of the elements involved in dissonant relations.
2. By adding new cognitive elements that are consonant with already existing cognitions.
3. By decreasing the importance of the elements involved in the dissonant relations.[41]

Festinger indicates that the first of the ways listed above can be understood as change in either behavioral or environmental cognitive elements. A change in the behavioral element means a change of attitude toward reality, e.g., to stop believing in something when it has been disconfirmed. A change in the environmental cognitive element is very difficult, especially if some change in the physical environment is necessary. If change in the social environment is necessary, there is the possibility of getting others to change their belief to conform to one's own. Thus social support can be sought for one's position.[42]

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[40] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 264.

There are various situations in which dissonance occurs. Festinger lists at least four such situations; as a consequence of a decision, as the effect of forced compliance, as the result of voluntary or involuntary exposure to information, and as the outcome of a social situation involving disparate elements. The first of these, post-decisional dissonance, occurs because an action has been taken which leaves the cognitive elements corresponding to the positive characteristics of the rejected alternatives and those corresponding to the negative characteristics of the chosen alternative in a state of dissonance. Such dissonance will be increased according to the importance of the decision and the relative attractiveness of the unchosen alternatives.[43] There is consonance, of course, in regard to the cognitive elements corresponding to the positive characteristics of the chosen alternative and the negative characteristics of the rejected alternatives. The consonance is increased as cognitive elements identical with the chosen and unchosen alternatives increase.[44] One of the ways to increase consonance and decrease dissonance is to increase the attractiveness of the chosen alternative or decrease the attractiveness of the rejected alternative, or both. Thus, Festinger notes, people who have purchased a new car tend to read new car ads, especially those relating to the type of car they purchased. This increases the attractiveness of the choice they made and reduces dissonance.[45] One can also reduce dissonance by seeing some of the characteristics of both alternatives as the same. One could, for instance, note that all of the cars considered had similar characteristics so that it didn't make much difference which one was chosen. A third way of reducing dissonance is to decrease the importance of various aspects of the decision. If one considered that, after all, the basic need was for transportation then any old car would do since all of them provided transportation.

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[42] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[43] Ibid., p. 262.

Forced compliance, the second way in which dissonance occurs, almost always results in dissonance whether it succeeds or fails in getting a person to behave publicly in a way that is at variance with his private opinion.

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[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid., p. 50.

This is so because, in the first place, the overt behavior brought on by reward or punishment is dissonant with private opinion but consonant with the reward obtained or the punishment avoided. If the overt behavior cannot be elicited there is still dissonance since the knowledge of the reward not attained or the punishment to be suffered is dissonant with the knowledge of what has been done even though there is consonance with that same knowledge and private opinion. An interesting aspect of this theory is that dissonance will be greatest if the promised reward or threatened punishment is either just sufficient to elicit the overt behavior or just barely not sufficient to elicit it.[46] In the latter case, dissonance can be decreased by magnifying the importance of private opinion or minimizing the extent of the reward or punishment. In the former instance, one can reduce dissonance by changing private opinion to conform with the public act or one can magnify the reward or punishment and thus justify the action because of the greater reward or the more intense punishment. An experiment conducted by Festinger and Carlsmith illustrates both aspects of the above 'barely sufficient' condition.[47] The experiment involved a $1.00 and a $20.00 condition. Undergraduate

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[46] Ibid., p. 263.

[47] Leon Festinger and J. M. Carlsmith, "Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58 (March 1959), 203-210.

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students were induced to perform monotonous tasks and then 'hired' to tell waiting fellow students that the tasks were enjoyable and interesting. One group of students was given $1.00 for the task and another group of students was given $20.00. After the experience, the students were interviewed as to their real feelings about the monotonous tasks they performed. The $20.00 students had not changed their private attitude about the monotony of the tasks but the $1.00 students had persuaded themselves that the tasks really were enjoyable and interesting. Thus the $1.00 students found themselves in a situation of high dissonance in which the reward was just sufficient to elicit the behavior. For the most part, they changed their private opinion to coincide with the overt behavior. The $20.00 students, on the other hand, had sufficient reward to justify the overt behavior and did not feel sufficient dissonance to cause them to change their private opinions. Arthur Cohen, another dissonance theorists, remarks concerning this phenomenon:

> Having chosen to take the discrepant stand, for whatever reason, there is dissonance between the event and his own actions committing himself to it. The less the reward when he complies, perhaps the greater the perception of choice, and the greater the consequent dissonance and attitude change.[48]

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[48] Arthur R. Cohen, "Attitudinal Consequences of Induced Discrepancies Between Cognitions and Behavior," in Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement, edited by Martin Fishbein (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 337.

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Cohen makes the dissonance dependent upon the amount of choice which the person perceives, i.e., the more choice involved the more pressure to be consistent and get rid of dissonance. Thus there is more likely to be change of attitude to conform with overt action when choice is involved.

The third situation in which dissonance occurs is that of voluntary or involuntary exposure to information. The new information may create cognitive elements which are dissonant with existing cognitions. When persons are exposed to such information they can seek new information which will provide cognitions consonant with existing cognitive elements and avoid those sources of new information which are likely to increase dissonance.[49] Exposure to dissonance-creating information frequently results in misinterpretation and misperception of the new information by the person so exposed in an effort to avoid an increase of dissonance. A smoker exposed to information linking smoking with cancer will tend to question the interpretation of the data. He will claim that the data do not prove the case.

In the final situation in which dissonance may occur, the social situation involving disparate elements,there are two categories to consider. One is the social situation in which disagreement in a group results in dissonance because of the knowledge that another person like oneself holds an opposing opinion. The other is the social situation in which an event occurs which invalidates the opinion held by a large number of people and creates dissonance for all of them. In the social situation in which there is disagreement among persons the dissonance will increase according to the importance of the opinion to the person, in the relevance of the opinion to those voicing disagreement, and in the attractiveness of those voicing the disagreement. One can reduce the dissonance in such an instance by changing one's own opinion, by influencing others to change theirs, or by rejecting those who disagree.[50] Where there is dissonance caused by disagreement people will also seek out others who already agree with them and they will seek to influence communication processes in an effort to obtain more social support. Social support is also avidly sought when a disconfirmatory event causes dissonance for a group of people. Few will change their own cognitive elements. Most will seek to change others and gain their support. The truth of this was borne out by the observations of Festinger and others in the events recorded in When Prophecy Fails.[51]

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[49] Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, p. 264.

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[50] Ibid., p. 265.

[51] Festinger, Riecken and Schachter, When Prophecy Fails.

The full account is given in Appendix A because it affords helpful experiential-descriptive data.

Social Judgment-Involvement

Muzafer Sherif is the principal proponent of the social judgment-involvement approach. Sherif takes exception with dissonance theory, especially at two points. The first exception involves the alternatives available for reducing a state of dissonance. The alternatives are; change one's own attitude, change the situation, add new elements, or seek social support. Sherif claims that,

> the alternative modes of behavior proposed in "cognitive dissonance" theory are not separate alternatives. Attitude change toward or away from an advocated position, or no change, or retrenchment in one's position are interrelated aspects of a judgment process.[52]

The judgment process of which Sherif speaks is one that involves making comparisons about two or more items, whatever their nature, in the ordinary course of events. The items are compared according to the person's own standards and assimilated or rejected on the basis of those internal standards. The behaviors following the act of judgment are all intended to carry out the judgment and thus are consistent with and follow from it. Therefore, the alternatives are part of an interrelated process and not separate alternatives at all.

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[52] Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafer Sherif and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965), p. x.

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The second aspect of dissonance theory with which Sherif disagrees is the matter of the magnitude of dissonance and the pressure towards reduction of dissonance. The magnitude of dissonance is related to the importance of the issue to the person as well as the amount of discrepancy involved. Dissonance theory, Sherif claims, says that, in this instance, a person may resort to change of attitude as a way of reducing dissonance. He objects to this possibility in the following statement.

> In our approach, a communication that concerns an issue in which the person is highly ego-involved (hence, important to him) is categorized by the person using his own position as a standard for comparison. Thus, proportional to its discrepancy, the communication is seen as more discrepant than it is, is evaluated unfavorably, and arouses irritation. When a communication is extremely discrepant, change toward that communication is never a possible alternative for a highly involved person. In such circumstances, our formulation predicts resistance to change and retrenchment in the person's own position. To the extent that the person is less ego-involved in the issue (it is less important) and that the advocated position is not extremely discrepant, the person will displace the communication close to his own position and react to it more favorably so that the possibility of attitude change toward the communication is greater.[53]

In the above quotation Sherif refers to the concept of ego-involvement, a key concept for him. Ego formation and functioning are important to his theory. The formation of the self takes place within social and physical surroundings. The ties and anchors that the person has in those surroundings are vital for self identity. Sherif relates his definition of attitude to the process of ego formation and functioning by saying that,

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[53] Ibid.

> the person's ties are treated as attitudes defining the bounds of what is acceptable to him as a person and what is objectionable, and the bounds of environmental events to which he is noncommittal one way or another.[54]

Since attitudes are related to the concept of self and are indications of what is acceptable, nonacceptable and noncommittal, wild fluctuations of attitude will not exist nor will acceptance of highly discrepant communication.

The judgment of whether something is acceptable or not is based on whether the item falls into the latitude of acceptance, the latitude of rejection, or the latitude of noncommittment. The openess or closedness of these latitudes is related to ego-involvement. The higher the ego-involvement of the person with the item or items to be judged the more restricted is the latitude of acceptance. In other words, the person will accept few items as compatible with his position. Many items will be rejected and one could say, in this instance, that the latitude of rejection is extremely wide. The latitude of noncommittment, at the same time, is almost non-existent. In the case of low ego-involvement the opposite is the case. There is more acceptance, less rejection and greater noncommittment. It is vital, Sherif says, to determine the latitudes in terms of ego-involvement if attitude research is to be of any value.[55]

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[54] _Ibid_., p. xiii.

It is at this point that Sherif is critical of much of the research in attitude change. It is simply not sufficient, he says,

> to describe the necessary conditions for personal conflict in terms of the simultaneous confrontation of logically incompatible cognitions or of positive and negative values. . . . An adequate theory of social influence, or communication, or psychological conflict must include conceptual tools for determining what is important, salient, or relevant to the individual. The issue of what personally concerns individuals is at least as important as the problems of what they do when two or more salient elements conflict.[56]

When the matter of what is important to the individual is known, the researcher has a clearer idea of what judgment the person will make and what will be his subsequent behavior.

What is it that determines what is important to the person? What is it that shapes the standards by which he makes judgments about the world? Sherif says that,

> Various studies have shown that many stands are related to the values and goals of a person's reference groups, that is, the groups he identifies with or wants to belong to. . . . major reference groups exert the greatest pull on personal tendencies.[57]

Because of the influence of reference groups one can say that the most dramatic instances of attitude change, when the reference group has changed,as well as the most striking instances of attitude maintenance, when the group has remained the same, can be found in studies of persons interacting within reference groups.[58]

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[55] _Ibid_. p. vii.

[56] _Ibid_., p. 73.

[57] _Ibid_., p. 68.

There are, however, exceptions to simply doing what the group does. The matter of ego-involvement must be taken into account.

> In highly ego-involving issues (for example, when the religious beliefs of a devout person are at stake, when the honor of the good father's family is challenged, or when a person dedicated to democracy faces a debate on the democratic way of life versus the totalitarian), the individual's entrenched position is the weighty anchor that overrides situational concerns to be tolerant of contrary opinions or to be agreeable. The felt discrepancy in these highly involving issues is never resolved by moving toward the advocated position. The advocated position is invariably felt as an outrage, a violation of what is sacred, as a travesty of human decency in our eyes.[59]

It is obvious from the above that Sherif believes that the desire to restore social stability does not always take precedence. Internal stability is of more importance in such instances and change of attitude is not an option.

Correlation of Luther and Cognitive Consistency Theorists

With the presentation of the cognitive consistency theories accomplished it is possible to correlate them with Luther on the basis of the criteria drawn from Luther's experience and theology. In each instance, the commonalities with Luther will be pointed out first. This helps to determine the way in which the theory is helpful in understanding and explaining Luther. Secondly, the differences between the theories and Luther will be examined. This will demonstrate some of the inadequacies of cognitive consistency theory in explaining creative intrapsychic conflict in a man like Luther. By way of review, the criteria drawn from Luther require an explanation of; the presence of two frames of reference, the total experience of Anfechtung or creative intrapsychic conflict and its stages, the time involved in satisfactorily resolving intrapsychic conflict and its recurrence, opposites held in constructive tension, and a non-reductionistic way of dealing with the theological dimension or the impact of God in Luther's life.

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[58] Ibid., p. 214. Cf., The Robbers Cave Experiment in Appendix B for an example of this phenomenon as well as for helpful experiential-descriptive data in intrapsychic conflict.

[59] Ibid., p. 228.

Cognitive balance theorists were the first to be presented. There are some commonalities with Luther and cognitive balance. Cognitive balance may deal with two frames of reference, although not clearly so. The example of the Yale student dealing with grades and coeds implies two frames of reference but the theorists do not make a point of it. There is also some commonality in dealing with the sequence of intrapsychic conflict. For the Yale man struggling with grades and coeds there is an implied conflict caused by unbalanced ambivalent relations between the elements and a feeling of resolution when balance is restored in one of the prescribed ways. There are, however, many differences between Luther and cognitive balance theorists. Cognitive balance does not deal as seriously as it might with two frames of reference. When two frames of reference are implied the solution of the imbalance is in the direction of staying within one of the frames of reference, i.e., deciding either for grades or coeds in one way or another. There is little possibility of creative interaction between the two frames of reference. In the second place, there is no indication of a resolution through anything other than a consciously cognitive process. Thus there is no place for other levels of mental functioning in the resolution of the conflict. This means that there is no full explanation of the entire sequence of intrapsychic conflict and its stages. Thirdly, there is no indication of the time element involved in reaching a satisfactory resolution of the conflict or any explanation of the possibility of its recurrence. It is as if there were no incorrect or premature resolutions before a satisfactory one is reached. In the fourth place there is little explanation of opposites held together in constructive tension in the resolution. The resolution opts mostly for one frame of reference. Finally, there is no provision for dealing with the theological dimension. Everything involved in cognitive balance is dealt with in terms of the social psychological theory.

The second category of theorists were those dealing with cognitive congruity. There is even less commonality with Luther here than with cognitive balance for the very thing that makes congruity more predictable also makes it less helpful in understanding Luther. There is a slight commonality with Luther when cognitive congruity deals with conflict involving objects and their bonds. When the Daily Worker (-) makes a positive statement about Freedom of the Press (+) there is incongruity or conflict. Resolution occurs when shifts on the scale bring objects and their bonds into a position of congruity. This partially deals with intrapsychic conflict but is by no means a treatment of the full sequence. There are many differences between Luther and cognitive congruity. Congruity operates with only one frame of reference. "Changes in evaluation are always in the direction of increased congruity with the existing frame of reference."[60] This obviously means that only one frame of reference is considered. Such a conclusion is reinforced by the 'incredulity factor.' When highly polarized objects are linked with a positive assertion people will simply refuse to believe it. The other four differences mentioned in connection with cognitive balance also apply here. Only consciously cognitive processes are employed which means less than a full explanation of the sequence of intrapsychic conflict. There is no indication of the time element involved, no provision for holding opposites in constructive tension, and no way of dealing with the theological dimension.

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[60] _Supra_, p. 150.

Milton Rokeach's belief congruence theory was the third position presented. There are some commonalities between Luther and Rokeach. Two frames of reference are implied with the belief-disbelief systems and the central-peripheral dimensions of the two systems. Rokeach also deals with intrapsychic conflict in a limited way. This is shown in the research with college students when inconsistencies in their ranking of values was pointed out and when inconsistencies between values and attitudes were brought to their attention. There could be the possibility of creative insight in Rokeach's system if interaction between belief and disbelief systems were allowed or if central beliefs such as values could be changed by intermediate or peripheral beliefs. However, his research and theory insists on the unchangeableness of central beliefs. This rules out creative interaction. There can be satisfactory resolutions only when inconsistencies are removed and become congruent with central beliefs. Rokeach does have another commonality with Luther when he allows for a 'sleeper effect,' thus adding a time dimension to resolution of conflict. The differences between Luther and Rokeach begin with the insistence that only one frame of reference really counts,

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the person's own belief system. Rokeach says, "We tend to value a given belief, subsystem, or system of beliefs in proportion to its degree of congruence with our own belief system."[61] People expect others to hold beliefs congruent with their own. All other beliefs are placed into the disbelief system of the individual. The latter system protects the belief system from change. The other differences between Luther and Rokeach involve less than a full understanding of the sequence of intrapsychic conflict since the problem-solving process involves only conscious cognition, no indication of the way in which opposites can be held in creative tension and no provision for dealing with the theological dimension.

The fourth theory was that of Leon Festinger and his theory of cognitive dissonance. There is some commonality between Luther and Festinger when Festinger indicates there may be two frames of reference involved in cognitive dissonance. He points out that one way to achieve consonance is to change one or more elements in the dissonant relation. If the person chooses to stop believing something when it has been disconfirmed he is opting for another frame of reference. This does not seem to allow for integration of two frames of reference that can result in creative insight. The research on the $1.00 and $20.00 condition shows that persons opt for one frame of reference or the other rather than creatively relating the two. Festinger also deals with the sequence of intrapsychic conflict to some extent. That sequence is present to some degree in When Prophecy Fails.[62] Conflict is caused in the minds of Mrs. Keech and her followers by the disconfirmation of their expectations. There is stunned silence and passive resignation until the arrival of a new revelation. When the revelation occurs there is further interpretation of it and sharing with others. The revelation proves inadequate because it is not a creative insight caused by the integration of two frames of reference but basically a reinforcement of the existing frame of reference. It is interesting that Festinger does not make use of his own data in drawing out the sequence of intrapsychic conflict. His interest lies in demonstrating how social support is sought to maintain a firmly held frame of reference. There are many differences between Luther and Leon Festinger. In regard to the two frames of reference implied in Festinger's theory, only the first method of dealing with dissonance offers possibilities for creative insight. However, changing one or more elements in the dissonant relation usually means opting for one or another of the frames of reference rather than a creative interaction between the two. All of the other possibilities -

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[61] _Supra_, pp. 155-156.

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[62] Cf., Appendix A.

addition of new cognitive elements consonant with present cognitions, decreasing the importance of elements involved, or seeking social support for present cognitions - are reinforcements of the present frame of reference. The incident of Mrs. Keech and her followers seeking to convince others of the correctness of their position is a vivid example of seeking social support. As mentioned above, Festinger does not deal with the full sequence of intrapsychic conflict although the data from Mrs. Keech's experience offers the possibility of doing so. He also does not provide for a time element in which incorrect or incomplete resolutions may occur prior to a satisfactory one even though the data of the Keech story also provides for that opportunity. Festinger does not allow for holding opposites in creative tension nor does he make provision for the theological dimension. All the data is explained in terms of dissonance theory.

The final theorist is Muzafer Sherif and his theory of social judgment-involvment. There is a minimal amount of commonality with Luther in Sherif's treatment of intrapsychic conflict. He does indicate that dissonance is created when a person receives a communication discrepant with his own internal standards. He could have gone on to examine in greater detail the full sequence of intrapsychic confict if he had used the data from The Robbers Cave

Experiment.[63] Conflict is evident between the Rattlers and the Eagles. It is intensified by the contrived conditions prior to the truck trip to the Arkansas border. The conflict over the use of one truck for both groups causes a general milling about and uncertainty until a solution is suddenly found. Both groups get in the truck together and friendly relations grow. Sherif, however, does not use the data available to him in the experiment. His purpose is to demonstrate the effectiveness of 'superordinate goals.' There are many differences between Luther and Sherif. Sherif does not deal with two frames of reference. He is critical of dissonance theory for even allowing the possibility of shifting to another frame of reference. All communicated items are compared to a person's own internal standards and either accepted or rejected on the basis of consonance with those standards. There is no possibility of change toward a communication which is highly discrepant with a highly ego-involved issue. Acceptance is only possible in a latitude of acceptance because the item is not discrepant or is irrelevant to the person's frame of reference. There is no explanation in his theory for the full sequence of intrapsychic conflict and all resolutions are cognitively oriented. The time involved in reaching a solution is

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[63] Cf., Appendix B.

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not treated although, again, data from The Robbers Cave Experiment could have been used to indicate a gradual movement toward resolution of the conflict. There is nothing to indicate holding opposites together in creative and constructive tension nor any provision for dealing with the theological dimension.

In view of the inadequacies of cognitive consistency theories to explain the experience and theology of Luther other theorists will have to be examined and analyzed.

Developmental Theorists

Erik Erikson

The first of the developmental theorists to be considered is Erik Erikson. For Erikson, intrapsychic conflict occurs in the developmental crises of the person. He says that,

> psychosocial development proceeds by critical steps - 'critical' being a characteristic of turning points, of moments of decision between progress and regression, integration and retardation.[64]

In another of his works he speaks of his understanding of crisis in the following manner:

> Crisis is used here in a developmental sense to connote not a threat or catastrophe, but a turning point, a crucial period of increased vulnerability and heightened potential, and therefore, the ontogenetic source of generational strength and maladjustment.[65]

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[64] Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1950), p. 270.

[65] Erik Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1968), p. 96.

Developmental crises are, therefore, unavoidable and vary to the degree to which the developing person is conscious of what is occurring. It is all part of his growth plan. As Erikson says:

> Whenever we try to understand growth, it is well to remember that epigenetic principle which is derived from the growth of organisms in utero. Somewhat generalized, this principle states that anything that grows has a ground plan, and that out of this ground plan the parts arise, each part having its time of special ascendancy, until all parts have arisen to form a functioning whole.[66]

Each of the crises in the developmental sequence occurs as part of the 'ground plan' of personal growth. Erikson lists many components involved in the crises when he discusses his developmental scheme. He uses the first of the crises, trust and mistrust, as his model. The components are:

> (1) The expanding libidinal needs of the developing model and with them, new possibilities of satisfaction, of frustration, and of 'sublimation.' (2) The widening social radius, i.e., the number and kinds of people to whom he can respond meaningfully on the basis of (3) his ever more highly differentiated capacities. (4) The developmental crisis evoked by the necessity to manage new encounters within a given time allowance. (5) A new sense of estrangement awakened along with the awareness of new dependencies and new familiarities (e.g., in early infancy, the sense of abandonment). (6) A specifically new psychosocial strength (here a favorable ratio of trust over mistrust) which is a foundation for all future strengths.[67]

Somewhat further on he adds a seventh component to this scheme, namely, the major human endeavor or institution which in adulthood guards the strength attained at each stage. In the first stage, for instance, the basic sense of trust is safeguarded by organized religion.[68] Thus the crisis involves internal components of expanding libidinal needs and more highly differentiated capacities. These come into contact with social forces. The result of the crisis is a sense of estrangement but also, hopefully, a new psychosocial strength, a strength related to and safeguarded by a social institution. Erikson has also added to the outcome of the crises the positive 'virtues' resulting from a favorable ratio of the positive strength over the negative tendency. The basic virtue resulting from the first crisis, trust and mistrust, is Hope. Hope is a subjective sense which enables the person to grow in a positive direction and it is accompanied by the objective quality of Drive.[69]

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[66] Ibid., p. 92.

[67] Ibid., pp. 104-105.

Erikson is interested in a proper understanding of the role of the ego in the developmental crises. The ego is that psychic 'place' where the crisis occurs and where it is resolved. In traditional psychoanalytic thought the ego is that which organizes experience and guards such organization against the untimely impact of drives and the undue pressure of an overzealous conscience. It is a selective, integrating, coherent and persistent agency central to the personality formation. In relation to the developmental crises it is that inner 'organ' that helps bind together man's inner life and social planning.[70] It must not be assumed, however, that the ego's successful resolution of the crisis means an assured and inflexible outcome. In order to avoid misunderstanding of this issue Erikson states:

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[68] Ibid., p. 105.

[69] Erikson, Childhood and Society, p. 274.

> What the child acquires at a given stage is a certain ratio between the positive and the negative which, if the balance is toward the positive will help him meet later crises with a predisposition toward the source of vitality. The idea, however, that at any stage a goodness is achieved which is impervious to all new conflicts within and changes without is a projection on child development of that success-and-possession ideology which so dangerously prevades some of our private and public daydreams.[71]

There is an on-going nature to the crises which means that the positive strength attained at one point may be overcome or put into question by a conflict at a later point.

In reviewing the eight developmental crises which Erikson uses, the components of each crisis and its outcome in terms of strengths and virtues are noted. The first stage has its libidinal basis in what Freud called the 'oral' stage. It is an incorporative stage in which the earliest and simplest modality is 'to get,' not in the sense of 'go and get' but in the receiving and accepting of what is given. It is important that the child find that what is needed is given by those around it. The focus is on the maternal care given to the child, a care which proves worthy of the trust of the child that its needs will be met. Beyond the simple incorporative stage, Erikson speaks of an active-incorporative mode in a 'second oral' stage. The child exercises a modality of 'taking' and 'holding on' to things. As Erikson notes:

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[70] Erik Erikson, Insight and Responsibility (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1964), p. 148.

[71] Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, p. 325.

> The crisis of the second oral stage is difficult to assess and more difficult to verify. It seems to consist of the coincidence in time of three developments: (1) a more 'violent' drive to incorporate, appropriate, and observe more actively, a tension associated with the discomfort of 'teething' and other changes in the oral machinery; (2) the infant's increasing awareness of himself as a distinct person; and (3) the mother's gradual turning away from the baby toward pursuits which she had given up during late pregnancy and postnatal care.[72]

Each of the three components indicated above plays its part in the crisis. There is a sense of having been deprived, of having been divided, and of having been abandoned. All of these leave a residue of basic mistrust against which a sense of basic trust must establish and maintain itself. Again, it is the quality of maternal care provided which proves most valuable in establishing the sense of trust as an outcome in the conflict between inner and outer forces. There will always be a sense of mistrust although a positive outcome means that the sense of trust predominates. Nevertheless, as Erikson insists, a sense of mistrust is a necessary ingredient for survival in life and it should not be assumed that the negative force is entirely obliterated. If basic trust is the strength issuing from a positive resolution of the crisis, Hope is the basic virtue. "Hope is the enduring belief in the attainability of fervent wishes, in spite of the dark urges and rages which mark the beginning of existence."[73] The external characteristic of Drive accompanies the internal impulse of Hope. Erikson also points out that Hope is the ontogenetic basis of faith and faith is nourished and maintained by the adult social institution of organized religion.

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[72] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

The second stage has its libidinal basis in anality. It is characterized by a retentive-eliminative mode. The child experiences muscular maturation, gains in ability to verbalize, to discriminate, and to co-ordinate a number of highly conflicting action patterns characterized by the tendencies of 'holding on' and 'letting go.' The still highly dependent child begins to express his autonomous will. This results in a conflict of unequal wills. The child is often unequal to his own violent will and parent and child are often unequal to one another.[74] For a positive sense of autonomy to result from this crisis it is necessary that parental control not be overcontrol which results in an overwhelming sense of doubt and shame. This is not to say that there is no sense of loss of self-control or a sense of parental overcontrol. But a positive outcome to the crisis means that doubt about one's ability and shame at being exposed does not predominate. The positive outcome of a sense of self-control without loss of self-esteem, or autonomy, is the source of the internal virtue of Will-Power and the external characteristic of Self-Control. Erikson defines Will as the "unbroken determination to exercise free choice as well as self-restraint, in spite of the unavoidable experience of shame and doubt in infancy."[75] The social structure which safeguards autonomy is "the principle of law and order, which in everyday life as well as in the courts of law apportions to each his privileges and his limitations, his obligations and his rights."[76]

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[73] Erikson, Insight and Responsibility, p. 118.

[74] Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, p. 107.

The third stage in the theory of infantile sexuality is called the phallic stage. The libidinal impulses at this time result in an intrusive mode. There are intrusions into space by vigorous locomotion, intrusion into the unknown by consuming curiosity, intrusion into other people's ears and minds by the aggressive voice, intrusion upon or into other bodies by physical attack, and sometimes the thought of the phallus intruding into the female body. Three developments have made this possible and contribute to the crisis which results.

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[75] Erikson, Insight and Responsibility, p. 119.

[76] Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, p. 113.

> (1) The child learns to move around more freely and more violently and therefore establishes a wider and, to him, unlimited radius of goals; (2) his sense of language becomes perfected to the point where he understands and can ask incessantly about innumerable things, often hearing just enough to misunderstand them thoroughly; and (3) both language and locomotion permit him to expand his imagination to so many roles that he cannot avoid frightening himself with what he has dreamed and thought up.[77]

Erikson suggests that the basic social modalities can best be summed up in the idea of 'making,' that is, in the childlike sense of 'being on the make.' There is an attempt to exercise initiative toward 'making' a favored parent the captive of one's own time and attention. In his play and imagination the child can become any great power or force he wants to be in order to capture the favored person or accomplish the desired goal. At the same time he can feel a sense of fear and terror at what he has imagined. The limits of the permissible and the possible courses of accepted action must be pointed out by those around the child. This is heavily dependent upon a patient family which can help the child realize the 'do's' and 'don't's' of life. These external forces become internalized in the form of conscience.

> The great governor of initiative is conscience. The child, we said, now not only feels afraid of being found

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[77] Ibid., p. 115.

> out, but he also hears the 'inner voice' of self-observation, self-guidance, and self-punishment, which divides him radically within himself; a new and powerful estrangement. This is the ontogenetic cornerstone of morality.[78]

However, the work of over-eager adults can make the conscience too severe a task-master in bringing about a sense of internal guilt. A predominance of guilt cripples the child and inhibits any initiative or it may cause the child to overcompensate in doing good things in order to overcome the sense of guilt. The predominance of the positive strength of initiative as the resolution of this crisis results in the internal virtue of Purpose and the external characteristic of Direction. "Purpose, then," Erikson says, "is the courage to envisage and pursue valued goals uninhibited by the defeat of infantile fantasies, by guilt and by the foiling fear of punishment."[79] The adult social institution related to this virtue is somewhat ambiguous. In one place, Erikson says,

> Social institutions, therefore, offer children of this age an economic ethos, in the form of ideal adults recognizable by their uniforms and their functions, and fascinating enough to replace the heroes of picture book and fairy tale.[80]

Later he speaks of adults offering children of this age "an eagerly absorbed ethos of action in the form of ideal types and techniques fascinating enough to replace the heroes of picture book and fairy tale."[81] Regardless of the difference in terminology, Erikson is attempting to point out the importance of adults modeling acceptable ways for initiative to be expressed.

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[78] Ibid., p. 119.

[79] Erikson, Insight and Responsibility, p. 122.

[80] Erikson, Childhood and Society, p. 258.

The libidinal drive goes underground, so to speak, during the fourth period. It is the period of latency and allows attention to more socially cooperative endeavors.

> Such is the wisdom of the ground plan that at no time is the child more ready to learn quickly and avidly, to become big in the sense of sharing obligation, discipline, and performance than at the end of the period of expansive imagination. He is also eager to make things together, to share in constructing and planning, instead of trying to coerce other children or provoke restriction.[82]

The positive outcome of this stage is a sense of industry. The child should have the sense of being able to make things and to make them well. "The danger at this stage is the development of an estrangement from himself and from his tasks - the well-known sense of inferiority."[83] It may be caused by an insufficient solution to the previous stage in which he may still want to be the baby at home rather than the big child at school or he may still compare himself with his father and the comparison arouses a sense of guilt as well as a sense of inferiority. Family life may not have prepared him for school life or school life may fail to encourage him in what he has learned to do well since nothing he does seems to count with his teacher or fellow students. Parents and teachers need to work together in a combination of work and play, encourage construction, and recognize productive effort, in order that the child may have a positive identification of himself as one who knows things and how to do things. Out of this can come the internal virtue of Competence and the external characteristic of Method. Erikson defines Competence as "the free exercise of dexterity and intelligence in the completion of tasks, unimpaired by infantile inferiority."[84] The social institution which is related to and maintains competence is the technological ethos of the child's culture.

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[81] Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, pp. 120-121. The problem is one of making a clear distinction between the social institutions of the third and fourth stages. There is no clear distinction between an economic ethos and a technological ethos. Richard Jones, Fantasy and Feeling in Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 131, designates 'moral law' as the related social structure. His solution, however, makes for ambiguity between 'moral law' and the 'law and order' of the second stage.

[82] Ibid., p. 122.

[83] Ibid., p. 124.

Adolescence brings the rapid growth of the body and the development of genital maturity. Because of this, the fifth stage causes the samenesses and continuities of the earlier stages to be questioned all over again. The adolescent is searching for a sense of identity in a time when he faces the adult tasks of the future with the inner accomplishments of the past. He is concerned about whether what he appears to be in the eyes of others is the same as what he feels himself to be and how he can connect what he is to the tasks ahead. The earlier stages all play their parts in the following manner:

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[84] Erikson, Insight and Responsibility, p. 124.

> If the earliest stage bequeathed to the identity crisis an important need for trust in oneself and in others, then clearly the adolescent looks most fervently for men and ideas to have _faith_ in, which also means men and ideas in whose service it would seem worthwhile to prove oneself trustworthy. . . .
>
> If the second stage established the necessity of being defined by what one can _will_ freely, then the adolescent now looks for an opportunity to decide with free assent on one of the available or unavoidable avenues of duty and service, and at the same time is mortally afraid of being forced into activities in which he would feel exposed to ridicule or self-doubt. . . .
>
> If an unlimited _imagination_ as to what one _might_ become is the heritage of the play age, then the adolescent's willingness to put his trust in those peers and leading, or misleading, elders who will give imaginative, if not illusory, scope to his aspirations is only too obvious. . . .
>
> Finally, if the desire to make something work, and to make it work well, is the gain of the school age, then the choice of an occupation assumes a significance beyond the question of remuneration and status.[85]

The estrangement of this stage is identity confusion. This can occur when those in whom one wants to trust prove unworthy of faith; when one is not free to give assent to avenues of duty or service; when what one imagines himself to be is denied or frustrated by others; or when occupational choice is not available. All of the preceding elements cause severe conflict between inner feelings and outer circumstance and leave the adolescent with uncertainty and

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[85] Erikson, _Identity: Youth and Crisis_, pp. 128-129.

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confusion. What is needed are confirming adults and affirming peers so that a firm sense of ego identity is possible. From the predominance of this positive outcome of the identity crisis comes the internal virtue of Fidelity and the external characteristic of Devotion. Erikson states that, "Fidelity is the ability to sustain loyalties freely pledged in spite of inevitable contradictions of value systems."[86] Adolescents not only need but also test out fidelity in themselves and others. This can result in supreme devotion but can also result in the exclusion of those with whom one feels a strangeness and hostility. The social institution to which fidelity is related and through which it is guarded is ideology. The regnant ideology must prove itself worthy of the fidelity of the adolescent lest he become disillusioned that those who hold it and exercise power through it are unworthy of their position and his fidelity. Thus the adolescent is a regenerative force for the recovery of waning forces for good and the rejuvenation of society.

The sixth stage of the developmental sequence is that springing from full genital maturity. Full genital maturity is expressed in a relationship of intimacy. The young adult, emerging from the search for identity is now ready to fuse that identity with someone else.

> He is ready for intimacy, that is, the capacity to commit himself to concrete affiliations and partner-

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[86] Erikson, Insight and Responsibility, p. 125.

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> ships and to develop the ethical strength to abide by such commitments, even though they may call for significant sacrifices and compromises. Body and ego must now be masters of the organ modes and of the nuclear conflicts, in order to be able to face the fear of ego loss in situations which call for self-abandon: in the solidarity of close affiliations, in orgasms and sexual unions, in close friendships and in physical combat, in experiences of inspiration by teachers and of intuition from the recesses of the self. The avoidance of such experiences because of fear of ego loss may lead to a deep sense of isolation and consequent self-absorption.[87]

Thus the estrangement possible at this stage is one of isolation. It is caused by the fear of loss of one's identity, a fear of fusion with anyone or any others lest there no longer be any 'self' to the self.

The counterpart to intimacy is distantiation, the readiness to distinguish, mark off, and, if need be, destroy those forces which are a threat to one's intimacy and solidarity. The forces thus designated are usually those which were regarded with suspicion during adolescence because they could not be regarded as part of one's identity. The danger is that such distantiation will result in the hardening of prejudices which blindly isolate and destroy other things and people. It is the responsibility of the adult to delineate proper areas of relationship and thus grow into a mature ethical sense which transcends adolescent ideology and childhood moralism.

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[87] Erikson, Childhood and Society, pp. 263-264.

The expression of mature sexual genitality is an integral part of this developmental stage. It is expressed in mutual intimacy and sensitivity with a loved partner. In order to be of lasting importance, Erikson says that the utopia of genitality should include:

1. Mutuality of orgasm
2. With a loved partner
3. Of the other sex
4. With whom one is able and willing to share a mutual trust
5. And with whom one is able and willing to regulate the cycles of
    - a. work
    - b. procreation
    - c. recreation
6. So as to secure to the offspring, too, all the stages of a satisfactory development.[88]

Such an expression of genitality brings together the opposites of male and female, fact and fancy, love and hate, work and play. The resulting internal virtue of the successful resolution of this crisis is Love. "Love, then, is the mutuality of devotion forever subduing the antagonisms inherent in divided function."[89] The external characteristic is Affiliation, while the social safeguard for the positive outcome of this stage is "a culture's style of sexual selection, cooperation, and competition."[90]

The seventh stage of development is one in which a large area of man's mind has been left uncharted by psychoanalysis.

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[88] *Ibid.*, p. 266.

[89] Erikson, *Insight and Responsibility*, p. 129.

[90] Erikson, *Childhood and Society*, p. 266.

Erikson says:

> I refer to man's love for his works and ideas as well as for his children, and the necessary self-verification which adult man's ego receives, and must receive, from his labor's challenge. As adult man needs to be needed, so - for the strength of his ego and for that of his community - he requires the challenge emanating from what he has generated and from what now must be 'brought up,' guarded, preserved - and eventually transcended.[91]

All of this is summed in the positive outcome of generativity. The negative outcome or estrangement possible at this stage is that of stagnation.

> Where such enrichment fails altogether, regression to an obsessive need for pseudointimacy takes place, often with a prevading sense of stagnation, boredom, and interpersonal impoverishment.[92]

The people involved begin to treat each other as one another's child which may result in physical or psychological invalidism. The most drastic results of generative failure will be seen in the next generation, a generation which suffered from the generative failure of the parents.

The positive outcome of this crisis, so much dependent upon the outcomes of previous crises, results in the internal virtue of Care. "Care is the widening concern for what has been generated by love, necessity, or accident; it overcomes the ambivalence adhering to irreversible obligation."[93] The external characteristic allied with Care is Production.

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[91] Erikson, Insight and Responsibility, p. 131.

[92] Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, p. 138.

[93] Erikson, Insight and Responsibility, p. 131.

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Erikson claims that all social institutions codify the ethics of generative succession. Through them all there has evolved a set of proven methods and a fund of traditional reassurance which enable one generation to meet the needs of the next. Thus, it could be said that education and tradition safeguard the function of generativity.

The final stage of human development is also one which has not received much attention. Yet here is the culmination of all of life, the cycle of one generation concluding itself in the next, the cycle of individual life reaching its own conclusion. The crisis involved at this time relates to the person's sense of the uselessness or worthwhileness of his own life. The positive outcome to this crisis is one of ego integrity.

> In the aging person who has taken care of things and people and has adapted himself to the triumphs and disappointments of being, by necessity, the originator of others and the generator of things and ideas - only in him the fruit of the seven stages gradually ripens.[94]

The man of integrity is able to accept his life and the contributions he has made as being the one and only life given him. He can see it as a whole in the context of a larger totality and he does not fear its end. On the other hand, estrangement due to the loss of ego integrity can result in despair.

> Clinical and anthropological evidence suggest that the lack or loss of this accrued ego integration is

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[94] Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, p. 139.

> signified by disgust and by despair: fate is not accepted as the frame of life, death not as its finite boundary. Despair expresses the feeling that time is short, too short for the attempt to start another life and to try alternate roads to integrity.[95]

The positive outcome of this crisis results in the internal virtue of Wisdom allied with the external characteristic of Renunciation. Erikson combines these two elements in his definition of wisdom. "Wisdom, then, is detached concern with life itself, in the face of death itself."[96] Such wisdom is able to view life as a whole and to share with the succeeding generation that which has been learned as valuable and helpful. Individual wisdom becomes allied with the social tradition, a tradition which gains from and yet safeguards the wisdom of individual lives.[97]

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[95] Ibid., p. 140.

[96] Erikson, Insight and Responsibility, p. 133.

[97] Cf., Ibid. pp. 135-137, where Erikson points out that Jean Piaget is critical of Erikson's view of the developmental cycle. In a 1955 meeting that brought Piaget, Erikson, and others interested in child development together, the discussion centered on whether there were 'general stages' in childhood which encompass all the functions of mind and body and yet, in their successive development, maintain autonomy from each other. The 'general stages' named by Erikson at each successive point in development imply a structural unity. Piaget took exception to that point of view. He offered himself as a person who is diversified, contradictory, and many-sided. There is, Piaget argued, a functional unity, that is, an ability to reconcile and coordinate patterns of growth in the total person. This agrees with his view of the on-going process of assimilation and accomodation moving toward higher levels of equilibrium. Erikson, however, was not convinced and continues to view the strengths of the ego as the structural basis for unity at each stage.

Following the presentation of Erikson's theory it is important to see how he uses it to analyze an important person in history like Luther. He has done so in Young Man Luther.[98] Erikson interprets Luther's Anfechtung as a severe identity crisis for which he sought delay and cure in the monastery.[99] According to Erikson's theory adolescence brings with it a questioning of all the continuities of the past. The first of the crises, trust and mistrust, was reopened in the case of Luther. The earliest stage did not establish for Luther a clear trust in himself and in others with the result that he was unable to determine who and what to trust. Hans Luther's severity led Martin to mistrust his father. As Erikson says:

> Here, I think, is the origin of Martin's doubt that the father, when he punishes you, is really guided by love and justice rather than by arbitrariness and malice. This early doubt later was projected on the Father in heaven.[100]

God also became an arbitrary judge who could not be trusted. This was most clearly shown in the incident of the First Mass. There before the altar, Luther faced an angry God whom he feared while at the same time waiting to face an angry earthly father who disapproved of his choice of vocation.[101]

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[98] Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1958).

[99] Ibid., p. 47.

[100] Ibid., p. 58.

[101] Ibid., p. 212.

However, Luther's earthly father, Hans, not only affected Martin's idea of God but also his own self-image. Martin felt himself so totally a sinner that he wanted to hide his face and be a nobody. This also was projected on God who became One Who turned His back, hid His face and was the terrible, hidden God.[102]

Luther eventually did resolve his identity Anfechtung, achieved a hard-won adulthood and recovered his own ego-initiative.[103] He did this by identifying himself with Christ, by finding Christ in himself.

> Yet now, in finding Christ in himself, he establishes an inner position which goes beyond that of a neurotic compromise identification. He finds the core of a praying man's identity, and advances Christian ideology by an important step. It is clear that Luther abandoned the appreciation of Christ as a substitute who has died 'for' - in the sense of 'instead of' - us; he also abandoned the concept of Christ as an ideal figure to be imitated, or abjectly venerated, or ceremonially remembered as an event in the past. Christ now becomes the core of the Christian's identity: quotidianus Christi adventus, Christ is today here, in me. The affirmed passivity of suffering becomes the daily Passion and the Passion is the substitution of the primitive sacrifice of others with a most active, most masterly, affirmation on man's nothingness - which by his own masterly choice, becomes his existential identity.[104]

Erikson assumes that Luther identified Christ's suffering with his own and found a solution in projecting his own experience on Christ. As Erikson goes on to say:

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[102] Ibid., p. 125.

[103] Ibid., p. 206.

[104] Ibid., pp. 212-213.

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> He who had sought to dispel the angry cloud that darkened the face of the fathers and of The Father now said that Christ's life _is_ God's face: _qui_ _est_ _facies_ _patris_. The Passion is all that man can know of God: his conflicts, duly faced, are all that he can know of himself. The last judgment is the always present self-judgment. Christ did not live and die in order to make man poorer in the fear of his future judgment, but in order to make him abundant today: _nam_ _judica_ _sunt_ _ipsae_ _passiones_ _Christi_ _quae_ _in_ _nobis_ _abundant_.[105]

Luther's resolution of his _Anfechtung_, as Erikson sees it, took place over a period of time in three or more distinct and fragmentary experiences. For others resolution or revelation may take place in one explosive event. The three experiences were the thunderstorm near Stotternheim, the fit in the choir, and the experience in the tower. He comments on the elements involved and their relation to each of the three incidents.

> Let me list the elements again: physical paroxysm; a degree of unconsciousness; an automatic verbal utterance; a command to change the over-all direction of effort and aspiration; and a spiritual revelation, a flash of enlightenment, decisive and pervasive as a rebirth. The thunderstorm had provided him with a change in the over-all direction of his life, a change toward the anonymous, the silent and the obedient. In fits such as the one in the choir, he experienced the epileptoid paroxysm of ego-loss, the rage of denial of the identity which was to be discarded. And later in the experience in the tower . . . he perceived the light of a new spiritual formula.[106]

Luther's perception of a new spiritual formula did not mean that the negative, fearful aspects of his life were completely obliterated. It did not mean, according to Erikson, that Luther's ego was able to balance the opposites which were present in him.

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[105] _Ibid_., p. 213.

[106] _Ibid_., p. 39.

> In his state of personal recovery, Luther (like any individual recovering from an oppressive mental state) had recourse to massive totalisms from which he derived the foundation stone for a new wholeness. The whole person includes certain total states in his balances: we are, Luther proclaimed, totally sinners (*totus homo peccator*) and totally just (*totus homo justus*), always both damned and blessed, both alive and dead. We thus cannot strive, by hook or by crook, to get from one absolute stage into another; we can only use our God-given organs of awareness in the here and now to encompass the paradoxes of the human condition. Psychologically speaking, this means that at any given moment, and in any given act or thought, we are co-determined to a degree which can never become quite conscious by our drives and by our conscience. Our ego is most powerful when it is not burdened with an excessive denial of our drives, but lets us enjoy what we can, refute what we must, and sublimate according to our creativity - always making due allowance for the absolutism of our conscience, which can never be appeased by small sacrifices and atonements, but must always remain part of the whole performance.[107]

There is the recognition, then, of a tension within Luther that is reflected in the theological dialectic of sinner and saint.

Jean Piaget

The second developmental theorist is Jean Piaget. He maintains that there are four general factors to mental development. The first three are common to most developmental theorists while the fourth is his unique contribution. The first factor is that of organic growth, especially the maturation of the nervous system and the

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[107] *Ibid.*, p. 216.

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endocrine system. The second factor is the role of exercise and experience in performing actions upon objects. The third is social interaction and transmission. The fourth is an internal mechanism which is observable at the time of each partial construction of thought by the child and at each transition from one stage to the next. This internal mechanism cannot be reduced to heredity alone since it has no pre-established plan.

> It is a process of equilibrium, not in the sense of a simple balance of forces, as in mechanics, or an increase of entropy as in thermodynamics, but in the sense - which has now been brought out so clearly by cybernetics - of self-regulation; that is a series of active compensations on the part of the subject in response to external disturbances and an adjustment that is both retroactive (loop systems of feedback) and anticipatory, constituting a permanent system of compensations.[108]

The process of equilibrium which involves active compensations on the part of the subject in response to external intrusions is the subject's method of dealing with internal conflict. What is already in existence internally interacts with what intrudes externally through what Piaget calls assimilation and accomodation. The external reality is assimilated to the schemata which already exist internally and the schemata, at the same time, are accomodated to the external reality. This action on the part of the subject means that no environmental stimulation is merely passively received and registered but is always acted upon while the environmental stimulation is acting simultaneously upon the subject's point of view. David Elkind remarks that this can be understood in the form of a dialectic.

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[108] Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder, The Psychology of the Child (New York: Basic Boooks, Inc., 1969), p. 157.

> At each level of development there are two poles of activity: changes in the structure of the organism in response to environmental intrusion (accomodation), and changes in the intruding stimuli due to the existing structure (assimilation). These two poles of activity constitute a sort of thesis and antithesis whose eventual synthesis is effected by a process of equilibration.[109]

The intrusions made upon the subject occur in two different ways. In the case of the lower, unstable sensorimotor and intuitive forms of equilibrium, the intrusion consists of real and actual modifications of the environment to which the subject responds as best he can without a permanent operational system. In the case of the higher operational structures the intrusion to which the subject responds may consist of imagined or anticipated modifications and the compensatory activities will also consist of imagining and anticipating the transformations.[110] It should also be noted that the two functions of assimilation and accomodation do not operate with equal strength at all times. The beginning of each stage has a predominance of assimilation while the end of each stage has a greater accomodation to reality as it reaches a more stable equilibrium.

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[109] Jean Piaget, Six Psychological Studies, edited by David Elkind (New York: Vintage Books, Inc., 1967), p. xii.

[110] *Ibid.*, p. 113.

It is perhaps incorrect to speak of a 'stable equilibrium' as if Piaget thought that equilibrium meant a balance of forces in a state of rest.

> It follows that equilibrium thus defined is compatible with the concept of an open system, and it would be better to speak . . . of a 'stable state in an open system.' . . . What is important for psychological explication is not equilibrium as a state but, rather, the actual process of equilibration.[111]

There is, then, an on-going process of intrusion, disequilibrium, assimilation and accomodation dealing with conflictual forces, and a state of relative equilibrium ready to deal with the next intrusion in the same manner.

In the development of thought there are four major stages and a number of sub-stages related to these. The first stage, that lasting from birth to about eighteen months or the attainment of language, is called the sensori-motor stage. Sensori-motor intelligence is essentially a practical intelligence. It is aimed at getting results rather than stating truths. A system of action-schemes is constructed to deal with reality. Piaget calls a scheme "the structure or organization of actions as they are transferred or generalized by repetition in similar or analogous circumstances."[112] The action-schemes are constructed entirely from movements and perceptions since there is no language or symbolic function yet present to provide thought or representation.

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[111] Ibid., p. 101.

[112] Piaget and Inhelder, p. 4.

There are several sub-stages to the sensori-motor stage of mental development. Piaget has continued to refine them over a period of time. In his 1940 essay, "The Mental Development of the Child," he uses three sub-stages. They are:

1. The reflex or hereditary stage, at which the first instinctual nutritional drives and the first emotions appear.
2. The stage of the first motor habits and of the first organized percepts, as well as of the first differentiated emotions.
3. The stage of sensorimotor or practical intelligence (prior to language) of elementary affective organization, and of the first external affective fixations.[113]

In one of his later works in 1969, The Psychology of the Child, he expands the stages to six.[114] The first stage involves the reflexes of the newborn child. Reflexes of particular importance for the future are such reflexes as the sucking and palmar reflexes. These give rise to 'reflex exercise,' that is, a consolidation by means of functional exercise. The second stage includes the formation of the first habits. An elementary habit is the exercise of a general sensori-motor scheme in which there is not yet any differentiation between means and ends. A third stage begins about four and one-half months with the coordination between vision and prehension in which the

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[113] Piaget, Six Psychological Studies, p. 5.

[114] Piaget and Inhelder. The original French edition was published in 1966.

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child begins to grasp everything in a circular reaction. Whereas in the third stage there still was no differentiation between means and ends, in the fourth stage the subject sets out to obtain a certain result, independent of the means he is going to employ. There is a coordination of means and ends which is new for this stage. Around eleven or twelve months a fifth stage occurs in which there is the search for a new means by a differentiation from schemes already known. It is at the sixth stage that sensori-motor intelligence reaches its zenith. At this stage the child becomes capable of finding new means not only by external groping but also by internalized combinations that culminate in sudden comprehension. This latter stage is the culmination of all the other stages and is the highest advancement of sensori-motor intelligence. It is not, however, to be separated from the others as if it were a different kind of intelligence.[115]

Another significant development that occurs in the first eighteen months is a kind of Copernican revolution in which the child moves from seeing himself as the center of the universe to one who is an object among many others in a universe that is made of permanent objects. This decentering process takes place from a position of egocentricity, a term which drew much criticism from Piaget's critics. At one point, Piaget called the lack of consciousness of the self

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[115] *Ibid.*, pp. 6-12.

"adualism."[116] In another place in the same work he experiments with the phrase "symbolism centering on the self" in connection with the preoperational stage.[117] He is anxious for the reader to understand that his use of the term 'egocentric' has no moral connotations. It is not that the young child will not see himself as other than the center of the universe. He cannot do otherwise.

At the end of the sensori-motor period and the beginning of the intuitive or preoperational stage there appears a function which is fundamental to the development of thought. That function is the ability to represent something by means of a 'signifier.' The signifier is in the form of mental image, symbolic gesture, or language. Piaget notes that the function of a signifier to represent a 'signified' object, event or person is usually called a 'symbolic' function. However, since linguists distinguish between 'symbols' and 'signs' he adopts his own term, the "semiotic function."[118] For Piaget there are five patterns of behavior that indicate the appearance of the semiotic function after eighteen months. First, there is deferred imitation, that is, imitation which starts after the disappearance of the model. Second, there is symbolic play or the game of pretending which is unknown at the sensori-motor level. In the third place there is the appearance of the drawing or graphic image which is an intermediate stage between play and mental image. It rarely appears before two or two-and-a-half. Then, fourthly, comes the mental image, no trace of which is observed on the sensori-motor level. The mental image appears as an internalized imitation. Finally, early language permits the reference to events not occurring at the time. Thus verbal presentation is added to image imitation.[119]

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[116] Ibid., p. 22.

[117] Ibid., p. 61.

[118] Ibid., p. 51.

One of the more important characteristics of ages two to seven, as noted above, is symbolic play. Symbolic play transforms reality by assimilation to the needs of the self. It is succeeded by games with rules as the child becomes more socially oriented. And that is succeeded by games of construction which tend to involve genuine adaptations or solutions to problems. However, it is symbolic play with its ludic symbols that gains most attention at this stage. In symbolic play the child is consciously assimilating reality to itself, sometimes for the solution of affective conflicts. The child will replay a frightening or unhappy situation and resolve it with a happier solution.

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[119] Ibid., pp. 53-54.

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> Generally speaking, symbolic play helps in the resolution of conflicts and also in the compensation of unsatisfied needs, the inversion of roles (such as obedience and authority), the liberation and extension of the self, etc.[120]

Piaget acknowledges that there is also unconscious symbolism, especially that present in dreams. However, he sees this as but a further extension of assimilation to the ego which is characteristic of symbolic play.

> If symbolic play is merely the expression of assimilation of reality to the ego, i.e., assimilation dissociated from the corresponding accomodation, the unconscious symbol is even more so. The unconscious character of the symbol can be explained by the complete egocentrism of dreams (in so far as there is loss of contact with reality), and of repressed tendencies (in so far as they are opposed to actual reality). . . . The origin of the unconscious symbol is to be found in the suppression of consciousness of the ego by complete absorption in, and identification with, the external world, and it therefore constitutes merely a limit case of assimilation of reality to the ego, i.e., of ludic symbolism.[121]

Piaget seems willing to grant some validity to unconscious symbolism as helpful in the resolution of conflict but he plainly points out its inadequacy in comparison to conceptual thought. Still, he is appreciative of Silberer's work in provoking and utilizing functional images, that is, images which incorporate the working of thought. He sees Silberer's work as indicating that symbolism is not necessarily totally unconscious and the result of repression and censorship, as Freud seemed to indicate. Symbolism can serve an integrative function in that "it may represent either evocation of the past for the purpose of present adaptation, or assimilation of the present to the past."[122] In this way symbolism can possibly serve to reintegrate desparate elements in its own way. However, symbolism often contains logical contradictions and lacunae which are "clear evidence of its inadequacy as compared with the coherence and synthesis of conceptual thought."[123] For Piaget symbolic thought is a pre-logical and not an anti-logical form of thought and is the primitive expression of the assimilative or affective schemas.

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[120] *Ibid*., p. 60.

[121] Jean Piaget, *Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. 1962), p. 199.

Another important characteristic is the appearance of mental images. Piaget feels that their appearance is relatively late because they are the result of internalized imitation. There are two broad categories of images; the reproductive and the anticipatory. Reproductive images duplicate what has been previously seen and are static in their nature. This is the way images function for the pre-operative child. They are the cause of intuitive thought, that is, thought which is dominated by what is seen. Intuitive thought, because it is dominated by visual and static images, is transductive in nature (goes from one prominent feature to the next without logical connection), rigid and irreversible.[124] What is lacking is the operational ability to envisage movements and transformations as is true of the concrete operational child. When such operations are available the second type of image, the anticipatory, begins to play a part.[125]

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[122] Ibid., p. 194.

[123] Ibid., pp. 210-211.

Language is a third important characteristic in the development of the preoperative child. Piaget is convinced that,

> language does not constitute the source of logic but is, on the contrary, structured by it. The roots of logic are to be sought in the general coordinations of actions (including verbal behavior), beginning with the sensori-motor level, whose schemes are of fundamental importance.[126]

Language contributes to the range and rapidity of thought. Sensori-motor thought can only proceed as fast as events while verbal patterns can represent chains of actions very rapidly. Sensori-motor thought is limited to immediate space and time whereas language enables thought to range over vast stretches of time and space. And whereas sensori-motor thought proceeds by means of successive acts, language can help thought represent all of the elements of a structure simultaneously.[127]

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[124] Piaget, Six Psychological Studies, p. 32.

[125] Piaget and Inhelder, p. 71.

[126] Ibid., p. 90.

[127] Ibid., p. 86.

By way of summary of the preoperational stage, there is a gradual decentering which permits the growth of operations and liberation from visual appearances and static images. This is also reflected in the growing social experiences of the child which moves him from moral feelings based entirely on external force to an autonomy which can at the same time take into account the point of view of others.[128]

At about the age of seven the child enters the stage of concrete operations. Piaget explains the transition that takes place.

> How can we explain the transition from intuitions to operations? Intuitions become transformed into operations as soon as they constitute groupings which are both composable and reversible. In other words, actions become operational when two actions of the same kind can be composed into a third action of the same kind and when these various actions can be compensated or annulled. Thus the action of combining (logical or arithmetic addition) is an operation, because several successive combinations are equivalent to a single combination (composition of additions) and because the combinations can be annulled by dissociations (subtractions).[129]

The child at this point is only able to operate concretely, that is, the objects or groups of objects must be present to the child. The logical organization of judgment and argument is inseparable from an observable content. The

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[128] For a thorough discussion of the movement in moral thought from heteronomy to autonomy and from arbitrary justice to that of equality and equity, cf., Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

[129] Piaget, Six Psychological Studies, p. 49.

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child cannot operate on the basis of mere hypothesis. This stage lasts until the age of eleven or so.

After the age of eleven the child enters the stage of formal operations in which abstract thought becomes possible.

> The great novelty at this stage is that by means of a differentiation of form and content the subject becomes capable of reasoning correctly about propositions he does not believe, or at least not yet; that is, propositions that he considers mere hypotheses. He becomes capable of drawing the necessary conclusions from truths which are merely possible, which constitutes the beginning of hypothetico-deductive or formal thought.[130]

Thus the child is able to reflect in the absence of objects. The objects are replaced by pure propositions. Such reflection is thought raised to the second power.

The four basic stages in Piaget's theory are characterized by him as follows:

> (1) Their order of succession is constant, although the average ages at which they occur may vary with the individual, according to his degree of intelligence or with the social milieu. Thus the unfolding of the stages may give rise to accelerations or retardation, but their sequence remains constant in the areas (operations, etc.) in which such stages have been shown to exist. (2) Each stage is characterized by an overall structure in terms of which the main behavior patterns can be explained. In order to establish such explanatory stages it is not sufficient to refer to these patterns as such or to the predominance of a given characteristic (as is the case with the stages proposed by Freud and Wallon). (3) These overall structures are integrative and non-interchangeable. Each results from the preceding one, integrating it as a subordinate

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[130] Piaget and Inhelder, p. 132.

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> structure, and prepares for the subsequent one, into which it is sooner or later itself integrated.[131]

Piaget's criticism of Freud is also an implied criticism of Erikson and his emphasis on structural unity. That same structural unity with its ordered development in the epigenetic cycle relates to another criticism of Piaget in regard to the dynamics of adolescence. At the formal operational level the adolescent is partly liberated from his past by mental structures he possesses and is oriented toward the future. But clinical psychology, says Piaget, sees the adolescent as thrown back into the past with new versions of old crises. He credits Erikson with at least pointing out that the adolescent may use elders as models and thus be liberated from infantile choices. But what even Erikson has ignored is the autonomy acquired by the child in late childhood and that means he is no longer bound by the heteronomous will of others. Also ignored are the cognitive constructions that make it possible to anticipate the future and accept new values.[132]

It is at the level of the adolescent that the formation of personality is fully possible. This means taking into account affective as well as cognitive aspects. The affective part of life, or the sentiments, are subject to the same process of equilibration that is true of the cognitive aspects.

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[131] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

[132] *Ibid.*, p. 150.

> They unquestionably involve conflicts or crises and reequilibrations, for the formation of personality is dominated by the search for coherence and an organization of values that will prevent internal conflicts (or seek them, but for the sake of new systematic perspectives such as "ambiguity" and other subjective syntheses). Even if we disregard the function of the moral sentiments with their normative equilibrium (in which they are so near to the operatory structures), it is impossible to interpret the development of affective life and of motivations without stressing the all-important role of self-regulations, whose importance, moreover, all the schools have emphasized, albeit under various names.[133]

Here Piaget agrees with Erikson on the necessity of developmental crises attaining positive outcomes. Piaget prefers to call the means of resolving the crises equilibration by self-regulation. The structure of self-regulation

> enables us to follow their step-by-step evolution . . . not in the abstract, but in the lived and living dialectic of subjects who are faced, in each generation, with endlessly recurring problems and who sometimes arrive at solutions that are slightly better than those of previous generations.[134]

Peter Wolff's Correlation of Piaget and Erikson

Peter Wolff has shown that there is more commonality between Piaget and Erikson than either of them may have realized. Wolff begins with a problem posed by a gap in psychoanalytic thought. There has been no way of accounting for the growth of ideas and words or the idea of a thing and the word for that thing. Almost by default psychoanalytic theory has utilized the trace conception of association theory in order to account for ideas and the words used to express them. Association theory claims that an external thing is internalized isomorphically as an undistorted visual representation. The word for the thing is also isomorphically internalized as an auditory representation thus making the connection between thing and word instantaneous and undistorted even in very young children. The problem with acceptance of association theory is that it stands in contradiction to some of the other assumptions of psychoanalytic theory. Wolff states it as follows:

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[133] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

[134] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

> Decisively in opposition to the association theory are the assumptions (a) of drives as intrinsic organizers of experience, (b) of congenital instinctual apparatuses that codetermine the way in which instinctual discharge is experienced, and (c) of drive-restraining structures independent of previous experience which regulate the occasions for discharge. Thus the concept of drive organization clearly implies that a function intrinsic to the organism . . . imposes a loose order on events which may or may not be physically identical but are experienced as similar.[135]

It is obvious that such assumptions weigh heavily against the undistorted internalization of visual and auditory

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[135] Peter H. Wolff, "Cognitive Considerations for a Psychoanalytic Theory of Language Acquisition," Psychological Issues, V (1967), 313.

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impressions which provide immediate use of things and words as soon as they are experienced.

Wolff turns to Piaget for another and more adequate understanding of the way in which the internal development of ideas and language can be understood. He notes that Piaget, like psychoanalysts, stresses an intrinsic developmental factor which actively selects, organizes, and fixes experience. In early childhood there is the sensori-motor stage which employs the action-schemata for the ongoing organization of experience. The schema, beginning with the earliest reflexes, provide a structure into which new experiences are assimilated by the child. These evermore complex schema provide a way in which new experiences are modified as to meaning in the light of already existing structures and they provide a way in which to relate the present to the past. In both these ways sensori-motor action-schemata differ from the isomorphic trace of sensory impressions. The trace concept theorizes that the sensory impression is internalized in undistorted form and is unrelated to past impressions. Sensori-motor theory says each experience is interpreted by the schema into which it is assimilated. This means a definite relation of the present to what is past. It should also be added that Piaget's notion of accomodation, of which Wolff takes little note, means that the new experience also modifies the schema to which it is assimilated.

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There is another factor in Piaget's developmental understanding which weighs against the trace concept. During the sensori-motor stage there is no representational thinking which utilizes images, symbols or language. There is only the use of motoric and perceptual elements which are the components of the action-schemata. It is only in the second stage of Piaget's sequence that 'semiotic' ability comes into being. After eighteen months the child develops the ability to use representational 'signifiers' to relate to 'signified' persons, objects or events. But even then the distinction between a thing and the word signifying it is a slowly developing process. The child at first has a global idea of the word as a property of the thing.[136]

As far as Wolff is concerned, Piaget's developmental theory is helpful in positing an intrinsic organizing function which unfolds epigenetically and supplies some of the understanding needed to fill the gap previously noted in psychoanalytic theory. What Piaget's developmental scheme does not do is take into account the motivational factors inherent in psychoanalytic drive theory. Piaget posits a motivational concept of the

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[136] Wolff notes that Piaget may not be entirely right about the lack of images prior to eighteen months of age. Evidence indicates that children dream during the first year of life and thus it is assumed that a twelve-month infant is capable of mental imagery. Ibid., p. 324.

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need to function but this implies that all schemata have the same value for the child, independent of any central state.[137] There exists in psychoanalytic theory, Wolff insists, a formulation for development which posits intrinsic organizing structures and also supplies the motivational factor of instinctual drives. It is the formulation of Erik Erikson that can both be correlated to Piaget's formulation as well as supply its lack.

The basic element in Erikson's theory is that of mode of organ action. In the first stage Erikson has such organ modes as 'getting and taking.' The second stage has the mode of 'holding on and letting go.' The third stage has the mode of 'making' and 'being on the make.' Each of these modes is related to appropriate organs for their expression but more important is the fact that,

> mode does refer to the 'mental representations' of stable and repeatable patterns in the same sense that the grasping schema of the newborn refers to the patterns of action and not to individual acts.[138]

Thus it is apparent that Erikson's concept of mode patterns is analogous to Piaget's sensori-motor schemata in that it affects what is internalized. And because Erikson retains the instinctual drives and their sequence as the motivational factor for mode expressions, he supplies what Piaget lacks in the area of motivation. Or, as Wolff states it:

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[137] *Ibid.*, p. 334.

[138] *Ibid.*, p. 331.

> Erikson's concept of mode retains the quantitative-economic aspects of drive conception, but also introduces peripheral organ systems as the determinants of instinctual aim. Erikson posits congenital schemata of experience, hierarchically ordered according to an epigenetic series and influenced by the vicissitudes of instinctual development.[139]

The commonality between Erikson and Piaget is in the functioning of Erikson's mode patterns expressed by peripheral organ systems and Piaget's sensori-motor schemata. The difference lies in the fact that Piaget posits a simple 'need to function' and thus makes all schema of equal value while Erikson supplies a motivational drive through the instinctual drives and their epigenetic sequence. Wolff clearly indicates that Erikson is more helpful in refuting the trace concept of association theory and in understanding the modification of language as it is internalized. However, as will be noted later, Erikson's mode patterns are not as helpful in understanding Luther's creative intrapsychic conflict since they are locked into an epigenetic sequence. In this regard Piaget is more helpful because he allows for creative insight to have its own time in life.

Correlation of Luther and the Developmental Theorists

In considering the correlation of Luther and Erikson first, there are some commonalities that can be noted between the positions of the two men. Erikson does deal with two frames of reference as indicated in his mode patterns and the dual nature of each of the crises related to them. He does not as clearly deal with two frames of reference in his treatment of Luther. There is a frame of reference for Luther which sees an angry father below and an Angry Father above with himself in between as total sinner. This relates to Erikson's first crisis and its element of mistrust. Erikson also apparently speaks of a positive frame of reference for Luther which sees the Father in Christ, himself as saint, and an earthly father of whom he is no longer afraid. Here, apparently, is the element of trust. However, as noted below, Erikson does not really take Luther's positive frame of reference seriously. He keeps Luther within the negative frame of reference because he is unable to account for the positive impact of God in Luther's life and allow for the theological dimension. Erikson recognizes a time element in the resolution of the Anfechtung, though it is limited. It is limited because it must take place within the epigenetically determined sequence and its crises. The crisis for Luther was one of identity. There was, however, a period of time involved in the resolution of Luther's identity crisis. It was not resolved all at once. Erikson points to three separate incidents. He lists the elements involved in the incidents. This means that he does deal with at least part of the total experience of Anfechtung and its steps. His listing of the elements or steps does not coincide exactly with the criteria determined from Luther since he does not use precisely the same experiences from Luther which were recounted in the earlier part of this paper. Nevertheless, there are some commonalities with the first three stages of the Anfechtung experience - active struggle, passive resignation and unexpected insight. Erikson does not speak of the long-range theological interpretations of the insights. He does seem to recognize that the resolution of the Anfechtung holds opposites in tension as he notes that Luther viewed man as totally sinner and totally saint. But it is difficult to understand how Erikson can account for Luther as saint since he actually keeps him in the sinner frame of reference.

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[139] *Ibid.*, p. 334.

There are some basic differences between Luther and Erikson. The first difference relates to the time element in relation to Anfechtung or creative intrapyschic conflict. Since Erikson has an epigenetically determined 'ground plan,' crises take place according to that plan. This does not allow for an experience like Luther's to take place at other times in life and at its own pace. The second and third differences are closely related. Erikson does not allow for creative interaction with Luther's more positive frame of reference because he does not account for God's positive impact in Luther's life. This means that Erikson does not provide for the theological dimension but keeps his interpretation entirely within the psychological realm. Erikson says that God was an angry God because Luther's father was an angry man. Luther was a sinner, a nothing, because of his angry father. The characteristics of God and of self were projections of Luther's father. The resolution of the Anfechtung, for Erikson, lies in the fact that Luther's suffering became identified with Christ's suffering and therefore he was accepted by God because of that suffering. And an accepting God made for an accepting father. The evidence from Luther disagrees with Erikson. In spite of Erikson's insistence that Luther abandoned the idea of Christ as one who died 'for' us and his affirmation of suffering and passion as all that we can know of God and of ourselves,[140] it was the futility of trying to suffer as Christ suffered that played so great a part in Luther's predestination Anfechtung.[141] The Anfechtung was successfully resolved only when Luther had the insight that God's concrete will to save was in Christus pro nobis.[142] In other words, the resolution of the Anfechtung came from God. Its source was outside Luther. Erikson attempts to keep the source

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[140] Supra, p. 205.

[141] Supra, p. 58.

[142] Supra, p. 65.

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inside Luther by insisting that Luther only realized that all one can know of God and of oneself is suffering. In Luther's terms, Erikson still leaves him as sinner before the hidden God. He has not permitted the negative aspects of man and God to interact with the God-given positive aspects of man and God to make Luther a saint before the God Who has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ. Luther's conscience, in Erikson's interpretation, would still be dominated by suffering and guilt rather than by peace and joy.

In a correlation of the positions of Luther and Piaget, there are some commonalities to be noted first. He does allow for two frames of reference within the person as the frames of reference evolve from the sensori-motor schemata through the intuitive stage to the conceptual thought of the operational stage. In the operational stage concepts can be manipulated for purposes of coherent and logical thought. Piaget also indicates something similar to the total process of Anfechtung when he speaks of the crises and conflicts of personality formation and of the internal mechanism of assimilation and accomodation moving toward equilibrium. David Elkind refers to this as a dialectic. But Piaget gives no indication of the stages of the process as experienced by a man like Luther. This does not help in understanding what goes on internally aside from the indication that assimilation predominates at the first and is gradually replaced by accomodation. The latter point shows that Piaget allows for a time dimension in the movement toward equilibrium. There is no pre-established, genetically determined, plan. There is a functional unity possible for the person rather than a structural unity. Thus he allows for more flexibility than does Erikson in the timing of creative intrapsychic conflict at various points in life.

But there are differences in the positions of Luther and Piaget. Piaget has no way of interpreting the stages of passive resignation and the flash of insight. As noted later in this paper, these two stages involve preconscious levels of mentation and symbolism. Piaget finds pre-logical symbolism very unsatisfactory and is unwilling to grant it much validity. Compared to the coherence and synthesis of conceptual thought it is very inadequate. Piaget would feel comfortable with the last stage of logical interpretation but would have no way of accounting for Luther's kind of interpretation which holds opposites in tension. For Piaget, conceptual coherence and logic predominate. Equilibrium always means a predominance of accomodation and, therefore, a very logical conceptual structure. And, finally, Piaget does not provide for the theological dimension in Luther's experience. In this regard he is much like Erikson since he believes that God is a projection of the child from the experience with his

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parents. He says, "The theory of the filial origin of the religious sense seems to us singularly convincing."[143]

Holistic Theorists

The limitations of cognitive consistency and developmental theorists in understanding and explaining Luther's theology and experience calls for the presentation and analysis of theories more inclusive of the whole personality and the full range of mental functions. Though, as noted before, there are many theories which could be termed 'holistic,' the ones presented in this section are those which examine the full range of mental operations and integrate them into theories of creative thought. Ernst Kris and Lawrence Kubie contribute the theory of the three-fold function of the mind; the conscious, preconscious and unconscious. Harold Rugg brings together many theories, including those of Kris and Kubie, into a more integrated theory on creative thought. Arthur Koestler is the most inclusive of all in his integration of elements from many sources in order to build a theory of the creative act. He has the advantage of empirical verification for his theory. He also proves to be the most satisfactory theorist in terms of meeting the criteria developed from the Luther material and thus is most helpful in explaining Luther's experience and theology.

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[143] Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, p. 94.

Ernst Kris

Ernst Kris points out that Sigmund Freud was the first to discuss the functions of the preconscious system.[144] Kris explains that the ego is the controlling force of a continuum of mental processes, including the preconscious, which ranges from problem-solving, logical, cohesive verbal statements to dream-like fantasy and imagery. In the case of cohesive verbal statements, the ego provides a very controlled access of the energies at its disposal to the level of consciousness. But in the case of fantasies and imagery there is ego regression. This means that the ego's controlling mechanisms are suspended so that the contents of the id and the primary process mechanisms can enter the conscious level. Kris says that,

> ego-regression . . . not only occurs under conditions of ego-weakness . . . but also during many types of productive processes. This suggested to me years ago the formulation that the ego may use the primary process and not only be overwhelmed by it.[145]

Through regression the ego may use primary processes for the purpose of creative thought.

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[144] Ernst Kris, "On Preconscious Mental Processes," in Organization and Pathology of Thought, translation and commentary by David Rapaport (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 474-493.

[145] *Ibid.*, p. 487.

In the creative process, i.e., in the production of novel resolutions to intrapsychic conflict, there is an inspirational phase and an elaborational one.

> The inspirational phase is characterized by the facility with which id-impulses or their close derivatives are being received. One might say: countercathectic energies are withdrawn to some extent, and added to the speed, force or intensity with which the preconscious thoughts are formed. During the "elaborational" phase, the countercathectic barrier may be reinforced, work proceeds slowly, cathexis lies with other ego-functions, for instance, with reality-testing, with formulating, or generally speaking, with communication with the public. Alternations between the two phases may be rapid, oscillating or distributed over long stretches of time.[146]

When the preconscious thought processes reach the level of awareness and are experienced as helpful in the resolution of conflict and the creation of new thought, there is an experience of relief and satisfaction. There is also the feeling that the revelation or insight attained during the inspirational phase has come from an outside agent.

> The maturing of thought, the entry into awareness, from preconscious to consciousness, tends to be experienced as derived from the outside, as passively received, not as actively produced. The tendency towards passive reception will take various shapes and forms, appear under the disguise of various modalities, but the subjective experience will remain that of reception.[147]

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[146] Ibid., p. 489.

[147] Ibid., p. 493.

Lawrence S. Kubie

Lawrence Kubie is much more explicit in his explanation of the three psychological processes which he calls 'mentation.' The conscious symbolic function is one in which the person is clearly aware of the relationship of the symbols of language to that which one intends to represent. The function of the language symbol is to communicate the content of thought and purpose. At the other end of the spectrum is the symbolic process in which the relationship between the symbol and what it represents has either been distorted or completely ruptured. The symbol here is a disguised and disguising representative of unconscious levels of psychological processes. The symbol may appear in dreaming or in psychological illness but what it represents is disguised and unknown. In between these two extremes is the preconscious.

> There is however, another type of mentation whose relationships to its roots is figurative and allegorical. The function of this intermediate form of mentation is to express at least by implication the nuances of thought and feeling, those collateral and emotional references which cluster around the central core of meaning. Here every coded signal has many overlapping meanings: and every item of data from the world of experience has many coded representatives.[148]

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[148] Lawrence S. Kubie, Neurotic Distortion of the Creative Process (Noonday Press, 1969), p. 30.

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Kubie explains that there are several elements involved in the preconscious level of mentation. First, there are those elements which have become preconscious through the learning process. They were initially conscious, at least to some extent. To these exteroceptive stimuli,

> preconscious processes add another type of sensory imagery which has its major roots both in entero- and proprioceptive experiences. These approximate less closely the limited one-to-one relationships of the fully matured language of conscious symbolic functions, but retain a broader overlapping base of multiple meanings. This enables them to use the symbolic process in a more allegorical and figurative fashion.[149]

The preconscious processes allow a freedom and flexibility which is not true of the conscious or unconscious processes. Conscious processes have a rigidity imposed by their anchorage in precise relationships to specific concepts and precepts. Unconscious processes also have a rigid anchorage, although that anchorage is to unreality. The free play and flexibility of the preconscious processes accomplishes two goals:

> It supplies an endless stream of old data rearranged into new combinations of wholes and fragments on the grounds of analogic elements and it exercises a continuous selective influence not only on free association but also on the minutiae of living, thinking, walking, talking, dreaming, and indeed, every moment of life.[150]

Because it can function freely and flexibly, the preconscious is the essential level in all creative processes and unless it can flow in a free manner there can be no true creativity. Kubie sums it up by saying that,

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[149] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[150] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

> The free play of preconscious symbolic processes is vital for all creative productivity. Preconscious psychological functions stand on the fringes of consciousness. Here the meaning of the symbolic is essentially analogic, yet relatively transparent, although it may be obfuscated in varying degrees. . . .[151]

Harold Rugg

Harold Rugg is also interested in the function of the preconscious because of the role it plays in providing the 'flash of insight,' an integral step in the process of creative thought. Rugg's studies lead him to conclude that there are four stages to prolonged creative work.

> First, a preparatory conscious period of baffled struggle; second, an interlude in which the worker apparently gives up, pushes the problem back or down or "out of mind" - more properly into another compartment of "mind" - leaving it for the unconscious to work upon; third, a sudden and unexpected "flash of insight," coming with such certitude that a logical statement of it can be immediately prepared; fourth, a period of verification, critical testing, and reconstruction.[152]

It is Rugg's thesis that the 'flash of insight' occurs at the critical threshold between the conscious and non-conscious levels of mental activity. He agrees that Kubie's theory on the function of the preconscious is very close to his own. He can find only two possible differences between his work and that of Kubie. Rugg's evidence seems to point to some creative imaginative abilities in all sectors of the continuum while Kubie states that the conscious and unconscious are too rigid to allow for any creative work at all. A second difference is that he prefers a different name than that of preconscious. He calls it the 'transliminal mind.'

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[151] Ibid., p. 141.

[152] Harold Rugg, Imagination (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 6.

> This state of mind is off guard, relaxed, receptive to messages, but it is also magnetic, with a dynamic forming power. I think of it as "off-conscious," not unconscious, for the organism is awake, alert, and in control. It is hypnoidal, resembling the light trance of hypnosis, although not hypnotically induced. or controlled. It partakes of both the hypnagogic, marking the drowsy state between waking and sleeping, and the hypnopompic, the corresponding state between sleeping and waking. It satisfies the criteria of the intuitive, receptive, identifying mind of intense concentration. . . .
>
> It is actively magnetic, attracting materials out of the non-conscious into the vestibule of the conscious mind. Such across-the-threshold power suggests the name which I give it: the transliminal mind.[153]

Rugg is also interested, as was Kubie, in determining the contents of the transliminal mind. The ingredients,

> accumulate continuously in the nervous and motor systems in a fusion of perceptual tracings and motor adjustments. Reconstructed below the threshold of awareness, these appear in the transliminal mind as a kaleidoscope of fantasy imagery.[154]

Rugg finds evidence for the place of motor adjustments in the functioning of the transliminal mind in the studies of

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[153] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[154] Ibid., p. 62.

Jean Piaget and the role that such adjustments play in the early sensori-motor phase of intelligence. He agrees with Kubie that the preconscious or transliminal mind is the center of creative thought. "Neither of the extremes of the continuum - the conscious or the unconscious - is free; both are marked by warping, inhibiting forces."[155] The conscious mind is shaped by the external forces of the world while the unconscious mind is shaped by autistic thought that turns away from the environment.

In the last part of his book, Rugg gives thirteen conditions for an adequate theory of creative imagination. He then states several theorems which incorporate the necessary conditions. Some of the more important theorems are the following. First, there is the theorem of the Three Stages of Creative Work.

> There is first a long, conscious preparatory period of baffled struggle; second, an interlude in which the scientist or artist apparently gives up, pushes the problem back or down or "out of mind," leaving it for the nonconscious to work upon. Then, third, comes the blinding and unexpected "flash of insight," and it comes with such certitude that a logical statement of it can be immediately prepared. These stages are present whether in art, science, technology, or philosophy.[156]

Then there is the Theorem of the Two-Fold Act of Thought.

> While there is only one basic human act of response, it is governed by two different orientations: the feeling mood of discovering and the logical mood of verifying. The first emphasis of my study is, therefore,

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[155] *Ibid.*, p. 89.

[156] *Ibid.*, p. 289.

> the sharp distinction between discovery and verification.
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> Since both phases are involved in the complete act of thought, I shall give the name "felt-thought" to the first part - discovery. It is largely based on feeling, although it employs some of the processes conventionally called thinking. The second part of the act - verification - is called "logical thought:" it consists essentially of systematic logical thinking and the establishment of clear, verbalized relationships.[157]

After discussing the two-fold way of knowing, Rugg goes on to speak of the Theorem of the Transliminal Mind. Here he repeats much of what has already been said. The transliminal mind lies between the conscious and unconscious. It is the place where the 'flash of insight' appears. It has freedom and flexibility. In addition, he states four other aspects of the transliminal mind that are worthy of note.

> First, it has uninterrupted access to a continuous flow of perceptual experience which is traced and preserved electrochemically in the nervous system, most of its continuous action below the threshold of awareness. Second, a continuing flux of imagery which pervades the entire conscious-nonconscious continuum. . . . Third, equally ceaseless ideomotor action is traced in the form of motor adjustments, incipient movements, and anticipatory sets or attitudes. The latter two, together, produce what now appears to be the initiating and indispensable requisite for every act of response, that is, imagery. Fourth, the ordered, conceptual content of the mind, which becomes synonymous with symbol and with metaphor image, involves Gestalts of figure-ground relationships, and is the key to thinking and judging, this also being traced and preserved in the unconscious storage.[158]

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[157] Ibid., pp. 290-291.

[158] Ibid., p. 293.

In his Theorem of the Forming Process Rugg emphasizes the importance of transformation. "The flash of insight is not only a self-forming process, it is also a trans-forming process. The stuff of the mind is transformed into meaningful response."[159] In his Theorem of the Off-Conscious Mind of Relaxed Concentration he cites the need for a state of relaxed tension or of being off-guard, before the flash of insight can occur. Finally, in the Theorem of the Two-Fold Symbolic Act, two types of symbolic acts are noted: (a) felt-thought through the gesture-symbol; and (b) verbalized-thought through the name-symbol.[160] The distinction between the two is important in order to recognize the validity of the gesture-symbol, a symbol which is more image than concept, but has validity in the thinking process. Rugg concludes that too much emphasis has been placed on logical, conceptual thought and not enough on creative discovery. More needs to be done to understand and use the dynamics of discovery.[161]

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[159] *Ibid*., p. 298.

[160] *Ibid*., p. 304.

[161] Graham Wallas deserves mention because of his remarkable agreement with Rugg. Wallas' work is older and his sources are limited to the biographical reports of creative men such as Helmholtz and Poincare. Nevertheless, it is informative. Wallas distills the formation of creative thought into four stages: preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification. (Graham Wallas, *The Art of Thought* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1926), p. 80.) The first stage, preparation, involves intense investigation of all aspects of the problem. Education is important since it is the educated person who can

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Arthur Koestler

The final, and most important, of the holistic theorists is Arthur Koestler. It is Koestler's theory of the creative act through 'bisociation' of matrices that proves to be the most adequate in explaining the conditions, content and process of Luther's experience and theology. The first concept to be understood in Koestler's theory is that of the matrix. He uses the term to "denote any ability, habit, or skill, any pattern of ordered behavior governed by a 'code' of fixed rules."[162] A matrix can include perceptual, cognitive,

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concentrate on a problem in a way that brings all elements to bear on it. Preparation gives way to incubation. Incubation is the stage in which there is voluntary abstention from conscious thought on the problem. The period of abstention can be spent in work on other problems or in relaxation from all conscious mental work. In the third stage, illumination, the trains of association which ultimately result in the 'flash' of success are either unconscious or take place in the periphery or 'fringe' of consciousness which surround focused consciousness as the sun's corona surrounds the full brightness of the sun. Wallas' 'fringe-consciousness' functions in the same way as the preconscious or the transliminal mind. There is a sub-stage before full illumination occurs. Wallas says:

> I find it convenient to use the term "Intimation" for that moment in the Illumination stage when our fringe-consciousness of an association-train is in the state of rising consciousness which indicates that the fully conscious flash of success is coming. (Ibid., p. 97.)

Once the 'flash' or the 'happy idea' has occurred there remains only the stage of verification. It is a fully conscious stage in which the logical implications of the 'flash' are worked out and verified. Because logical thought is used in this stage it is much like the first stage of preparation.

[162] Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964), p. 38.

and motor skills as well as the psychological structures that are variously referred to as 'frames of reference,' 'associative contexts,' 'universes of discourse,' 'mental sets,' or 'schemata.'[163] Every matrix is governed by codes, largely unconscious, that determine how the elements of the matrix shall be manipulated. There is flexibility to the codes which allows for choices to be made in the manipulation of elements. The choices that are made are the strategies possible in a matrix. Koestler uses the analogy of a chess game to indicate the relationship of matrix, code, and strategy.

> The matrix is the pattern before you, representing the ensemble of permissible moves. . . . The code is the fixed, invariable factor in a skill or habit; the matrix its variable aspect. The two words do not refer to different entities, they refer to different aspects of the same activity. When you sit in front of the chessboard your code is the rule of the game determining which moves are permitted, your matrix is the total of possible choices before you. Lastly, the choice of the actual move among the variety of possible moves is a matter of strategy, guided by the life of the land - the 'environment' of the other chessmen on the board.[164]

Normally, thought takes place within the framework of a single matrix. The elements within a matrix become so interrelated with one another that a concept or idea remains embedded within its associated matrix. There are many such matrices in the mind of a single individual. They are, for the most part, unrelated to one another and elements that belong to one matrix seem incompatible with other matrices. At the times when a concept or idea becomes linked with any other matrix than that with which it is normally associated, a creative act occurs. Koestler calls this 'bisociation.' He explains:

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[163] Ibid., p. 96.

[164] Ibid., pp. 40 and 42.

> I have coined the term 'bisociation' in order to make a distinction between the routine skills of thinking on a single 'plane,' as it were, and the creative act, which . . . always operates on more than one plane. The former may be called single-minded, the latter a double-minded, transitory state of unstable equilibrium where the balance of both emotion and thought is disturbed.[165]

The concept of bisociation can perhaps best be understood through the use of one of Koestler's figures. In Figure 2, an idea, L, normally linked to one frame of reference (M_1) also becomes linked to another context (M_2), one which is normally incompatible with the first matrix. When this situation occurs, L is not merely linked to one frame of reference but bisociated with two frames of reference.[166]

For bisociation to occur there are several conditions which must be met. The first condition is the 'blocked situation.' A blocked situation is one in which a problem occurs that cannot be solved by the usual alternatives presented within one associative context or frame of reference. A person normally scans his present frames of reference seeking a solution. The present frames of reference are

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[165] Ibid., pp. 35-36.

[166] Ibid., p. 35.



Figure 2.
Bisociation of Matrices

made up of past experiences which cause pertinent elements of thought to be embedded within them. The rules of thinking about those elements or objects are also derived from past experience.[167] The rules may be unconscious but they still guide the way in which the element or object is understood and interpreted. In a blocked situation none of the past ways of dealing with the problem seems to help. The person becomes frustrated and unable to function in a logical, straight-forward manner.

A second necessary condition for the creative act is the presence of other matrices that can afford possible solutions. The other matrices must be known inside out so that they are fully present for the possible act of bisociation. The constant pressure of the blocked situation keeps the problem on the mind's agenda but no solution is possible unless another matrix is present. In terms of Figure 2, M_1 and M_2 must both be present for bisociation to occur.[168] This makes possible a condition of 'ripeness' in which all that is necessary for a solution is available for use.[169]

The presence of another matrix is not necessarily conscious. It may have become so much a part of the person that it is embedded in routine thinking. Once a person has mastered the skills or techniques of a matrix it slides from consciousness down into the inner recesses of the mind. This is the 'linear gradient' of awareness.[170] It is a vertical gradient ranging from sharp consciousness of a skill or technique to unconsciousness of its presence when it has been mastered. This allows conscious attention to be turned to other matters that must be mastered. Yet, even though the person is unaware of the matrix, the internalized codes or rules govern the context, purpose and meaning of an idea or object associated with that matrix. The codes govern the scanning process when a solution is sought to a conscious problem.

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[167] Ibid., p. 162.

[168] Ibid., p. 107.

[169] Ibid., p. 110.

A third condition necessary for the creative act is 'thinking aside.'

> When a situation is blocked, straight thinking must be superseded by "thinking aside" - the search for a new, auxiliary matrix which will unblock it, without having ever before been called to perform such a task.[171]

In order for thinking aside to take place, conscious control of the thinking process must be relinquished.

> The temporary relinquishing of conscious controls liberates the mind from certain constraints which are necessary to maintain the disciplined routines of thought but may become an impediment to the creative leap; at the same time other types of

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[170] Ibid., p. 156.

[171] Ibid., p. 163.

> ideation on more primitive levels of mental organization are brought into activity.[172]

The more primitive types of ideation are indifferent to the rules of verbal logic, unperturbed by contradiction, untouched by the dogmas and taboos of common sense. These more primitive types of ideation occur below the level of consciousness and are found in the preconscious and unconscious levels of the mind. These levels of the mental hierarchy form quasi-parallel (or concentric) layers, are discontinuous and under normal conditions are kept separate from each other.[173] They differ from the linear gradient of awareness where the awareness of a given skill or technique is on a continuous scale from focal awareness, through peripheral awareness, to unawareness. Thinking at the more primitive levels of the mind is a regression but it is a *reculer pour mieux sauter*, a drawing back in order to make a spring.[174] At the more primitive levels of the mind the person drifts from matrix to matrix in a seemingly unaware and effortless search for bisociation. The most fertile region of the mind seems to be

> the borderland between sleep and full awakening - where the matrices of disciplined thought are already

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[172] *Ibid*., p. 169.

[173] *Ibid*., p. 180.

[174] *Ibid*., p. 173.

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> operating but have not yet sufficiently hardened to obstruct the dreamlike fluidity of imagination.[175]

When an act of bisociation occurs a reverse process from the downward regression also occurs. There is the upward surge of creative impulse which reconstructs the mental landscape. The first movement is one of regression to a more primitive level of ideation while the second movement is an ascent to a new, more complex level of mental evolution. The first involves disintegration of rigidly held patterns of thought while the second is the construction of a more complex pattern of thought.

There are many bisociative patterns that can occur. Most of them can be found in dreams in one way or another, says Koestler. They are:

> the pun: two strings of thought tied together by a purely acoustical knot; the optical pun; one visual form bisociated with two functional contexts; the phenomenon of displacement or shift of attention to a previously unnoticed feature; the concretization of abstract and general ideas in a particular image; and vice versa, the use of concrete images as symbols for nascent, unverbalized concepts; the condensation in the same link-idea of several associative contexts; the unearthing of hidden analogies; impersonation and double identity - being oneself and something else at the same time, where the 'something else' might belong to the animal, vegetable, or mineral kingdom.[176]

New integrations do not always come into being suddenly and effortlessly. There are many things that can happen along the way. One thing that can happen is 'premature integration.' Premature integration is faulty integration usually caused by the fact that the matrices which are bisociated have not yet themselves been fully consolidated. The right kind of intuition can result in wrong conclusions in such a case. This has the effect of delaying the sought-for solution for a period of time. Premature integration can, however, have beneficial results in that more mature attempts are stimulated once the prematurity has been recognized.[177] Another roadblock in the way of the full-blown creative act is that of 'snowblindness.' Snowblindness refers to that

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[175] *Ibid.*, p. 210.

[176] *Ibid.*, p. 179.

> remarkable form of blindness which often prevents the original thinker from perceiving the meaning and significance of his own discovery. . . . The defense mechanisms which protect habits against the intrusion of novelty accounts both for our mental inertia and mental stability.[178]

Alongside the personal defense mechanisms against novelty there are social mechanisms against novelty which cause others to refuse to acknowledge the validity of an individual's creative insight. This can result in a great deal of anguish for the person who has overcome his own blindness but finds it difficult to overcome the blindness in others. A third factor that prevents sudden integrations is the process of 'gradual integration.' Gradual integration occurs when

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[177] *Ibid*., p. 216.

[178] *Ibid*.

> intuition has established some tentative link between two distant frames of reference, but that link is insufficient to overcome resistances and effect the fusion. It will have to be strengthened . . . or else additional links will have to be discovered to precipitate the integration.[179]

Koestler sums up the ways in which new integrations occur.

> New integrations arise by various processes which can be arranged in a series. It ranges from faulty or premature integrations, through partial blindness toward the meaning and significance of one's own discoveries, to the gradual blending of matrices by dint of repetitive experiences, which increase the number of links between them. Finally, there is the sudden illumination of 'spontaneous' discoveries, sparked off by an unconscious intuition, or a chance observation, or a combination of both.[180]

A recapitulation of the entire creative act according to Koestler indicates four stages to the process; a blocked situation, a period of incubation, the creative act itself, and the stage of verification, elaboration and consolidation. In the first stage, the blocked situation increases the stress of a frustrated drive. All traditional methods of solving the problem have been exhausted. The second stage begins when organized purposeful behavior begins to go to pieces and random trials accompanied, perhaps, by tantrums and attacks of despair, take place. Or there may be absent-mindedness which is, in fact, single-mindedness;

> For at this stage - the period of "incubation" - the whole personality, down to the unverbalized and unconscious layers has become saturated with the problem,

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[179] Ibid., p. 220.

[180] Ibid.

> so that on some level of the mind it remains active, even while attention is occupied in a quite different field.[181]

The third stage is the creative act itself in which bisociation between two matrices takes place and a new fusion occurs. This can take place by:

> displacement of attention to something not previously noted, which was irrelevant in the old and is relevant in the new context; the discovery of hidden analogies as a result of the former; the bringing into consciousness of tacit axioms and habits of thought which were implied in the code and taken for granted; the uncovering of what always had been there.[182]

Then there is the last stage of verification, elaboration, consolidation. It is by far the least spectacular, the most exacting, and occupies the longest period of time in the life of the individual.[183] Such a four-stage process, Koestler points out, occurs not only in the life of individuals but also in the social context of discovery in many different fields.

Koestler's theory gains in credibility from the work of Eric Klinger who incorporates bisociation theory into his own respondent-process theory of fantasy. He also indicates that empirical evidence validates the theory. Klinger, following B. F. Skinner, refers to conscious, directed thought as 'operant' thought while non-elicited thought is referred to as 'respondent.' He describes

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[181] Ibid., p. 119.

[182] Ibid., pp. 119-120.

[183] Ibid., p. 125.

Koestler's theory in terms of his own language as follows:

> One must assume first an individual in a state of current concern over solving a problem whose solution is momentarily blocked. His concern increases the likelihood that he will respond affectively to concern related stimuli and, by generalization, to other stimuli or ideas that bear some resemblance to them. His affective responses to any of these stimuli carry with them respondent segments whose content very likely includes elements of operant sequences relevant to the goal of the concern. If the individual now encounters a stimulus or idea that resembles a concern-related stimulus in some non-obvious respect, his respondent response will bring it into close juxtaposition with concern-related operant activity. He responds to the new stimulus as if it belonged to the problem-solving frame of reference, thereby fusing the two and producing the bisociative act.[184]

Klinger concludes that the model of creative thinking which emerges from his theory and that of Koestler is consistent with available evidence concerning creative acts and creative persons.[185] And, again, he points out that the conditions for the creative act presented in bisociation theory "emerge consistently in empirical studies of creative individuals."[186]

Correlation of Luther and the Holistic Theorists

In correlating the positions of Luther and the holistic theorists, Ernst Kris and Lawrence Kubie are treated jointly since they are both in the psychoanalytic tradition. Looking at the commonalities first, it can be noted that Ernst Kris is helpful in understanding some of the dynamics involved in two of the steps in the total experience of Luther's Anfechtung, the steps of unexpected insight and long-range theological interpretation. Kris refers to these two steps as the inspirational and elaborational phases. The inspirational phase involves withdrawal of countercathectic energies and the application of those energies to the preconscious thought processes. In the elaborational phase the countercathectic barrier is reinforced and cathectic energies are applied to reality testing and public communication. Kris also provides helpful explanation of the inspirational phase when he speaks of the revelatory experience as one of passive reception rather than active production. Lawrence Kubie provides further explanation of the functioning of the preconscious during the second step of passive resignation. Whereas conscious processes are rigidly anchored to reality and unconscious processes are anchored to unreality, preconscious processes have a flexibility which allows for the rearrangement of old data into new combinations. This makes possible the third step of an unexpected insight.

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[184] Eric Klinger, Structures and Functions of Fantasy (New York: Wiley-Interscience Press, 1971), p. 218.

[185] Ibid., p. 221.

[186] Ibid., p. 223.

However, there are serious deficiencies and differences between Luther's position and that of Kris and Kubie. Neither of them deal adequately with two frames of reference nor do they deal with the total experience of Anfechtung and its

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resolution. They do not help in understanding the time element involved in reaching new insights nor the reasons for continuation of the process. They do not explain how opposites can be held together in constructive tension and there is no provision for the reality of the impact of God in the life of a man like Luther. Kris, for instance, would most probably insist that though insight or revelation is experienced as passively received, there is no validity to the assertion that God granted a revelation to Luther.

Harold Rugg has some commonalities with Luther. He is especially helpful in providing an understanding of the four steps involved in Luther's Anfechtung. Rugg refers to the four steps as; a period of baffled struggle, an interlude in which the person apparently gives up, an unexpected 'flash of insight,' and a period of verification. He gives added dimension to the dynamics of the interlude when he refers to the workings of the transliminal mind. It is centered in the preconscious and has the unique ability to create freely. It has access to many components of the mind which can interact. There is some indication of multiple frames of reference when Rugg speaks of the stored conceptual content of the mind as accessible to the transliminal mind for use in producing the flash of insight.

There are also some deficiencies in Rugg's explanatory power as well as one basic difference from Luther's position. As noted above, Rugg implies multiple frames of reference but he is not sufficiently clear in his reference to them. He gives no indication of the time dimension involved in achieving the flash of insight nor of the reasons for recurrence of the process in the life of a person. He does not explain that the insight is one in which opposites are held together in fruitful and constructive tension. And, in line with the preceding positions of Kris and Kubie, he does not allow for the validity of the theological interpretation of Luther who truly believed that God was making an impact in his life.

It is Arthur Koestler's position that best helps in understanding Luther's experience and theology. It not only adequately meets the pre-requisite of providing data at the descriptive-experiential level but has the most commonalities with Luther even though there is one basic difference. The first criterion from Luther involves frames of reference. Luther had both the Scholastic frame of reference and his own growing evangelical frame of reference. Koestler is helpful in that his understanding of the creative act requires at least two frames of reference or matrices. The presence of two matrices of thought is necessary for bisociation to occur. Each of the matrices has its own code which governs the strategies possible within the matrix. The genesis of a matrix is highly conscious. As it is mastered it slips below the conscious level and becomes an unconsious part of the person. This is the 'linear gradient' of the matrix. For Luther, the Scholastic theological system became so much a part of him that his attempt to find a gracious God was locked into the matrix of that theological system. Over a period of time, at least from 1508-09 on, Luther was building another matrix. This matrix was built by various means, including the bisociative process. It was highly conscious at first. As more and more elements were added to it, it also slipped below the level of consciousness. It was not until the latter matrix was sufficiently present that the condition of 'ripeness,' of which Koestler speaks, was present and made possible the bisociation of the two matrices. This produced the more momentous insights of Luther.

The second criterion from the Luther material was that the social psychological position explain the total experience of Anfechtung and the dynamics involved in each of the four steps; active struggle, passive resignation, unexpected insight, and long-range theological interpretation. The active struggle for Luther in the spiritual Anfechtung was the attempt to find a gracious God within a theological frame of reference which made it impossible for him to do so since he could not refrain from sin and take the first step toward God. This is the 'blocked situation' of Koestler in which a drive is frustrated because of the inability to solve the problem within the matrix in which it is embedded and by whose code it is governed. For Luther it was a frustrating situation that caused him to rage against the God who judged him instead of accepting him. The passive resignation of Luther was that point at which the struggle turned to despair and finally silence. Koestler describes this as the 'period of incubation.' It is the period of time when, though the conscious mind may not seem to be focusing on the problem, the whole personality down to the unverbalized and unconscious layers of the mind has become saturated with the problem. Thus the problem is still active on one of the more primitive layers of the mind. At a more primitive level of ideation, such as the preconscious, there is a continuous search for bisociation which is unencumbered by the normal codes and rules of logic. Though on the surface, a person such as Luther may appear to have 'given up,' the search for a solution went on at a different level. The unexpected insight that Luther experienced is the 'creative act' of Koestler. In the creative act a link idea is bisociated with two matrices. Now a new and complex insight rises from the depths to which the problem had settled. In Luther's case, the spiritual Anfechtung was solved by linking 'righteousness' from the old matrix with 'righteousness' in the new matrix. 'Righteousness' then became passive instead of active and had repercussions for many other aspects of his thought. (See Figure 3) The possibility of passive righteousness had already been present as Luther acknowledged in his 1545 description of the Anfechtung. Augustine had spoken of it in his The Spirit and the Letter. But now it gained new prominence and was the key bisociation. In the pre-


Theological Framework 1
(-)God (Hidden Will)
Christ
Gospel
Formal (or active) Righteousness
Love
Meritum de Condigno
Infused Grace
Meritum de Congruo
Law
Works
Concupiscence
(-)Self (conscience)
(-)Father (Hans)
L
Theological Framework 2
(+)God (Hidden Will)
Christ
Gospel
Passive Righteousness
Faith
Concupiscence
(+)Self (conscience)
(+)Father (Hans)

Figure 3.
The Spiritual *Anfechtung*

destination Anfechtung the first link idea was the will of God which shifted from the emphasis in the old matrix that God might choose to damn to the emphasis in the new matrix that God must surely choose to save. This did not prove entirely adequate, so the second link idea in the predestination Anfechtung was that God chose to save in Christ who was a concrete revelation of His will. (See Figure 4) The long-range theological interpretation of Luther is similar to the last stage of Koestler which involves verification, elaboration and consolidation. It has already been sufficiently demonstrated that Luther's theological writings were long-term attempts to interpret, elaborate, and consolidate his insights.

The third criterion from Luther stressed that there must be some explanation of the period of time involved in resolving the Anfechtung and an understanding of the recurring Anfechtungen in Luther's life. Luther struggled over a period of years, reached incomplete conclusions, achieved momentous insights, and yet experienced recurring Anfechtungen. As mentioned before, Koestler indicates that 'ripeness' is necessary before bisociation can take place. Both matrices must be fully present. Thus the creative act has its own time schedule. Prior to that time there may be premature integrations. This occurred for Luther in his 1515-16 Lectures on Romans when he tried to explain active and passive righteousness. His thought at that time was incomplete and premature compared to the insight he gained


Theological Framework 1
(-)God (Hidden Will-Damning)
Christ
Gospel
Passive Righteousness
Faith
(-)Self(conscience)
Theological Framework 2
(±)God (Hidden Will-Saving?)
L
Christ
Gospel
Passive Righteousness
Faith
(±)Self (conscience)
L
Theological Framework 3
(+)God (Hidden Will-Saving!)
Christ (Concrete Revelation of Will)
Gospel
Passive Righteousness
Faith
(+)Self (conscience)

Figure 4.
The Predstination Anfechtung

in 1518. There is also a premature integration in the resolution of the predestination Anfechtung which he describes in his comments on Psalm 22 in the 1519-21 Operationes in Psalmos. He found a more satisfactory solution when he focused on Christ as the concrete evidence of the saving will of God. It could also be said that Luther experienced a partial blindness ('snowblindness') to the meaning and significance of his own discoveries. All of the elements, apparently, for the solution of the spiritual Anfechtung were there in 1515-16 but it was only after 1518 that Luther could look back and see that that was true. The same could be said of the predestination Anfechtung. Luther was partially blind to the possibilities already present in the revealed Christ.

Koestler's position on gradual integration can be applied to Luther both before and after the major creative insights he experienced in the spiritual and predestination Anfechtungen. As has already been stated, there were a growing number of the elements of Luther's theology present prior to 1518 and prior to the resolution of the predestination Anfechtung. It was the gradual integration of a number of these links which made the unexpected insights of the creative act possible. However, these creative acts, momentous as they were, were themselves part of a larger gradual integration that continued to occur in the life of Luther. This helps explain the recurring

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Anfechtungen of later years. The challenges to Luther's calling as a reformer meant that his call had to be released from the old matrix and linked to the new one in which his acceptance by God made his calling sure. It also made possible his freedom from fear of disobedience to his father. The troubling circumstances of martyrdom of confessors of the Gospel also had to be linked to the new framework of thought so that what was important was not worthiness or unworthiness for martyrdom but the good confession of faith in Jesus Christ. As new problems arose, the first tendency was to keep them in the old framework of thought. They had to be linked again and again to the new framework so that acceptance by God in faith through the Gospel was strengthened. These continual integrations enabled Luther to speak of growth and of the greater grasp of the conscience by Christ. What had been gained was not lost but was strengthened by a growing number of links. This also enabled Luther to increasingly link God as the source of Anfechtung into the complex organization of thought he was building. God could allow evil forces to be at work in His alien, hidden, and Law dimensions but these aspects of God could still be linked more and more to the framework of his proper, revealed and saving purpose in the Gospel.

The fourth criterion from Luther requires a social psychological position to allow for positive and constructive resolutions that hold opposites in tension.

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All of Luther's insights and theological interpretations express the negative and positive aspects he had experienced in the Anfechtungen. They are held together in dialectical tension. Koestler allows for solutions that hold opposites in tension through his bisociation of matrices. They are bisociated into a new and more complex pattern but elements of both matrices continue to exist even while the link idea provides a constructive and positive solution to the problem. For Luther elements of the old matrix were still represented in his view of man as sinner, as slave to sin, as striving for active righteousness, and as one who sought salvation through works. Yet he could link man into the new matrix and view him as saint, free in God to be a slave to others, recipient of passive righteousness, and saved through faith to work for others. From the old matrix he could acknowledge the necessity of God's alien work and hidden nature and accept the important function of the Law. At the same time men were not separated from God but linked to Him through the cross, His proper work, His revealed will in Christ, and the grace of the Gospel. As Koestler notes, there is a disintegration of the old rigidly held patterns of thought and the construction of a new and more complex pattern. However, that new and more complex pattern still contains elements of the old matrix with which the new is bisociated.

The final criterion from Luther requires that the social psychological position must maintain the integrity of the impact of God and the theological dimension in the life of Luther without reducing the experience to purely social psychological terms. Here is where Koestler is inadequate and differs from Luther. Although his theory is the most helpful in explaining and understanding Luther he does not maintain the reality of God and provide for the validity of theological intepretation. Koestler has to be supplemented in this regard. Koestler's view of the reality of God is indicated in the way he uses Biblical incidents. He uses them, for instance, to illustrate one of the archetypes of special significance for the act of creation. The archetype is known as the Night Journey or the Death-and-Rebirth motif. He states:

> The symbolic expressions of this pattern are as old as humanity. The crisis of Night Journey may take the form of a visit to the underworld (Orpheus, Odysseus); or the hero is cast to the bottom of a well (Joseph), buried in a grave (Jesus), swallowed by a fish (Jonah); or he retires alone into the desert, as Buddha, Mahomet, Christ and other prophets and founders of religion did at crucial times in their lives.[187]

Thus Koestler interprets the experience of God, in this instance, in terms of the period of incubation necessary for the act of creation. This reduces the reality of God and the validity of theological interpretation to Koestler's own terms. A corrective will be supplied in the concluding chapter.

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[187] Koestler, The Act of Creation, p. 358.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

Adequacy of the Method of Correlation

In this concluding chapter the first task is to demonstrate that the method used to correlate the positions of Luther and the selected social psychological theorists adequately meets the criteria set forth in the introductory chapter. Methodological inquiry begins with the assumption of a common unit of experience. The common unit of experience treated in the two positions in this case is that of creative intrapsychic conflict and its four stages: conscious conflict, 'giving up' on solving the conflict, sudden insight, and interpretation of the insight.[1] The common unit of experience is to be correlated at a single level of understanding. The level of understanding used in this study is the descriptive-experiential in contrast to a second theoretical-interpretive level. Functional analogies (or commonalities), as well as differences in the understanding of function, were demonstrated at the descriptive-experiential level. The functional analogies are reviewed in the next section of this chapter. The detailing

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[1] Supra, p. 11.

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of commonalities and differences indicates that each position is allowed to maintain its own integrity which is one of the requirements involved in determining the adequacy of the method of correlation.

The next part of methodological inquiry deals with the philosophical assumptions involved in the method of correlation. The greater the commonalities existing in the area of philosophical assumptions, the closer the method is to being interdisciplinary. This assumes that a truly interdisciplinary method is, by definition, one in which all philosophical assumptions are common. If there are few common assumptions the method of correlation is assumed to be multidisciplinary. The purpose of distinguishing between interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary methods of correlation is the avoidance of facile assumptions that a study is truly interdisciplinary when it may not, in fact, be so. A rigorous examination of the methodological assumptions gives a study more validity, recognizes the limitations involved, and maintains the integrity of each of the positions involved. When there are differences in any of the philosophical assumptions it is more honest to call a method multidisciplinary, assuming that there is still a common unit of experience and a common level of understanding. If there are no common factors between the disciplines involved in the correlation its validity as a method should be questioned.

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The first of the philosophical assumptions is epistemology. The common unit of experience of creative intrapsychic conflict with its four steps and other ramifications, i.e., two frames of reference, time requirements, recurrence, and opposites in tension, was shown to be analogous in its epistemic function for both Luther and Koestler. The basic process of 'knowing' through creative intrapsychic conflict is the same for both. Therefore, there is a common epistemological assumption between the two positions. The same cannot be said of the ontological assumptions of the two positions. The ontological reality of God assumed by Luther was not affirmed by the social psychological theorists. The way in which the integrity of Luther's experience of God can be maintained is presented in the next section of this chapter. Just as there is no common ontological assumption between the positions there is also no common axiological assumption. Luther and the social psychological theorists do not agree on the validity of religious experience and its theological interpretation. Luther placed great value on his religious experience. He was so convinced of the reality of God's intervention in his life that he was willing to use his experience and its theological interpretation as the test of truth for others. Social psychologists make no claims for the validity of religious experience and its interpretation. Thomas O'Dea, speaking as a structural-functional sociologist, can be

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taken as indicative of the position of any behavioral scientist.

> Functional theory, like all sociological theory concerning religion, strives to maintain an attitude of value-freedom. It makes no judgment as to the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. Like all sociology, it takes a so-called "naturalistic approach" to religion. As a social science, sociology seeks to understand behavior in terms of natural causes and effects. This is not an anti-religious ideological position, since even causes beyond nature, if they act upon men, must act through men and the nature of men. . . . It is a necessary axiom for the pursuit of scientific study in any field of inquiry.[2]

O'Dea's statement makes it obvious that there can be no common axiological assumption between a theological position like Luther's and a social psychological one like Koestler's. The lack of common ontological and axiological assumptions concerning the reality of God and theological interpretations of insights gained by His intervention leads to the conclusion that, though there is a common epistemological assumption, the correlation of the positions of Luther and Koestler is multidisciplinary rather than interdisciplinary.

Turning now to the norms of correspondence, coherence and function, the norm of correspondence would seem to be adequately fulfilled. This norm states that the method of correlation should account for the 'facts' under scrutiny in both positions and adequately deal with commonalities and differences between the positions while maintaining the integrity of both. The method of correlation, utilizing a single level of understanding, does account for the 'facts' of creative intrapsychic conflict and all its ramifications. The norm of correspondence is met with greatest success in the correlation of Luther with Koestler's holistic position. The commonalities between the two positions have been pointed out and are reviewed again in the next section of this chapter. A basic difference has also been noted and will be compensated for in the next section. All of this allows for the integrity of each position to be maintained and does not collapse one into the other.

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[2] Thomas F. O'Dea, The Sociology of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 17-18.

How well the method of correlation fits the norm of coherence is problematical. This norm inquires about the way in which the method and its results fit the body of already established theory. Kaplan admits that this is a conservative norm that must not be taken with such seriousness that it prevents a breakthrough into new understandings. This author is not aware of other attempts to analyze Luther's experience and theology as creative intrapsychic conflict and to correlate his position with social psychological positions that deal with the same phenomenon. Lloyd Sheneman, in his doctoral dissertation at Yale in 1964, entitled, "The Teaching Ministry of the Church and the Law-Gospel Distinction," did examine law and Gospel according to the theology of Gustaf Wingren as Wingren developed it from the New Testament, Iraneus and Luther.[3] He then relates the law-Gospel distinction to the 'two-foci' or 'community' theory of education, a theory which relies heavily on Reuel Howe. Sheneman concludes that learning as a human enterprise prepares for and responds to the Gospel. He does not conclude that there is a basic learning process involving creative intrapsychic conflict implicit in the law-Gospel distinction. He also concludes that many learning theories are compatible with the law-Gospel distinction. It is obvious from this brief review that Sheneman did not use Luther's experience and theology as his primary theological source nor did he attempt to correlate Luther with social psychological positions dealing with a similar phenomenon. A more recent attempt to deal with Lutheran Law and Gospel theology and its educational implications is that of Stephen Schmidt in "Teaching the Faith: On Edge of the 70's," a monograph of the Lutheran Education Association.[4] Schmidt does not use Luther's experience

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[3] Lloyd E. Sheneman, "The Teaching Ministry of the Church and the Law-Gospel Distinction" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale Divinity School, 1964).

[4] Stephen Schmidt, "Teaching the Faith: On Edge of the 70's," Monograph Series, I (River Forest, Illinois: Lutheran Education Association, 1971). Cf., "Teaching the Faith: Models and Methods," Concordia Theological Monthly, XLIV (September 1973), 287-297.

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and theology as his primary source. He deals with Law and Gospel, especially as defined by Werner Elert, and attempts to correlate it with Granger Westberg's crisis counseling model. The result is a Lutheran teaching model which is described in the last section of this chapter. Schmidt does not attempt to correlate the same positions used in this dissertation on the basis of the same common experience with the same conclusions. He is, however, much closer to the method of correlation and the conclusions reached in this dissertation than is Lloyd Sheneman.

The last of the three norms employed by Kaplan is that of function, i.e., how well does the method of correlation promote further inquiry into the relation between theological positions and positions in other disciplines such as social psychology? Does the method point to the possibility of correlating positions other than the ones employed in this dissertation? The answer would seem to be a positive one. The method is adapted from James Loder. He used it to correlate the positions of Søren Kierkegaard and Sigmund Freud. This dissertation demonstrates that the method can be used to correlate Luther's experience and theology with social psychological positions dealing with the same unit of experience. Whether or not this leads to further attempts to use the method of correlation with other positions dealing with a common experience remains to be seen.

In conclusion, the method of correlation has proven its validity in correlating two positions dealing with a common unit of experience at a single level of understanding, pointing out the commonalities between the two positions, and yet detailing the differences in order that both positions maintain their integrity. Due to the fact that there is commonality only in the epistemological assumption, it is best to regard the correlation of the two positions as multidisciplinary rather than interdisciplinary. In regard to the norms of correspondence, coherence, and function, it has been shown that the norm of correspondence is met in the correlation of Luther and the holistic position of Arthur Koestler, that coherence with previous findings is problematical due to the lack of precisely similar studies, and that the norm of function seems to be adequately fulfilled.

Luther and Creative Intrapsychic Conflict

The reader will recall that it is the hypothesis of this dissertation

> that Luther's Anfechtungen and the resulting theological understandings are an expression of on-going creative intrapsychic conflict and conflict resolution and that an understanding of the conditions, content, and process of that creative conflict yields conclusions directly related to Christian Education principles and practice.[5]

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[5] *Supra*, p. 1.

It is the intention in this section of the concluding chapter to indicate that the first part of the hypothesis has been and can be demonstrated, i.e., that Luther's Anfechtungen and their resulting theological understandings are indeed an expression of on-going creative intrapsychic conflicts and conflict resolution. Section three of this chapter will indicate that an understanding of the conditions, content and process of intrapsychic conflict yield conclusions directly related to Christian Education principles and practice.

Intrapsychic conflict refers to internal inconsistencies and opposing forces which cause conflict and result in mental reorganization as a solution to the conflict. Creative intrapsychic conflict refers to a resolution of the conflict which is new and unique, involving integrations between previously isolated frames of reference. It does not refer to a solution which is confined to a single frame of reference. In order to demonstrate that Luther's Anfechtungen were indeed creative intrapsychic conflicts, and to understand the conditions, content and process involved, other theories dealing with creative intrapsychic conflict were investigated and correlated with Luther's experience. This was done on the basis of the correlational model utilizing criteria drawn from Luther at the required descriptive-experiential level. Cognitive consistency, developmental, and holistic theorists were presented and correlated with Luther's experience and theology. Conclusions were drawn about the commonalities and differences based on the criteria derived from Luther. There were some commonalities between Luther and the cognitive consistency theorists but also a great many differences. There were also some commonalities between Luther and the developmental theorists along with many differences. The greatest commonalities were found between Luther and the holistic theorists, especially Arthur Koestler and his theory of the creative act. The commonalities between Luther and the various theorists are reviewed in this section. The differences will not be repeated except for the fundamental difference in relation to the last criterion regarding the integrity of Luther's experience of God and the validity of his theological interpretation. All of the theorists, including Koestler, were unable to provide for the reality of God in Luther's experience and the validity of his theological interpretation. That inadequacy is treated in this section with the help of Langdon Gilkey and Ian Ramsey.

The hypothesis that Luther's Anfechtung and theological interpretation are indeed expressions of on-going creative intrapsychic conflict can be demonstrated through the following resume organized around the criteria drawn from the Luther material. The first criterion was that the social psychological position must take into account at least two frames of reference. When cognitive consistency theorists deal with two frames of reference, as do cognitive balance and cognitive dissonance theorists, they do not regard them as possibilities for interaction and creative insight. The conflict is usually resolved within the predominant frame of reference or the subject opts for the second frame of reference without creative interaction with the first. In the developmental theorists, Erikson allows for two frames of reference in the dual nature of his crises. But when he analyzes Luther's situation, he is unable to put Luther into a positive frame of reference but keeps him in the negative frame of reference. Or, in other words, the source of the resolution is in Luther and not in God's action in Jesus Christ. Jean Piaget allows for two frames of reference through the dialectic of assimilation and accomodation in the development of conceptual thought through its various stages although the end result is always a logical equilibrium. Among the holistic theorists, Harold Rugg refers to multiple frames of reference when he speaks of the stored conceptual content of the mind as one of the elements utilized by the transliminal mind in producing creative insight. However, Arthur Koestler deals most adequately with two frames of reference. His concept of matrices governed by codes which control the strategies possible within them is most easily translatable into Luther's two theological frames of reference, the Scholastic and the evangelical. The necessity of both matrices being present for a condition of 'ripeness' helps in understanding the delay in Luther's resolution of his conflicts.

The second criterion required an explanation of the total experience of Luther's Anfechtung and the dynamics involved in each of its four steps; active struggle, passive resignation, unexpected insight, and long-range theological interpretation. Cognitive consistency theorists, in all instances, deal with conflict. The subject must solve a problem. They also deal with the resolution of the conflict, though not as an unexpected insight. The solution is, rather, a consciously cognitive readjustment without any indication that other levels of the mind are involved. Among the developmental theorists, Erikson deals with the first three steps of the total experience of Anfechtung, omitting the last stage of theological interpretation. He does not adequately explain the dynamics of each step. Jean Piaget gives some indication of the total process of conflict when he speaks of crises that are solved by the internal mechanism of assimilation and accomodation and its movement toward equilibrium. But he gives no indication or explanation of the internal dynamics involved. Among the holistic theorists, Ernst Kris and Lawrence Kubie are helpful in explaining the dynamics involved in some of the steps of creative conflict when they speak of the role of the preconscious in providing the flexi-

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bility necessary for creative interaction. Kris adds to an understanding of the experience when he states that 'revelation' is always experienced as passively received and not actively produced. After the insight has been achieved, Kris and Kubie indicate that controlled conscious processes take over for purposes of interpretation. Harold Rugg is even more helpful in an understanding of the four steps of creative conflict. He refers to a period of baffled struggle, an interlude in which the person 'gives up,' an unexpected flash of insight, and a period of verification. His reference to the dynamics of the transliminal mind (or the preconscious) aids in understanding the more flexible processes of the mind that make creative insight possible. Arthur Koestler is the most helpful of all in explaining the four steps and their dynamics. First, there is a blocked situation in which the problem is unresolvable within its present matrix. This was the case with Luther's spiritual and predestination Anfechtungen. Then, there is a period of incubation when the problem sinks to more primitive levels of ideation and a free-floating search for bisociation takes place. Luther reached this point when his rage turned to meditation and then to silence. The creative act occurs when there is a bisociation of previously unintegrated matrices through a link idea. In his spiritual Anfechtung, the link idea for Luther was 'righteousness.' In his predestination Anfechtung, the first link was the 'will of god,' but the second and more adequate link was the 'concrete will of God in Christ.' Finally, there is a long period of verification, elaboration and consolidation. Luther spent years writing out interpretations of the insights he had gained.

The third criterion involved an understanding of the length of time required for resolving the Anfechtung as well as the phenomenon of recurring Anfechtungen. Among the cognitive consistency theorists only Rokeach hints at a time dimension in conflict resolution when he speaks of a 'sleeper effect,' i.e., attitudes change over a period of time toward congruency with central beliefs. Erikson, as a developmental theorist, allows for a limited time element in the resolution of intrapsychic conflict. It must take place within the epigenetically determined sequence and its appropriate crises. Piaget allows for a more flexible time dimension in the movement toward equilibrium since there is no pre-established 'ground plan.' Both Erikson and Piaget allow for recurring conflict since they posit on-going conflicts in the growth of persons. Among the holistic theorists, Arthur Koestler offers the best understanding of the time involved in resolving Anfechtungen. There can be premature integrations, partial blindness to one's own discoveries, and gradual integrations in which successive links are forged between two matrices. In both Luther's spiritual Anfechtung and in his predestination Anfechtung there were premature integrations,

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partial blindnesses, and gradual integrations. The full-blown creative act may occur as the climax of this series of events. This was the case for Luther in 1518 when he experienced the resolution of his spiritual Anfechtung and when he experienced the resolution of his predestination Anfechtung a bit later. Koestler is also helpful in his theory of gradual integration in explaining the recurring Anfechtung of Luther. Momentous insights become significant links in an ever-growing complex of thought which is strengthened as more and more links are forged between matrices. In Luther's case more and more links were forged by the resolution of Anfechtungen caused by challenges to his calling, the martyrdom of confessors of the Gospel, and other troubling circumstances. This also explains the strengthening of the conscience's hold on the Gospel and the integration of God as the source of Anfechtung into his evangelical framework of thought.

The fourth criterion stated that an allowance must be made for holding opposites in fruitful and constructive tension in the resolution of conflict. In the developmental theorists, Erikson comes closest to providing for opposites in constructive tension through the two forces involved in his nuclear crises and in his remarks about Luther's 'massive totalisms,' e.g., sinner and saint at the same time. However, Erikson does not adequately follow through on Luther since he keeps him in a sinner frame of reference due to his inability to account for the reality of God's intervention in Luther's life. Piaget has little or no tension since he insists on logical equilibrium. Koestler, as a holistic theorist, allows opposites to be held in tension because of the bisociation of matrices. Elements of both matrices are present in the new and more complex organization of thought that is built. The link idea (or ideas) makes it possible for opposites to be held together in constructive tension. Each of the eight theological formulations of Luther presented in this dissertation demonstrate how opposites are held together in constructive tension.

The final criterion requires that some way be found to maintain the integrity of Luther's experience of God and the validity of his theological interpretation of that experience without reducing those elements to social psychological terms. All of the social psychologists who have been considered are inadequate in this respect. Even Koestler needs to be supplemented in order to allow for the reality of God in Luther's life and the validity of his theological interpretation.

Langdon Gilkey is helpful in providing a framework of thought with which to overcome this inadequacy.[6] He

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[6] Langdon Gilkey is helpful because of his 'ontic' analysis of life. He notes that his

> method involves an "ontic" rather than an "ontological" analysis, that is, a description of the kinds of experiences human beings enjoy in being in the world, rather than an analysis of the ontological structures of either human being or Being generally. Clearly,

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begins with a phenomenological analysis of the ontic phenomena of human existence in which the dimension of ultimacy or unconditionedness appears. Ultimacy is that which appears in human experience as the source or ground of human existence. It also manifests itself in an awareness of the limits of existence. It appears as transcendent to human finite powers because it is both the source of all that human beings are and the negation of all that they are. It constitutes the threat and limit of an infinite Void. It also appears as the source of all values and thus is appropriately called 'sacred.' Because of the characteristics of source, limit, transcendence and sacrality and because of the strange dialectic of negation and affirmation, there is an element of mystery to ultimacy.[7]

> an ontical analysis, if valid, points beyond itself to an implied ontological view of both man and Being generally. (Langdon Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969), p. 306, n. 1.)

An examination of Luther's Anfechtung is an ontic analysis as is the description of intrapsychic conflict by social psychologists. The social psychologists, however, remain at the ontic level while Luther goes on to make ontological assertions about man and God. Gilkey provides a way to begin with the ontic and move to the ontological. He also provides a way to affirm the ontological reality of the God experienced in the ontic and the validity of theological interpretation of that experience. Gilkey's method of beginning with the ontic and moving to the ontological sets him apart from most theologians, even the theologian to whom he is most indebted, Paul Tillich. As Gilkey says, "It is this priority of the ontic over the ontological . . . that distinguishes more than anything else . . . this analysis from that of Paul Tillich." (Ibid., p. 307, n. 1.)

[7] Ibid., pp. 313-314.

There are four conditions of human existence which cause the experience of ultimacy - contingency, relativity, temporality, and freedom. Contingency leads to a sense of the giveness of life and the joy that comes from the sense of giveness. But there is also an anxiety, a fear, a sense of the Void, that is the correlate of this exultation. This infinite threat to existence leads to a search for security and points to the horizon of ultimacy. Relativity in secular life is a creative element that makes possible creative freedom and the appearance of the new. But men also become aware of the relativity of all that they do and are threatened with meaninglessness. Here they face the Void. The sense of ultimacy breaks in through the search for that which can put meaning back into life. Temporality has the possibilities of opening up the new in the future but it also brings the negative experience of the threat of insignificance and death. In the depths of every man there appears again an infinite Void and a driving anxiety. Something must be found that will remain, some importance that will last. Because of the conditions of contingency, relativity and temporality, an unconditioned dimension of existence is felt.

> This dimension or framework of ultimacy appears directly in the awareness of an unconditioned Void, and a dim but powerful awareness of this negative context of ultimacy is the source of our common traits of fanaticism, frantic striving, meaninglessness and boredom, terror at death and the future - an awareness that is thematized in our puzzled and often painful personal questions about life's meaning, and more formally in the literature that explores this range of ultimate questions. It is experienced

> indirectly in the joyful wonder, the creative meanings, and the resolute courage of life despite its obvious contingency, relativity, and temporal character; and this awareness of the power and meaning of life is thematized in one way or another in every positive philosophy of men, secular or otherwise, and in all of his religions.[8]

There is, therefore a negative frame of reference to life which attains the dimension of ultimacy when ultimate questions are raised. What is rooted in ordinary secular life gains the deeper dimension of ultimate negativity when answers to ultimate questions are sought. In Koestler's terms, a matrix developed from the negativity of everyday existence attains an ultimate dimension when the questions implicit in it are raised as ultimate questions and there are no answers to those questions within the matrix. There is, on the other hand, a positive frame of reference, or matrix, which is rooted in everyday existence but which is only indirectly or vaguely sensed. It does not attain the dimension of ultimacy, as will be shown, until a revelation occurs which gives it that dimension and thus provides it with the power to answer the ultimate questions.

The same direct and indirect frameworks appear in regard to the fourth condition of secular man, that of freedom. Freedom involves the task of creatively finding one's own identity and of enacting that identity through one's own decision and power. Freedom has benefits in that no man can be creative of a meaningful existence unless there are in him facets of genuine inward freedom; unless what he is and does springs from himself, from the use of his own powers, evaluations and decisions. There can be no creative community with others in family or friends or society without the free self-directing participation of the members of that community.[9] Because of freedom, each man is faced, at the deepest level, with the question, "What kind of person do I want to become?" This means finding a model which one wants to adopt, a model which is an essential image of man. In the search for that model there is an encounter with the sacred, some form of the ultimate, namely, an unconditioned standard for existence. This standard

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[8] Ibid., p. 362.

> culminates in an entirely different set of norms, those of love and justice, the requirement to my integrity that the self, if it is to be a self, give itself to its neighbors in love and in the fundamental respect of the neighbor's integrity and rights.[10]

The ultimate now obligates and judges. This becomes all the more apparent when the model refuses incarnation;

> it remains 'over there,' unembodied in us, outside of us - and we remain much as before, dedicated, yes, but untransformed, inauthentic and now divided against ourselves. . . . we seem unable, perhaps even strangely unwilling, to become what we thought we really wanted to be.[11]

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[9] _Ibid_., p. 369.

[10] _Ibid_., p. 381.

[11] _Ibid_., p. 385.

There is a sense of alienation, of being disunited at the core of one's being from the real self and isolated from others on the one hand, and, secondly, the sense of guilt, or unworthiness and unacceptability, on the other.

> Our most fundamental searches, then, as transcient fallible creatures, are for an ultimate commitment in terms of which our contingency may be anchored against disintegration and unreality, and for an ultimate acceptance and reconciling power through which this inevitable process of self-rejection and inner disunity can be stopped and reversed into creative community with others.[12]

The questions of "Who am I?" and "How can I be made whole again?" are two of the most vital ultimate questions that can be asked. But existence can only raise the ultimate questions. It cannot give the answers. Any answer arising out of finite existence can always be countered with a 'No!' In that 'No!' the sacred manifests itself as a radical jugment on human life. The ultimate is now experienced, not just as Void, but as condemnation. The will of God for human beings becomes the judgment of God on human beings.[13]

It is only through revelation that an answer can be given. Revelation "is that definite mode of experience in which a particular answer to these ultimate questions that arise in relation to all secular life manifests itself, is received, and so 'known.'"[14] Thus revelation is also rooted in human experience. What is important to the form which revelation takes and the symbolic language used to interpret it is the community in which it takes place.

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[12] Ibid., p. 402.

[13] Ibid., p. 395.

> It is, then, in definite experiences within some historic tradition that the truth of particular symbols and symbolic systems within the general range of religious discourse becomes evident to the experiencer.[15]

If the experience takes place within the philosophical community its particular symbols and symbolic systems will predominate. If it takes place with the Christian community Christian symbols and symbolic language predominates. The revelation that occurs to an individual is a 'given' and the symbolic language of the community in which it occurs is valid for its interpretation.

Gilkey points out that proof for such interpretation is secondary. Theological thought and language explicates, it does not establish, the fundamental convictions and viewpoints which it represents.[16] The fundamental convictions are established in the experience of revelation. Gilkey makes the case for the validity of theological language even stronger when he says that, "the ultimate and the sacred, that to which the symbol 'God' refers, cannot be proved, lest this symbol contradict its own intention."[17] Since no proof of the reality of God is possible, language about God takes the form of confession and conviction based on the experience of revelation. Theological language expresses the conviction that God has crossed the Void, that the infinite has come to the finite. He remains hidden from men as long as they exist only in terms of the creaturely and try to ground their answers to ultimate questions in creaturely capacities. But God unveils Himself to men through the Void. He unveils His presence in all of life. He reveals that He is the source, security, meaning, wholeness, reconciler, and guarantor of eternity. Thus the positive framework of life has its ultimate dimension in God. The reality of God experienced in revelation and the validity of theological interpretation about that reality are based on faith as the apprehension of the sacred in and through the profane. The meaningfulness of theological answers is based on their relation to ultimate questions.[18] In the case of Luther, then, the reality of God and the validity of his theological interpretations are self-authenticating because of the revelatory experience out of which they came and the community in which they took place.

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[14] Ibid., p. 426.

[15] Ibid., p. 428.

[16] Ibid., p. 441.

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[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., p. 455.

Langdon Gilkey shows that the negative and positive frameworks of experience and thought in everyday life attain dimensions of ultimacy when ultimate questions are asked and ultimate answers are given through the revelatory action of God. The same is true of the language used to interpret those experiences. It is ordinary language that gains the dimension of ultimacy and becomes the symbolic language of faith. Ian Ramsey adds to an understanding of this when he also roots the beginnings of revelation and religious language in ordinary human existence. Religious language begins with object language that deals with the personal situations of everyday life. But that object language is given very special qualifications, logical peculiarities, logical impropriety.[19] The use of language in this way can evoke an 'insight,' a 'discernment' of God from which commitment follows as a response.[20] Talk about God is an ultimate explanation of the kind of commitment the Christian professes. But this ultimate commitment, when talked about in terms of qualified object language can also become the occasion for discernment by others, the kind of discernment with which religious commitment is associated.[21] If religious language can cause discernment this means that

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[19] Ian T. Ramsey, Religious Language (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 42.

[20] Ibid., p. 41.

[21] Ibid., p. 53.

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Luther's theological language can be analyzed and 'opened up' in order to determine the questions which it answers, the opposing forces which it holds in constructive tension, the compressed conflict it contains, so that it becomes useful in helping others to deal with the same questions, forces and conflicts which Luther experienced. In the following paragraphs Luther's theological language is 'opened up' in order to indicate how it expresses the negative and positive frameworks and forces in life when they atain the dimension of ultimacy. In this way the opposing forces contained in his theological interpretations become available for use in a creative conflict model of Christian Education.

Luther recognized the presence of God in all of life. He is the giver and the sustainer of life, the One through whom men can be accepted and reconciled, and the One through whom life goes on into eternity. Men desire these positive benefits but do not know their source. But God is also present in life as the one who limits, threatens, coerces and judges. Men also do not recognize the source of these negative forces. All of this is implicit in Luther's understanding of the presence of God through the first use of the Law, the political or civic use, which is limiting and constraining. The opposing forces occasioned by God's presence are felt in every man's existence. They are vague strivings of which man may only be dimly aware at first.

When man becomes acutely conscious of the conflicts, solutions are desperately sought. Man recognizes that he is and does wrong and is guilty (sinner), but desperately wants to be accepted and do right (saint). He recognizes that he cannot overcome the forces that enslave him (slave) and wants to be free in himself and for others (free/slave). In spite of his enslavement he still seeks to actively justify himself before self and others (active righteousness) but finds that he cannot and seeks something or someone outside himself to justify who and what he is (passive righteousness). He attempts to do whatever limited good he finds in himself to do (works) but longs for something that can come from beyond himself to overcome his limits and help him to be what he ought to be (faith/works). At this point man comes to that which stands over against him. This is Luther's second use of the Law, the accusatory and judging use. Man first attempts to find the solution to his conflicts in human existence and the finite (glory) but finds that impossible. There is no ultimate solution there. The only possible answer is in the agony of suffering (cross). The One who stands over against him is strange and harsh (alien) and man desires Him to be friend and helper. His will to help or destroy remains hidden (the hidden God) to one who wants him open and known as Savior (the revealed God). He stands over against man in judgment on all his wrong-doing, enslavement, attempts at self-justification and limited

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good (Law) while man desperately seeks forgiveness, acceptance and reconciliation (Gospel).

When every desire is blocked, every question answered with a 'No!' both in the finite and from the infinite, and when the depths of despair are reached, then there is the possibility of an ultimately satisfying solution or answer. Luther experienced the dilemma of a 'No!' at every hand and reached the point of despair. He reacted with rage and anger which stilled to meditation and finally to silence.

In the midst of the silence of despair comes an unexpected revelation. God Himself bridges the gap, crosses the Void, with His own resolution of the conflict, the creative insight to the problem, the ultimate answer to the ultimate question, the new discernment. It is through the suffering of conflict, problems, and questions that He comes. He makes it known that suffering is the way He came in history in His son, Jesus Christ. In His coming He shows that His proper work is to befriend and help. He reveals that He is open and known for what He is in Jesus Christ, a Savior. His coming announces the 'Good News' that He forgives, accepts and reconciles. Through His coming, a man 'knows' that though he is a sinner, he is accepted as saint. He 'knows' that in spite of his enslavement, he is free before God for himself and for others. He 'knows' that righteousness is 'given' and not produced. He 'knows' that it is faith that accepts forgiveness and not his meager works that merit it. Thus he is enabled to be of help to others.

The educational usefulness of 'opening up' Luther's theological language in the above manner will be demonstrated in the following section.

Christian Education Principles and Practice

As stated in the introduction to the dissertation, Christian educators in the Lutheran tradition should be especially interested in principles of Christian Education derived from the theology to which they are committed. An analysis of Luther's experience and theology leads to certain conclusions for the way in which Christian Education should be principled and practiced. Such principles and their implications for practice are presented in this section. The categories of principles used are those proposed by D. Campbell Wyckoff. He clusters the questions arising out of the practice of Christian Education and groups them under the headings of purpose, scope, context, process, personnel, and timing. Purpose is the 'why' of Christian Education, scope the 'what,' context the 'where,' process the 'how,' personnel the 'who,' and timing the 'when.'[22]

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[22] D. Campbell Wyckoff, "Understanding Your Church Curriculum," Princeton Seminary Bulletin, LXIII (Winter 1970), 77-84.

The order in which the principles are presented in this section is not the same as the above order. Here the order is governed by an inductive logic proceeding from the study of Luther's experience and theology and its relation to the social psychological positions at the required descriptive-experiential level. The principle finding of the study, as clearly indicated in the preceding section of this chapter, is that Luther's experience and theology are an expression of on-going creative intrapsychic conflict and conflict resolution. In terms of educational principles, creative conflict and its resolution is a description of process, the 'how' of learning. That is why process is the first principle to be presented. The description of a learning process that relies on intrapsychic conflict appropriate to the learner next leads to a consideration of timing, especially the importance of learner's time and its relation to other aspects of timing. The importance of the learner brings into focus the principle of personnel. The learners are the principle people involved but they need to be guided by teachers who are sensitive to their existential conflicts and able to help them deal constructively with the conflicts. Such learners and teachers require the context of a Christian community which is open to learning through creative conflict and supportive of those who are wrestling with it even while it is actively engaged in a ministry within its own historical and social setting. The logic of this inductive approach finally

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leads to the principles of scope and purpose. The scope, or content, naturally involves all those conflicts which the learner encounters in his spiritual, intrapersonal and interpersonal existence. The elements of scope are woven into a statement of purpose along with the outcomes anticipated in the life of the learner. A statement of purpose should, at a minimum, include the areas of scope and the anticipated outcomes in relation to them. However, the statement of purpose which concludes this section also includes principles other than scope. An inductive approach demands a generalization that pulls together the particulars that have been studied. Thus the statement of purpose serves as an inclusive summary of all the principles which have been presented.

An inductive approach based on Luther's experience and theology begins, then, with a consideration of the learning process or the 'how' of Christian Education. The learning process derived from the Luther material and correlated with the social psychological data involved four steps; active struggle, passive resignation, unexpected insight and long-range interpretation. Since the first step involves a struggle between conflicting forces it can simply be called 'conflict.' Since the second step involves 'giving up' the conscious struggle so that the problem can be dealt with at other levels of the mind, it can more simply be called 'resignation.' Since the unexpected insight is a new and creative answer arising

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from the lower levels of the mind, it can be called 'insight.' (Since it is experienced as passively received and not actively produced, it could also be called 'outsight,' implying that it comes from outside the person.) And, finally, since theological interpretation is but one mode of interpreting creative intrapsychic conflict depending on the community in which the insight takes place, the last step can be called 'interpretation' for the sake of simplicity. The problem for the Christian educator is that this four-stage learning model needs to be converted into a teaching model if the experience is to be replicated in the life of the learner. In other words, directions for the teacher need to be added if the learning model is also to become a teaching model.

If a teacher is to use the model, there are certain necessary preparatory steps. First, the teacher must determine an appropriate conflict in the life of the learners. To do this, the teacher must be sensitive to the group, allow them to express the conflicts they experience, and listen with an alert ear to what is going on in the lives of the students. The expressions of the learners themselves are not the only source of appropriate conflicts. Though conflict is inherent in human existence, it may be only vaguely sensed or even deliberately avoided. The teacher must often use other sources to determine conflicts appropriate to the lives of the learners. The conflict must be one that involves opposing forces. It must

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involve simultaneously opposing forces. It is not a true conflict if only one of the forces is expressed or given predominance in the conflict statement. The conflict must also have the characteristic of universality so that it is not particular and singular. Everyone in the group must feel that it is appropriate for them. This is especially important if the teaching-learning model is to be used with a group of persons. Finally, the conflict must be significant enough to lead to the experience of ultimacy. This rules out minor or unimportant conflicts which do not engage people at the most significant levels of their lives. An example of a statement of conflict involving simultaneously opposing forces which are universal and significant can be extracted from one facet of Luther's experience and theology. Assuming that the teacher has found it appropriate for his learners, Luther's slave/free/slave concept can be 'opened up' and stated in personal terms as follows:

> "I want to be free to be for others but the need to care for myself often traps me in my own self-centeredness."

After determining a statement of conflict, the teacher should examine the opposing forces in the conflict and determine the way in which they manifest themselves in life. This is necessary in order to provide a basis for the questions to be asked and for guidance in the discussion of the conflict. An examination of the opposing forces in the above conflict statement includes such observations as:

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> "I want to care for others and their needs because I feel it is my responsibility."
>
> "When I fail to meet the needs of others, I feel guilty about it."
>
> "I also need to care for myself and what happens to me."
>
> "If I don't care for myself, no one else will."
>
> "When I don't care for myself, I often feel guilty for not taking advantage of opportunities."
>
> " Though just caring about myself seems wrong, it is often so overwhelming that I can't do anything about it."

The third step in teacher preparation is the selection of a medium that incorporates the conflict, one that will serve to bring the conflict forcefully to consciousness in the learners. The medium can be a story, symbol, film, recording, current event or other item. A Biblical pericope could also serve the purpose but many people in the Christian community have preconceived answers or solutions for Biblical incidents, especially the familiar ones. This prevents them from seeing the opposing forces incorporated in the selection. Therefore, it is best not to begin with a Biblical section. An example of a medium incorporating the sample conflict is the novel by Richard E. Kim, The Martyred.[23] The story involves the return of two South Korean pastors, one of whom is a Mr. Shin, from a North Korean prison camp where twelve other pastors were executed. The two pastors who returned are suspected of collaboration with the Communists by betraying the other twelve. The question of collaboration is never answered in the story. After selection of the conflict medium the final step in teacher preparation is the determination of questions that can be asked about it in order to help the learners become aware of the conflicting forces involved. Questions for the story of The Martyred are:

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[23] Richard E. Kim, The Martyred (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1964).

> "How would you have felt if you had been a member of Mr. Shin's congregation?"
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> "If you had been Mr. Shin, what would you have done about the other pastors in the prison camp?"
>
> "Would you have cared more about your own survival or that of others?"[24]

After the teacher has gone through the four preparatory steps, the teaching-learning session can begin. The first two steps in the conflict phase of the model are the presentation of the conflict medium and questions related to the conflict incorporated in the medium. The third step is discussion of aspects of the conflict as it is experienced in the context of the learners' lives. The teacher guides this discussion through use of the observations and questions gained from the second step of his own preparation. The discussion can involve dimensions of the conflict as they

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[24] I am indebted to the Educational Center-Episcopal for suggestions in teacher preparation. The Center's manual states that the teacher must select an issue that involves simultaneous, universal and mutually opposing forces within persons, analyze the dimensions of the issue, select a launching device, and write cue-in questions. (The Educational Center, Basic Manual (St. Louis: The Educational Center, 1971), pp. 16-23).

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are manifested in the society surrounding the learners. Such questions as these may be used:

> "How does this conflict show itself in the competition for jobs between individuals and races?"
>
> "How does it manifest itself in the demand for equal educational opportunity?"

After the exploration of the conflict in the wider social context the discussion must move to the level of personal involvement in the conflict. The teacher guides the learners in exploring and discussing how the conflict is experienced in their own lives. Questions are asked that have been prompted by the teacher's examination of the dimensions of the conflict.

> "Do you often feel a responsibility to care for others?"
>
> "What happens when you fail to carry out that responsibility?"
>
> "Who cares about you?"
>
> "Do you often regret that you do not take advantage of personal opportunities?"
>
> "Who usually wins out in your life, yourself or others?"

Such questions sharpen the conflict in the lives of the learners. The conflict should also be further sharpened so that the dimension of ultimacy enters in. Here is where Biblical material is appropriate. An example of the use of Biblical material is the incident of the rich young man in Matthew 19:16-22. The young man asked what good deed he must do to have eternal life. After Jesus told him to keep the commandments, the young man assured him that he had observed all the commandments. Jesus then said to him, "If you would be perfect, go, sell what you possess and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me."[25] The young man responded by walking away in sorrow because he had great possessions. Discussion of this incident brings a dimension of ultimacy to the conflict and is an example of what Luther calls the second use of the Law. Now the learners may experience the One who stands over against them. In order that the conflict may be felt as deeply and sharply as possible, each of the learners should state the conflict in terms of his own life either orally or in writing. The ability to experience and state the conflict in terms of one's own existence may come at varying times for members of the group but it is necessary if the conflict is to be deeply felt and possibly resolved.

The second step in the creative conflict teaching-learning model is resignation. The learners should be allowed to indicate when they are ready to 'give up' on the conflict for the moment. The teacher should allow the learners, either as a group or individually, to break off consciously dealing with the conflict in order to go to another place or engage in some other activity. This allows the conflict to be dealt with at another level of the mind. By this time the conflict has saturated the being of the learners to the point that it continues to be dealt with even if they are not consciously struggling with it. An additional impetus for continued unconscious involvement in the conflict is the expectation, triggered by the learning group and, perhaps by past experience, that the conflict must and will be dealt with and resolved. Resignation and insight, however, take place within the learner's own space and time. They cannot be restricted to a given place or an alloted time.

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[25] Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version.

During the cessation of conscious struggle the third step in the model, insight, may occur in the form of a revelation, an illumination, a bisociation of matrices. God may choose to reveal Himself to the person in His own way and in His own time. In terms of the sample conflict, God may provide a revelation of Himself as One who forgives, accepts and frees a person from his own enslavement so that he is free for others. When this occurs the learner should feel free to inform the teacher that it has indeed happened and that he is ready to share it with others. Of course, a revelation may not occur and that is the risk that the teacher, the group, and the individual must be willing to take.

The fourth and final step of the creative conflict model involves interpretation. When the learners in the group indicate that they have experienced insights which resolve the conflict the teacher provides a context in which the insights can be shared, interpreted, and verified as proper solutions to the problem, meaningful answers to the questions raised, constructive resolutions to the conflict. The members of the group thus help one another in testing the validity of the insight each has gained from the conflict with which all have struggled.

It is obvious that the use of the model must be flexible. The teacher and the group play significant roles only in the first and last steps. Learning as creative insight takes place within the learner in the second and third steps at his own rate and in his own space. It should also be apparent that, though the model has its own experiential and theological integrity, its use can only provide an occasion for God to act. For the person who has previously experienced a revelation of God the use of the model provides occasion for appropriation of deeper and more widely ranging insight into the relation of God to life's conflicts. For one who has not previously experienced such insight as revelation, the use of the model prepares him to appropriate and interpret the insight when it occurs. In either case, it is God who acts to provide the insight as a revelation of Himself.

It must not be assumed that the creative conflict model is the only way in which teaching and learning can take place. It is a model derived from Luther's experience and theology and has creative insight and interpretation as its purpose. However, as Koestler indicates, creative insight takes place through the bisociation of two previously unrelated matrices. This means that the positive matrix of God's action in Jesus Christ needs to be available if it is to bisociate with the negative matrix of God's judgment. Matrices can be learned in a number of ways and many different models for the learning of matrices can be employed in the Christian community. There are at least four different sources of learning models according to Joyce and Weil in Models of Teaching.[26] 'Information Processing' is one source. Joyce and Weil describe six different models stemming from that source. The other sources are 'social interaction,' 'personal sources,' and 'behavior modification.' The creative conflict model, though not mentioned by Joyce and Weil, would most likely fall into the category of 'personal sources.' The model in that category which most closely resembles the creative conflict model is the 'Synectics' model of William J. J. Gordon. At this point no evaluation is made concerning the appropriateness of any of these models for the learning of matrices in Christian Education. They are only included in order to indicate the number of possibilities.

The creative conflict model is presented in Figure 5. However, even though the Figure conveys a conciseness about the model, the reader must bear in mind all that has been said about flexibility in the use of the model.

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[26] Bruce Joyce and Marsha Weil, Models of Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972).

Teacher Only	Teacher and Learners	Learners Only	Teacher and Learners
a. Diagnosis of conflict appropriate to learners. b. Conflict statement of opposing forces. c. Examination of full dimensions of conflict. d. Selection of medium incorporating the conflict. e. Questions related to conflict medium. (Above the conscious level.)	Step 1 - Conflict. a. Presentation of conflict medium. b. Questions that examine conflict medium. c. Discussion of conflict in social areas. d. Discussion of conflict in personal life. Sharpen conflict in relation to God.		Step 4 - Interpretation. Opportunity for learners to express insight and test validity.
(Below the conscious level.)		Step 2 - Resignation. Time for other levels of the mind to deal with conflict. Step 3 - Insight. Occurence of insight, revelation, bisociation.	

Figure 5. Creative Conflict Teaching-Learning Model

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As stated earlier, timing, or the 'when' of Christian Education, follows logically from the creative conflict model of process because the model focuses on learner's time. The learner's time is of paramount importance for the model since it begins with the determination of conflicting spiritual, intrapersonal and interpersonal forces already existent in the life of the learner. The learner's time, however, is not to be divorced from the other 'times.' Wyckoff indicates that the other 'times' to be considered are occasional (or situational) time, church's time, and God's time. Occasional (or situational) time is related to the learner's time since such 'time' is the historical and social context which precipitates many of the conflicts which the learner experiences. It is also the arena in which the dimension of ultimacy or the reality of God is present, even though often unrecognized. The church's time is also related to the learner's time since it is in the context of the Christian community that the matrices of God's negative judgment and positive promise are learned as well as the Christian symbolic language which is used to express these matrices. The church, in its confrontation with the social and historical context, its determination of the will of God for it in that context, and its faithful response in worship, nurture, witness and service, involves the learner in many of the conflicting forces facing the community and the individual. The church is thus the context in which creative learning can take place. The final aspect of timing, God's time, refers to the presence and action of God in all of life. What He has done in the past is revealed in Scripture but He continues to act in law and Gospel in human existence, facing men with His ultimate demands but finally revealing Himself as One who forgives and reconciles.

In relation to learner's time, there are two limitations to the use of a creative conflict model with young children. Since the act of bisociation requires two matrices of thought, it is necessary for the learners to be mature enough mentally to have conceptual frameworks which can interact. It is not until the age of eleven or so that Piaget indicates a child reaches the stage of formal operational thought. Goldman has found that religious thinking lags behind everyday thought since it is 'secondary,' i.e., it uses analogy, metaphor and simile built on everyday experience, thought, and language.[27] In view of these considerations it may not be possible to use a creative conflict model until the age of twelve or thirteen. Another limitation concerns the social and moral immaturity of young children. They must have had time to experience what it means to be human and be able to reflect on that experience. As Goldman says:

> Yet until some such reflection at a personal level is achieved, the major insights of the Christian

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[27] Ronald Goldman, Readiness for Religion (New York: The Seabury Press, 1970), p. 33.

> faith cannot be grasped. The key to the relationship of love between man and God, and between man and man is in the hands of the child who has experienced what it is to be loved, or to have lost love, who has come face to face with himself in the demands of social living. Deeper still is the experience of redemptive need, to be saved from oneself to realistic awareness of one's own nature. It is the sheer moral inexperience of the young which makes them unaware of the real issues of life.[28]

Thus the moral immaturity of young children as well as the lack of conceptual ability indicates that the use of a creative conflict model might well be reserved until junior high age.

The priority of learner's time indicates that learners are the key people in the Christian Education enterprise. But they are the primary focus only if there are sensitive and supportive teachers involved. The teachers must be sensitive to the conflicts inherent in the lives of the learners. They must be able to determine what conflicts are appropriate for the learners. This is accomplished by being with and listening to the learners as they express the existential conflicts they feel. However, the learners are not the only source of understanding the conflicts appropriate to their age and situation. Teachers have other sources through knowledge of developmental patterns, of the socio-cultural milieu and of the will of God for the Christian community in that milieu. From these sources teachers come to realize that there are conflicts with which the learners must consciously deal even if they have only been vaguely sensed or consciously repressed. Thus teachers may be called 'responsible interveners' into the lives of learners since they bring to consciousness conflicts which individuals as well as the Christian community must face. One test of being a responsible intervener is the test of personal experience. If the teacher has experienced and dealt with the conflict, it also has validity for the learners in most cases. If the teacher has not experienced the conflict, it is best not to raise it in the life of the learners.

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[28] _Ibid._, p. 35.

In guiding the learners through the experience of creative conflict teachers must be sensitive to the direction of the discussion and enable the learners to become personally involved and able to state the conflict in terms of their own existence. Teachers must also be careful not to push for a resolution before the learners have actually experienced an insight which constructively resolves the conflict. Finally, teachers provide a context for the interpretation of the insights, allowing the group to test them for validity without requiring conformity to previous interpretations. Implicit throughout this discussion is the willingness of the learners to deal with conflicts inherent in their own existence. This takes time, experience, and support from the teachers and the community. Learners conditioned to learn and repeat traditional interpretations will hesitate to deal with conflicts in a way that can lead to creative insights and revised interpretations. The experience can be threatening at first. Teachers must take this into account and allow the learners to proceed at their own pace even while continuing to encourage them to deal constructively with their conflicts. This again emphasizes the need for flexibility in the use of the creative conflict model.

In order for learners and teachers to deal with conflicts creatively they need the context of a Christian community which is appreciative of the value of learning through creative conflict and supportive of its members as they struggle to resolve conflicts. However, the Christian community should not only be supportive of its members, it should also be actively engaged in a ministry to its historical and social context as it faithfully seeks to do the will of God in the world. An isolated and protective Christian community results only in repetition of past interpretations with no growth through creative conflict and insight for the members individually or the church corporately. When the Christian Church is actively engaged in the world and struggling with the conflicts raised through confrontation and involvement, creative conflicts and insights can occur, new interpretations be formulated, and more faithful ways of living enacted. There is another important facet of the context which must be acknowledged if the conflicts, insights, and interpre-

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tations are to be 'Christian.' As mentioned in the discussion of the church's time, the Christian community is the context in which God's expectations and demands as well as His forgiveness and acceptance in Jesus Christ are learned in the symbolic language of the community. Thus when conflicts result in new insights, the insights will be appropriated as a revelation of God as One who forgives, accepts and reconciles in Jesus Christ and the interpretation will be couched in the language of the Christian community. This relates the learner's experience to the past experience of God by the Christian community and reinforces the presence of God in the individual and corporate life of the community in the present.

The inductive approach to the presentation of principles leads to the final pair of closely related principles, scope and purpose. The 'what' of Christian Education necessary for learning through creative conflict encompasses all the intrapsychic conflicts in human existence in their spiritual, personal and social dimensions. Another way of stating the scope is to speak of conflicts in relation to God, self, church and others. This latter statement makes a distinction between those who are members of the Christian community and those who are not. The value of this distinction lies in the recognition of the different communities in which the Christian lives and the fact that both of them affect the learner in unique ways, the church in its challenge to faithful ministry and its support while dealing with the conflicts raised by such a challenge, and the non-Christian community with the conflicts raised through involvement in its problems and structures. Still it must be recognized that all the relationships of scope are interrelated. Involvement in social relationships inside and outside the church as well as the dynamics of personal development and growth lead to conflicts which ultimately confront the learner with Him who stands over against men and yet, finally, reveals Himself as being for, not against, His creatures.

The statement of purpose, or the 'why' of Christian Education, includes all of the relationships of scope and the anticipated outcome in the learners in relation to each. A comprehensive statement of purpose usually includes these two dimensions. However, the following statement of purpose is inclusive of even more of the principles than scope. Explicitly or implicitly it is inclusive of all the principles which have been presented. Besides scope, it explicitly includes the principles of context, personnel (especially the learner), and process. Implicitly, it includes timing. Because of its inclusiveness it serves as a summary and generalization for the inductive approach followed in this section and as a starting point for structuring teaching-learning situations in the future.

> The purpose of Christian Education is that learners, within the context of the Christian community, become increasingly aware of the internal conflicts caused by participation in personal and social existence, more actively struggle with these conflicts

> until they experience God's negation of their efforts, more frequently experience constructive resolution of the conflicts through creative insights into God's positive purpose in their lives, and be more able to interpret and act upon the meaning and significance of those insights for their own existence, the Christian community, and society.

With this purpose in mind, a teacher becomes sensitive to and alert for expressions of the conflicts indicated in the scope. When any of the spiritual, intrapersonal or interpersonal conflicts become evident the teacher can help the learners deal with them through the creative conflict model of learning.

When the teacher arrives at the point of preparing a curriculum based on the preceding principles, a decision regarding an organizing principle becomes necessary. An organizing principle indicates how the six principles are integrated in order to guide curriculum planning. The organizing principle shows how the process of learning is to be implemented using relevant timing by the persons involved in the context so that the scope is encompassed and the purpose accomplished. Another way of stating the function of the organizing principle is to say that it is the underlying logic which determines where the curriculum planner is to begin, how he is to proceed and where he is to end the plan. A curriculum using the afore-mentioned principles very obviously requires an organizing principle that begins with the spiritual, intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts appropriate to the lives of the learners and deals with them in the sequence of the creative conflict model. More traditional organizing principles in Christian Education rely on a logic outside the learner to order the sequence of learning, for example, Bible or church history (a chrono-logic), or systematic theology (a theo-logic), while the organizing principle proposed here relies on what is appropriate to the learner (a psycho-logic). However, the emphasis on a psycho-logic does not mean that the conflicts are only those stemming from the internal growth dynamics of the learner but also from the learners relation to persons within and outside the Christian community and from his relation to God. Such an organizing principle also does not mean isolation of the learner from the Christian community or from God. Such isolation would mean the learning is not Christian. It does mean beginning with the learner and his conflicts and guiding him through the creative conflict model so that he utilizes the theological and human resources of the Christian community and arrives at a constructive resolution to his conflicts in a positive relation to God. There is no doubt that construction of a curriculum utilizing such an organizing principle is a challenging and difficult task.

Critique of Other Principles of Christian Education in Lutheranism

Some educators within Lutheranism have made a study of Lutheran theology and determined principles for Christian Education stemming from such study. Other educators have been responsible for the construction of Christian Education curricula and have devised principles which guided them in the production of those curricula. Of those who have made a study of Lutheran theology and its implications for Christian Education, Lloyd Sheneman and Stephen Schmidt are two of the most prominent. Both have already been mentioned in the first section of this chapter. Sheneman's study, "The Teaching Ministry of the Church and the Law-Gospel Distinction," was written as a doctoral dissertation for the Yale Divinity School in 1964. A summary of the differences between Sheneman's study and this one indicates that Sheneman used the theology of Gustaf Wingren as his theological base and related it to the 'two foci' or 'community' theory of education rather than using Luther's experience and theology and correlating it with social psychological positions. He concluded that learning as a human enterprise prepares for and responds to the Gospel. Therefore, many learning theories are compatible with the law-Gospel distinction. He did not conclude that there is a learning process of creative conflict implicit in Lutheran theology and that it is the one most compatible with Lutheran theology.[29] Stephen Schmidt was also mentioned in the first section of this chapter. Schmidt uses Law and Gospel as his basic Lutheran theological stance. He says, "The structure of Lutheranism is the understanding of existence as death and the Gospel of Jesus as life."[30] He states that such a theology requires "a curriculum which raises the ultimate religious questions," and, "educational environments which encourage difficult and controversial questions."[31] Contained in those remarks are implications for the scope and context of Christian Education. He becomes explicit about context and personnel when he says that "Our classrooms must reflect creative possibilities where children face each other, eye to eye," and require "teachers who will be open to newness, first to themselves and then to their pupils."[32] Of greater interest is Schmidt's conclusion regarding the process of Christian Education. As indicated previously, he attempts to correlate Granger Westberg's pastoral counseling model with Lutheran theology and arrive at a Lutheran teaching model. He does not reveal his method of correlation, however. Westberg's counseling model involves the following sequence: (s) Crisis - Need; (2) Despair, Identity Crisis; (3) Helpfulness! Therapy; (4) New Insight; (5) New Way of Life.[33] Schmidt then proposes a Lutheran teaching model involving the following steps: (1) Approach (Law, crisis); (2) Curriculum experience (life, newspaper, Bible event, media, etc.); (3) Sharing: Who Am I? (around curriculum event); (4) Gospel (What God has done, group process, confession-absolution); (5) New Ways to celebrate.[34] In a later revision of the model, Schmidt shortens the steps in the sequence to crisis, encounter (data), dialogue (confession and absolution), and response (freedom).[35]

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[29] *Supra*, p. 270.

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[30] Schmidt, "Teaching the Faith: On Edge of the 70's," p. 3.

[31] Ibid., pp. 3 and 4.

[32] Ibid., p. 4.

[33] Ibid.

Stephen Schmidt's principles differ from the ones proposed in this dissertation in several ways. In the first place, they are not derived from an analysis of Luther's own experience and theology, but from Law and Gospel theology in general, especially as interpreted by Werner Elert. Secondly, they did not involve a correlation with social psychological theories dealing with intrapsychic conflict. As a result, Schmidt does not have an understanding of the learning process in terms of creative intrapsychic conflict. The teaching-learning model presented in this dissertation includes a greater understanding of the internal dynamics involved in creative learning. However, Schmidt's attempt to derive educational principles consistent with Lutheran theology is the most recent and fruitful study known to this writer.

Those who have been responsible for the construction of Christian Education curricula in Lutheran Churches have made little, if any, attempt to work out principles consistent with Luther's experience and theology. In the Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod, for instance, the teaching model employed by educators in the early decades of this century was that of Johann Friedrich Herbart. As Schmidt notes, Herbart's five steps were well suited to teach an intellectual theology. The five steps were; preparation, presentation, assimilation, generalization, and application.[36] These steps were used for the presentation of a systematic body of factual content. Basically, it is an 'information processing' model. Things have changed in the Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod with the introduction in 1971 of the Mission:Life curriculum. However, an analysis of its principles reveals that they are not based on Luther's experience and theology and differ in significant ways from the principles presented in this dissertation. Each of the principles of Mission:Life will be presented and analyzed. Since the drafters of the educational principles for Mission: Life did not state their principles in the same categories that Wyckoff uses, various foundational writings related to Mission:Life were examined for statements that set forth the substance of the principles. Thus the principles listed below come from several sources.

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[34] _Ibid_., p. 5.

[35] Schmidt, "Teaching the Faith: Models and Methods."

The first principle, that of purpose, for Mission:Life is stated as follows:

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[36] Schmidt, "Teaching the Faith: On Edge of the 70's," p. 2.

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> The objective of our Christian education program is that,
> through the Word and Spirit of God, the individual
> may know God, especially His seeking and forgiving
> love in Christ, may respond in faith
> and grow up into Christian maturity;
>
> and that as the individual sees himself a reconciled,
> redeemed child of God and member of Christ's body,
> the church, he may live happily in peace with God,
> himself, and his fellowmen,
> and may express his joy in worship of God
> and in loving service to others;
> and that in love of God he may value all of God's
> creative work in His world and church,
> may participate actively in God's mission
> to the church and the world,
> and live in the Christian hope.[37]

The important terms in the first part of this statement of purpose are 'know' and 'respond.' The use of the term 'know' implies a highly cognitive learning process. It implies more of an information processing model than one of creative conflict. And, although the individual is to 'respond' in faith, there is no indication of the way in which that response is triggered. The second and longer part of the statement is helpful in spelling out the relationships of life and the nature of the response to each. However, there is no indication that each of these relationships also causes conflict and a positive response is possible only when the conflict is creatively resolved. In theological terms, there is no indication of the dialectic of Law and Gospel expressed in this statement of purpose.

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[37] Board of Parish Education, *Design for Mission: Life* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1970), p. 27.

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The next principle of Mission:Life is that of scope. The scope of Christian Education involves the person's relationships to God, Bible, Church, Others, World and Self.[38] The relationships mentioned in this statement of scope are the vital ones affected by Christian Education. One of them, the Bible, is out of place since it is a means toward the end of affecting relationships and not an end in itself. As mentioned in the discussion on purpose, there is no indication that each of these relationships is a cause for conflict as well as an occasion for constructive response.

The principle of context for Mission:Life is stated as follows:

> The context in which man's restoration takes place is the church, which includes children and youth. The church is the body of Christ, all its members. A fundamental truth regarding the church is that teaching is an essential function of the church (Matt. 28: 19-20). This teaching consists not merely in transmission of information but especially in relationships and in the fostering of the doing of God's Word (I Cor. 12: Eph. 4, etc.). As God's people study and learn the Word of the Scriptures, declare their faith to one another, and apply the Gospel to their present life and world, Christian education is in process.[39]

The principle of context, as stated here, is helpful in denying that teaching is merely the transmission of information and in high-lighting the necessity of supportive relationships and the 'doing of God's Word.' However, the statement makes no mention of the church confronting its historical and social context, sensitizing its members to the internal conflicts precipitated by such confrontation, and supporting them in working through the conflicts to new insights and interpretations. The process outlined in the statement merely indicates the learning of Scripture, a declaration of faith, and the application of the Gospel.

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[38] Frederick A. Meyer and Harold W. Rast, Foundations for Christian Education (St. Louis: Board of Parish Education, The Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod, 1971), pp. 28-32.

[39] Board of Parish Education, p. 32.

Two statements from Design for Mission: Life speak of the principle of personnel.

> The learner is usually a Christian who has a measure of God's Spirit within him. And the teacher is a witnessing believer who is in a loving servant relation to fellow members of Christ's body.[40]

The other statement is:

> Learning depends largely on the quality of relationships. The leader, teacher, communicator, and his expressions and responses are highly important in Christian education.[41]

The stress is again on the relationships between teacher and learner but there is little evidence as to how the relationships are to help educationally. The same criticism about relationships can be repeated here as was stated in the comments on context. What was said there about the church's role regarding conflict can be repeated here regarding the teacher's role as agent of the church. The experience of the learner should be added here. He should be helped to become aware of internal conflicts and guided in reaching creative insights through the Spirit of God.

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[40] Ibid., p. 38.

[41] Ibid., p. 43.

A statement of the principle of process is found in a pamphlet written by Delbert Schulz, one of the architects of Mission:Life.

> Learning takes place as learners listen, explore, discover, and appropriate or internalize their discoveries. Too often Christian educators assume that exploration and discovery are unnecessary. . . . But Christian educators will have to allow the learner to explore and discover even if it seems risky to let him ask questions and probe for solutions.[42]

This statement of process is much like that of the learning model utilized in the Cooperative Curriculum Project.[43] The steps in the learning process outlined here - listening, exploring, discovering, and appropriating - allow for the possibility of learning by creative conflict but there is no specific mention of the way in which 'discovery' and 'appropriation' take place. The model is also inadequate as a teaching model since there are no indications of what the teacher is to do to facilitate learning. A final observation is that this description of the learning process seems inconsistent with the statement of purpose in which knowing and responding imply an information processing model

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[42] Delbert Schulz, A New Curriculum for the Church (St. Louis: Board of Parish Education, the Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod, n.d.), p. 11.

[43] Cooperative Curriculum Project, A Design for Teaching--Learning (St. Louis: Bethany Press, 1967), p. 33. Definite similarities can also be noted between the Cooperative Curriculum Project's statements of purpose and scope and those of Mission:Life.

Three short paragraphs from Design for Mission:Life speak of the principle of timing.

> Today the concern is for insight into a significant issue of life and openess to discovery of new aspects of truth. The personal interest and active involvement of the learner in the matter under study is valued and fostered, and a greater variety of approaches to a question or subject is likely to be used.
>
> Awareness of the importance of the individual as a person also has grown in recent years. This has led to a growing interest in the psychology of interpersonal relations, the personal touch, and group dynamics.
>
> Are these trends applicable to religious education? Very much so. The God-intended nature of the church calls for a focus on the Word of truth, especially the Gospel-life significance of that which is being studied. It also requires the personal interest, involvement, understanding, and participation of the learner in the meaning of the Word under consideration. A mere passive assent to what is taught in the church will not lead to a vigorous personal faith and Christian life.[44]

This statement of timing is very good in its emphasis on the learner's time. There are implications for learning by creative conflict when it is stated that there is a "concern for insight into a significant issue of life and openess to discovery of new aspects of truth." Also important is the statement that the God-intended nature of the church "requires the personal interest, involvement, understanding, and participation of the learner in the meaning of the Word under consideration." There is, however, no indication of how that interest, involvement, understanding and participation takes place. It must be assumed that it takes place through the learning model stated in the principle of process. If it were not for the other principles of Mission:Life surrounding this statement of timing, much of what is said here could be incorporated into the timing principle for a model of creative conflict. Therefore, this statement of timing does not seem totally consistent with the principles of purpose and context for Mission:Life since it emphasizes the learner and implies a learning process not evident in those previous principles.

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[44] Board of Parish Education, p. 39.

A statement of organizing principle is found in Meyer and Rast's, Foundations for Christian Education.

> The church school child lives concurrently in several relationships. Although these relationships may be identified in various ways, the authors have selected those indicated in the diagram below (God, Bible, Church, Others, World, Self). They believe Christian education should be organized around the Christian child-in-relationship principle.[45]

The "Christian child-in-relationship" principle is a good one. It emphasizes the learner and the relationships in which he is involved. It is consistent with the principles of purpose and scope in naming those relationships. However, it does not point out that those relationships cause conflict in the life of the learner, conflict which needs to be creatively resolved, interpreted, and acted upon. This makes it inconsistent with the organizing principle derived from Luther's experience and theology. In sum, the principles of Mission:Life seem derived from a number of sources and not from a serious examination of Luther's experience and theology, a theology to which Lutheran educators are ostensibly committed.

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[45] Meyer and Rast, pp. 27-28.

The American Lutheran Church and the Lutheran Church in America also do not seem to be consistent with Lutheran theology in their educational principles. These two bodies are working on a new curriculum. Their statement of purpose for the curriculum is:

> The central objective for educational ministry in
> The American Lutheran Church and the Lutheran Church
> in America shall be
> to assist persons
> to perceive, respond to, and participate in
> God's continuing activity and revelation,
> particularly in Jesus Christ,
> in the human and Christian communities
> as they deal with their continual life involvements of
> being a person,
> relating to persons and groups, and
> living in society, culture and the physical universe.[46]

First of all, it is possible to gain some clue to the theological basis of this statement by examining the phrase, "God's continuing activity and revelation, particularly in Jesus Christ, in the human and Christian communities." John H. Reumann, refers to this theology as a 'tradition-history' theology. Reumann, in an article commenting on the statement of objective, points out that there are other theological approaches that can also be considered. They are; 'heilsgeschichte,' 'cosmic' theology, and 'existential' theology. It is the latter which is most closely akin to Luther's theology and yet Reumann notes that it "ironically, has seldom received much conscious endorsement in official Lutheran circles."[47] If Luther's experience and theology had been the theological basis for the American Lutheran Church and Lutheran Church in America statement of objective it would have more closely resembled the statement of objective presented in this dissertation. Nonetheless, the emphasis on perception, response, and participation allows for the possibility of a creative conflict model of learning. It is also possible that the 'continual life involvements' of persons in the relationships mentioned implies a consciousness of the conflicts caused by involvement in those relationships. However, there is no indication that such a learning process is what the drafters of the statement had in mind. All in all, this statement of principle does not appear to be based on Luther. One can only hope that Luther's experience and theology and the educational principles derived from it will not only receive official endorsement in Lutheran churches but also

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[46] C. Richard Evenson, editor, Foundations for Educational Ministry, Yearbooks in Christian Education, III (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), p. 301

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[47] John H. Reumann, "God's Activity," in Foundations for Educational Ministry, edited by C. Richard Evenson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), p. 67.

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significantly affect the practice of Christian Education in those churches in the future.

APPENDIX A

When Prophecy Fails[1]

The prophecy that failed was that of Mrs. Marian Keech of Lake City. But even though her prophecy was disconfirmed by the failure of its fulfillment, she and the group around her remained committed to it. They also attempted to convince others of the truth of her prophecy. The authors list five conditions that cause increased fervor even in the face of disconfirmation.

> 1. A belief must be held with deep conviction and it must have some relevance to action, that is, to what the believer does or how he behaves.
> 2. The person holding the belief must have committed himself to it; that is, for the sake of his belief, he must have taken some important action that is difficult to undo. In general, the more important such actions are, and the more difficult they are to undo, the greater is the individual's commitment to the belief.
> 3. The belief must be sufficiently specific and sufficiently concerned with the real world so that events may unequivocally refute the belief.
> 4. Such undeniable disconfirmatory evidence must occur and must be recognized by the individual holding the belief.
> 5. The individual believer must have social support. It is unlikely that one isolated believer could withstand the kind of disconfirming evidence we have specified. If, however, the believer is a member of a group of convinced persons who can support one another, we would expect the belief to be maintained and the believers to attempt to proselyte or to persuade nonmembers that the belief is correct.[2]

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[1] Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter, When Prophecy Fails (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1956).

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

Mrs. Marian Keech had deep convictions and she was able to gather around her a small group of committed people. She claimed to receive messages from extra-terrestrial Guardians, representatives of a higher order of life. One of those creatures, Sananda, was the special messenger to Mrs. Keech. She wrote down everything he communicated to her. The most startling message she received involved the flooding of a vast amount of the world on December 21. Prior to that time the believers would be rescued and taken away in flying saucers. Over a period of months a small group of people came to believe Marian Keech and committed themselves in unalterable ways. Dr. Thomas Armstrong, Edna Post, and Kitty O'Donnell all resigned from or lost their jobs because of their commitment. Others committed themselves in less drastic, but equally unalterable ways. The group around Mrs. Keech was never large. The core group in Lake City consisted of eleven persons. In another town, Collegeville, there were six more committed people. This latter group was comprised largely of students at the college where Dr. Armstrong had worked in the college health services.

That there were disconfirmations of the beliefs of the group cannot be doubted. The authors note that there were a series of them over a period of several days.

> The first disconfirmation occurred on December 17, and the series came to an end at 5:00 a.m. on the morning of December 21. During this time there were

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> three specific and unequivocal disconfirmations and a strong attack against the key points in the ideology.[3]

The first disconfirmation occurred on Friday, December 17. Sometime before noon on that day, Marian Keech received a phone call from a man who said he was from outer space. He informed her that a saucer would land in her back yard at 4:00 p.m. that afternoon. The believers prepared themselves for the pick-up, waiting on the back porch for the arrival of the flying saucer. By 4:10 p.m., Marian Keech returned to the living room. By 5:30 p.m., the rest gave up and returned to the living room.

> There was almost no discussion of the matter among the believers. . . . Instead Marian sat for a message and received one that made her weep because it bore such glad tidings. Sananda informed her that when the group was picked up she would return to 'the Father's house' and need not come back to earth again.[4]

But the group still had to come to terms with the disconfirmation. The understanding that the group finally agreed upon was the the incident was a practice session. A noticeable change after the disconfirmatory event was the willingness of Mrs. Keech and Dr. Armstrong, the two principal believers, to spend time with the press and the public in an attempt to persuade and convince them of the truth of the prophecy.

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[3] Ibid., p. 139.

[4] Ibid., p. 140.

At midnight that same day, Friday, December 17, Mrs. Keech received a message that a flying saucer was on the way to her back yard to pick up the chosen ones. The group of believers hurriedly went into the yard and waited in the cold and snow. By 3:20 a.m., everyone was back in the house. There were only sketchy attempts to explain the disconfirmation. Everyone went to bed cold and exhausted. On the next day, Saturday, they decided that the event had been another drill. That did not entirely satisfy them, so they decided to keep the event secret. However, the group was very open to reporters and others on Saturday.

> The believers were beginning to see the advantages of publicity in bringing people to the house whom they could attempt to persuade and convert. . . . The need for social support following the disconfirmation on Friday was very strong.[5]

On Saturday Marian Keech received another message from Sananda that bolstered her hopes. He said that he had never been tardy, never kept them waiting nor disappointed them. The group had a visit from five young men on Saturday evening who were regarded as spacemen come to test the strength of the believers. The five young men spent more than two hours in the house, mostly in private and earnest conversation with Mrs. Keech or Dr. Armstrong. Both were convinced that they had been tested by spacemen and had emerged triumphant. Mrs. Keech asked for and got a standing vote of confidence from the group.

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[5] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

> It seems probable that this episode finally enabled the group to recover from the effects of the Friday night disconfirmation. In effect, the spacemen had come. It was simply that they had come Saturday night instead of Friday night.[6]

Sunday passed without further messages but on Monday morning, December 20, Mrs. Keech received a message that said the whole group would be picked up and put on board a flying saucer at midnight. As the hour approached, the group of believers waited tensely in the living room of the Keech home. The hour of midnight came and went.

> One might have expected some visible reaction. Midnight had passed and nothing had happened. The cataclysm itself was less than seven hours away. But there was little to see in the reactions of the people in the room. There was no talking, no sound. People sat stock still, their faces seemingly frozen and expressionless. Mark Post was the only person who moved. He lay down on the sofa and closed his eyes but did not sleep. Later, when spoken to, he answered monosyllabically but otherwise lay immobile. The others showed nothing on the surface although it became clear later that they had been hit hard.[7]

The group of believers remained awake and some began discussing the meaning of the event, but nothing really satisfied them. At about 4:45 a.m., Marian once more summoned everyone to the living room announcing that she had just received a message. She read the words she had written.

> For this day is it established that there is but one God of Earth, and He is in thy midst, and from his hand thou has written these words. And mighty is the word of God - and by his word have ye been saved -

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[6] Ibid., p. 155.

[7] Ibid., p. 163.

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> for from the mouth of death have ye been delivered and at no time has there been such a force loosed upon the Earth. Not since the beginning of time upon this Earth has there been such a force of Good and Light as now floods this room and that which has been loosed within this room now floods the entire Earth. As thy God has spoken through the two who sit within these walls has he manifested that which he has given thee to do.[8]

This message was received with enthusiasm by the group. The cataclysm had been called off because the little group had spread so much light that God determined to prevent the destruction of the world. Two more messages followed in rapid order. One was to serve as an introduction to the above message and the other gave it the title, "The Christmas Message to the People of the Earth," indicating that the message was to be distributed as widely as possible. Most of the believers in the group were jubilant, although one weakly committed member left. The others called the newspapers, wire services, and any others they could contact.

It was evident, though, that there was still discomfort as the result of the disconfirmation. Mrs. Keech sought guidance from any and every source, including the observers who were part of the group and were trying to be as unobtrusive as possible. She received a message that she would be able to tape-record the chorus of the extra-terrestrial Losolo University. However, the tape proved to be blank when played back. She also received a message that the entire group was to gather outside the Kreech home on December 23, at 6:00 p.m., and sing Christmas carols. Spacemen in flying saucers would visit them. The event was given much publicity and a large crowd gathered. It was an obvious bid for support but it accomplished the opposite result when there was no extra-terrestrial visitation.

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

The effects of disconfirmation on the Lake City group are summarized by the authors as follows:

> We find that, of the eleven members of the Lake City group who faced unequivocal disconfirmation, only two, Kurt Freund and Arthur Bergen, both of whom were lightly committed to begin with, completely gave up their belief in Mrs. Keech's writings. Five members of the group, the Posts, the Armstrongs, and Mrs. Keech, all of whom entered the pre-cataclysm period strongly convinced and heavily committed, passed through this period of disconfirmation and its aftermath with their faith firm, unshaken and lasting. Cleo Armstrong and Bob Eastman, who had come to Lake City heavily committed but with their conviction shaken by Ella Lowell, emerged from the disconfirmation of December 21 more strongly convinced than before; Cleo's change of heart seems to have lasted while Bob's may have been temporary. Bertha Blatsky and Clyde Wilton started out with some doubts. They reacted to disconfirmation by persisting in their doubts and admitting their disillusionment and confusion, but still not completely disavowing Mrs. Keech and her particular beliefs. We have noted that both Clyde and Bertha were forced to face disconfirmation in isolation and have suggested that this factor may account for the sharp contrast between their reactions and those of Cleo and Bob.[9]

Along with the continued commitment of this group was a willingness to seek social support for their beliefs. The believers sought publicity, began personal proselytizing, practiced openness instead of secrecy, and persisted in making predictions.

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 208.

The effects of the disconfirmation on the Collegeville group, removed as they were from the support group, were quite different from the effects on the Lake City group. Of the six people, mostly college students, who had been part of the Collegeville group, three gave up their beliefs, two became more doubtful, and only one, after a period of skepticism, maintained faith. Susan Heath, the one who remained faithful, was the only one of the Collegeville group who was with another member of the group at the time of the disconfirmation on December 21. The authors comment:

> In summary, the effect of disconfirmation on the individuals from Collegeville about whom we have data was (with the exceptions noted) to decrease conviction and either to have no effect on proselytizing or to inhibit it. . . . Thus most of the Collegeville group reduced the dissonance created by the disconfirmation through giving up belief, whereas in Lake City the members held fast and tried to create a supportive circle of believers.[10]

The authors conclude that the evidence from the Keech group strongly supports the contention that the support of others is needed to maintain belief in the face of disconfirmation. Without that support, the tendency is to reduce dissonance through giving up the belief.

The group around Mrs. Keech did not last long. Complaining neighbors threatened to bring legal action against

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[10] Ibid., p. 227.

Mrs. Keech. This so frightened her that she and the others disbanded. Mrs. Keech joined a dianetics center in Arizona. Dr. Armstrong became a peripatetic lecturer on flying saucers, extra-terrestrial worlds, and other phenomena. The others faded back into life in various ways.

APPENDIX B

The Robbers Cave Experiment[1]

The Robbers Cave Experiment was carried out with a selected group of twelve-year-old boys who were at a Boy Scouts of America camp adjacent to Robbers Cave State Park in southeastern Oklahoma. Twenty-four boys were screened for common background, normal home and school experiences and common educational level. This eliminated problem cases and ruled out extraneous factors that might affect the experiment. One group of twelve boys arrived at the camp a day ahead of the other group. This group, which came to be known as the Rattlers, began the activities through which the experimenters hoped to form an in-group with its definite structures and norms. The other group arrived a day later to begin the same sort of activities. The latter group, the Eagles, did not know of the presence of the Rattlers so that their in-group formation might proceed as planned. The first phase of in-group formation lasted six days for the Rattlers and five days for the Eagles.[2]

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[1] Muzafer Sherif and others, *Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment* (Norman, Oklahoma: Institute of Group Relations, University of Oklahoma, 1961).

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

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Stage two of the experiment began when the two groups became aware of each other's presence. The friction phase of the inter-group relations began immediately with the boys challenging each other to a baseball game. The experimenters planned a tournament of competitive activities which would result in social distance and unfavorable stereotypes between the two groups. The tournament consisted of three baseball games, three tugs-of-war, three tent-pitching contests and a football game. In addition, there were activities which the counselors would score and thus be able to keep the cumulative scoring close. These activities included three cabin inspections, a show of skits and songs, and a treasure hunt.[3] Negative relations between the two groups grew. The Eagles burned the banner of the Rattlers after being defeated in the first baseball game. The next morning the Rattlers seized the Eagles' flag as the groups arrived at the field. Names were hurled between the two groups, raids were carried out on the respective cabins, and some scuffling and fighting occurred. The end result of the competition was that neither group wanted to have anything to do with the other under any circumstances. Whereas they had previously contented themselves with calling each other names like 'stinkers,' 'braggers,' 'sissies,' and the like, they now objected to eating in the same dining hall.[4]

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[3] _Ibid_., p. 99.

[4] _Ibid_., p. 111.

The next stage was an attempt to integrate the two groups. In the first part of this stage there was an attempt to integrate the groups through contact in mutually satisfying activities. It was hypothesized that such contact would not serve to integrate the groups. The two groups did such things as seeing a movie together and shooting off fireworks together. But they continued to shove each other in the dining hall line, throw paper, food, and names while they carried on their 'garbage wars.'

The principle hypothesis of the experiment was:

> When groups in a state of friction are brought into contact under conditions embodying superordinate goals, the attainment of which is compelling but which cannot be achieved by the efforts of one group alone, they will tend to cooperate toward the common goal.[5]

It was also hypothesized that a number of situations embodying superordinate goals would have a cumulative effect on reduction of tension between the two groups. In line with these hypotheses a number of situations were experimentally structured which embodied superordinate goals.

The first problem involved the water supply of the camp. The camp counselors shut off the valve and stuffed a faucet on the tank with packing. When the entire camp was without water the counselors had the boys divide into groups to search for the cause. All groups eventually met at the tank, having found nothing wrong with the pipes.

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[5] Ibid., p. 52.

When the boys discovered there was water in the tank they began to unplug the faucet. There was some cooperation among the boys in doing this. The Rattlers were also willing to let the Eagles drink first since they had been without water the longest. Some spontaneous horseplay followed the restoration of the water supply and this involved intermingling of the groups. But at supper the groups stuck together, called each other names, and threw things at one another. It was obvious that one situation embodying a superordinate goal was not enough to bring the groups together. A second situation was not sufficient either. The staff told the two groups that a movie both wanted to see could not be rented by the camp because of insufficient funds. If they wanted the movie, both groups would have to pitch in from their own funds. The groups voted to share the cost. The movie was shown. The groups remained divided in viewing it.

The camp counselors then planned an outing in which several situations embodying superordinate goals would be involved. After arriving at the lake site in separate trucks, the two groups were confronted by the fact that the truck which went to get their food had stalled. The other truck had been hidden out of sight by this time. A few boys suggested pushing the truck but that met with little success. One boy saw the rope used in the tug-of-war and suggested they pull the truck with it. The rope was looped over the bumper and boys got on both ends and pulled. There

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was some intermingling of boys on the two ends of the rope and a lot of back-slapping when the truck finally started. This was followed by a situation in which some decision had to be made about whether the food, which was in bulk, would be prepared for each group separately or whether they would prepare it jointly. Joint preparations began even before verbal discussion had reached any decision. Most retired to eat their food in the same groups as before, however. When it came time to pitch their tents the boys found that the accessories were so mixed up that they had to cooperate in sorting out the needed articles. This was done without any evident hostility between the groups. When the truck stalled again, the boys used the same rope to pull it and became thoroughly intermixed in the process.

A trip to the Arkansas border was the event that really precipitated conflict that called for an inter-group resolution. The counselors insisted that only the good truck could be used for the trip since the other one was unreliable. That left the Eagles without a truck for the trip. If the Rattlers went to Arkansas, the Eagles would have to wait around all morning until they could take the trip in the afternoon. The authors indicate the dilemma as follows:

> At one point, Clark (Eagle) said, "We could all go together," but Simpson (Rattler) said, "No" - that the Rattlers could go to Arkansas and the Eagles could go back to the camp. This discussion illustrates well the state of flux which prevailed at this time in intergroup affairs. At times, as at supper the previous evening, the group lines seemed to disappear; at others the group demarcations would re-appear.

> Whether or not group lines would be followed was coming to depend more and more on factors in the immediate situation (situational factors).[6]

There was more prolonged discussion on what to do. Mills, the Rattler leader, proposed they all go in the Rattler truck but Simpson, another Rattler, said, "Let's don't."

> Mills (R) now moved out of his group and paced up and down between the groups, explaining his ideas to both of them. When the staff asked what they were going to do, there was a general hub-bub which was resolved when Mills (R) and Clark (E) said, "Let's go!" and headed for the Rattler truck.[7]

The boys all piled into the one truck and enjoyed the trip together. They sang songs and generally interacted very well. During the trip, Craig (E) and Allen (R) suggested they all go back on the same bus when camp was over. Most of the boys approved but Harrison (R) muttered, "Let's go back the way we came." Mills (R) said nothing until he saw that the majority backed the idea, then he also agreed to it.

The last evening in camp indicated how well the situations embodying superordinate goals had functioned. The seating in the dining hall was mixed. The campfire afterwards was congenial. The boys took turns entertaining each other. All derogatory references were gone. There was still some resistance to the idea of going back on the same bus. When it was mentioned that all were going back together, someone was heard to mutter, "No, we're not." But, on the whole, the activities were marked by acceptance and mutual good-will. The authors note that,

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[6] Ibid., p. 175.

[7] Ibid., p. 177.

> The establishment of friendly relations between groups through functional interdependence in situations involving experimentally introduced goals was carried over (transferred) to spontaneous intergroup cooperation in a situation in which no superordinate goal was formally introduced.[8]

The camp ended with all of the boys going back on the same bus to Oklahoma City. The Rattlers showed their good will by spending the last of their prize money for the whole group, including the Eagles. There was little evidence of group awareness along the former lines of separation.

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[8] Ibid., p. 181.

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